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This dissertation examines psychoanalysis in a colonial context, tracing its history in 
early to mid-twentieth century India. A rich, neglected archive of diaries, letters, 
administrative documents, as well as psychoanalytical and literary writing in Bengali 
and English, are drawn on to offer an account of the Indian Psychoanalytical Society 
(est. 1921), and the anthropologists, doctors, army officers and political figures who 
were in different ways intimately involved with psychoanalysis. Reconstructing 
these narratives, and by means of a close reading of texts by Freud, I suggest that the 
understandings of temporality, sexuality and authority in Freudian psychoanalysis 
resist colonial discourses of progress and civilisation, notably in relation to the 
category of the ‘primitive’, thus frustrating attempts to appropriate the theory for 
colonial endeavours.  
 
In this thesis, psychoanalysis is both an object of historical study, and a form of 
questioning, part of colonial history and a body of writing and theory available for 
contested readings. I discuss writing by two colonial psychoanalysts, Lt. Colonel 
Claud Daly, and Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill, which combines an investment in 
psychoanalysis with commitment to Empire, based on a desire for all-knowing 
psychic and political mastery. In contrast, the memoirs of renowned psychoanalyst 
Wilfred Bion, recounting his childhood in India, are read for their more complex 
psychic register and anti-colonial strain. Records left by dream-collecting colonial 
administrators in the Naga Hills, and documents relating to the trial and ‘insanity 
plea’ of revolutionary nationalist Gopinath Saha, show us the historical operations of 
psychoanalysis in collective life. In addition, literary writing by the modernist poet 
H.D., Temsula Ao, Bankimcandra Chatterji, and Rabindranath Tagore, offers 
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Note on Translations and Abbreviations 
I have relied on the Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud for 
the English translations of Freud’s work, except in discussions that require a 
comparison with the German texts, or with other English translations. All Bengali 
texts are cited in English translation, though when required I provide my own 
translation of untranslated Bengali sources. 
 
The original and sometimes unorthodox syntax of the archival sources has been 
maintained. In all quotations and citations, spellings of proper names correspond to 
the form used in the source quoted.  
 
This dissertation is referenced in the format prescribed by the Chicago Manual of 
Style, but since most of the material quoted is either archival or literary, I have used 
square brackets to indicate all editorial interventions made by me, such as omitted 
text in quotations. The complete reference is provided in the first instance of citation, 
followed by shortened citations in subsequent citations. For archival sources, the full 
reference is provided for each citation, unless otherwise noted in the case of 
extensive quotations from the same source. The names of archives and their location 
are noted in full in the first instance of citation, and the following abbreviations are 
used thereafter: 
 
BPS: British Psychoanalytical Society 
IORPP: India Office Records and Private Papers 
NAI: National Archives of India 
NMML: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 
PRMC: Pitt Rivers Museum Collection 
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Some of the objects that populated Sigmund Freud’s consulting rooms in Bergasse 
19, Wien IX, came with him to London. When the most precious of these, the 
“famous collection of Greek and Egyptian antiquities” and other “Oriental treasures” 
arrived, the poet and novelist H.D. sent the Professor a bunch of gardenias to “greet 
the return of the Gods.”1 Freud, quoting this in his note of thanks, added, “other 
people read: Goods”.2 These objects, both the ones that were returned to the 
Professor, and the ones that were lost, made another journey, coming to inhabit 
H.D.’s memoir of her analysis with Freud. Here they have the dual status of “Gods 
or the Goods”.3 
These objects have an exceptional mobility in H.D.'s account. They are 
symbols, hold associations that she is invited to release, and are portals into other 
times. Time, like the objects, is also particularly mobile—both seeming to move into 
each other: “[l]ength, breadth, thickness, the shape, the scent, the feel of things. The 
actuality of the present, its bearing on the past, their bearing on the future”.4 A 
multiplicity of times and places co-exist and coalesce in the analytic room that H.D. 
describes. There is the present moment, in which she adjusts the rug or sneaks a look 
at her wristwatch. There is the childhood home evoked by the porcelain stove, which 
transforms Freud's room into her father's study. The objects and paintings sometimes 
stand for another, civilisational, time—but one that becomes part of the present again 
when it reappears as dream symbols discussed in analysis. And right outside the 
room, there is the historical moment, stacked with rifles on the street corner, 
scratched in chalk on the pavements. In H.D.'s analogy, time was like a room, with a 
fourth dimension to it: “described and elaborately tabulated in the Professor's 
volumes”.5 In the account of her analysis, she would represent an attempt to 
articulate a relationship to time, to find the time that she was living through. 
It is a moment of tension in the text, when Freud invites H.D. to look at the 
objects arranged on his desk: “I did not always know if the Professor's excursions 
with me into the other room were by way of distraction, actual social occasions, or 
                                                
1. H.D. (Hilda Dolittle) Tribute to Freud (Manchester: Carcanet, 1985), 11.  
2. H.D., Tribute ,11. 
3. H.D., Tribute ,11. 
4. H.D., Tribute ,23.  
5. H.D., Tribute, 23.		
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part of his plan”.6 In an exchange where all gestures and words seem more than 
usually weighted with meaning, H.D. describes herself drawn to the objects on the 
desk, while at the same time trying to think of an appropriate response to them. Her 
response is articulated within her reading of Freud's desire: “I wanted then, as at 
other times, to meet him halfway”.7 She picked a statuette of a Hindu god—(Vishnu, 
by her guess)—to comment upon, partly incorporated into her elaborate personal 
mythology because of the S-shaped serpents that formed a dome over the god's head 
in the statuette. She could not, however, easily take in the object or enter it: “this 
carved Indian ivory which compelled me, yet repelled me, at the same time”.8 Her 
expression of interest in it, despite her ambivalence towards it, was directed by her 
reading of its place at the centre of the semi-circle of objects—seen as a mark of its 
importance to Freud.  
This was desire predicated on an attempt to predict the desire of the other: the 
teacher, the master.  In this, H.D. seemed to fail. Freud, “barely glancing at the 
lovely object”, said that it was sent to him by his “Indian students”.9 He followed 
that with the remark: “On the whole, I think my Indian students have reacted in the 
least satisfactory way to my teaching”.10 It had then not been possible to meet him 
halfway. “So much for India, so much for his Indian students”, she wrote.11 In a 
gesture that seems to have an almost consolatory, restorative position in the text, 
right after this dismissal, Freud offers to H.D. a small statue of Athena (“He knew 
that I loved Hellas”).12 She had kept her place amongst his chosen students.13 
                                                
6. H.D., Tribute, 68.  
7. H.D., Tribute, 68.  
8. H.D., Tribute, 67.  
9. H.D., Tribute, 68.  
10. H.D., Tribute, 68.  
11. H.D., Tribute, 68.  
12. H.D., Tribute, 69.  
13. Mark Edmundson's account of Freud's last days also returns to this statuette of Athena:  
Marie Bonaparte, who sat on the stairs every day after Anna was arrested to make sure that 
the Gestapo did not come and take away the Professor, and who often seemed to know what 
Freud needed, sometimes better than he knew himself, soon smuggled away his favorite 
treasure: a bronze statue of Athena, a little more than four inches high. Athena's left hand is 
poised to grip a spear, which was lost; in her right hand she holds a libation bowl. She is 
wearing a Corinthian helmet, set far back on her brow, and a breastplate, decorated with the 
figure of Medusa, though in this rendition, Medusa is without her snakes. The statue had a 
special place in Freud's heart, symbolizing both wisdom and martial prowess; it was an icon 
of the mind as warrior, the intellect combatant. Marie Bonaparte held it for Freud at her 
home in Paris to present to him when he was finally free. 
The Death of Sigmund Freud (London: Bloomsbury, 2007),119. See also Stathis Gourgouris’ 
virtuosic reading of Freud’s 1936 essay “A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis” as revealing the 
fantasy of Greece/Hellas as a desire for civilisation, where Hellas is “a reality that is necessarily, 
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In fact the dissatisfaction with ‘India’ had a precedent. H.D. writes that after 
her first series of sessions with Freud, which began in March 1933 and lasted a few 
months, she did not plan on returning to Vienna for further analysis. It was news of 
the death of the patient who saw Freud in the analytic hour preceding hers that 
brought her back. H.D. saw this patient, Johannes Jacobus van der Leeuw, as the 
person who would inherit Freud’s work. As she put it to Freud: “I felt that you and 
your work and the future of your work were especially bequeathed to him. Oh, I 
know there is the great body of the Psycho-Analytic Association, research workers, 
doctors, trained analysts, and so on! But Dr. van der Leeuw was different.”14 In 
response, Freud said: “[y]ou have come to take his place.”15 H.D.’s account of van 
der Leeuw: “wealthy, influential, well-born. He owned vast plantations in the Dutch 
East Indies and had travelled in India for the purposes of occult investigation. He had 
contacted a teacher or young devotee there, had been influenced by the Eastern 
teaching, but that had not satisfied him” suggests that once again, the path to Freud 
was based on a dissatisfaction with, a dismissal of India.16 
A passionate aviator, van der Leeuw had been killed in a plane crash when he 
was flying back from Johannesburg. Freud had said that he, along with van der 
Leeuw, had been concerned with the possibility, the tendency of the aviator to fly too 
high, and too fast. His plane had crashed just as Freud was beginning to think he had 
“found a solution”.17 The aviator may have been afraid of flying too high, but in 
another context, Freud himself was perhaps afraid of diving too deep. William B. 
Parsons, a scholar of religion, has discussed how Freud cited Schiller’s poem “The 
Diver” when engaged by the Swiss poet Bruno Goetz in a conversation about 
Hinduism:  
 
The Bhagavad Gita is a great and profound poem with awful depths. “And 
still it lay beneath me hidden in purple darkness there” says Schiller’s diver, 
who never returns from his second brave attempt. If, however, without the 
                                                                                                                                     
constitutively, ideal”. “The Punishment of Philhellenism” in Dream Nation: Enlightenment, 
Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 123.	
14. H.D., Tribute, 6. 
15. H.D., Tribute, 6. 
16. H.D., Tribute, 5. J.J. van der Leeuw had been involved with the Theosophical Society, and the 
Indian philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurthy (who later broke away from the Theosophists). The 
Theosophical Publishing House printed van der Leeuw’s books The Fire of Creation; The Conquest 
of Illusion; and Gods in Exile.  
17. H.D., Tribute, 6. 
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aid of a clear intellect you become immersed in the world of the Bhagavad 
Gita, where nothing seems constant and everything melts into everything 
else, then you are suddenly confronted by nothingness. Do you know what it 
means to be confronted by nothingness? Do you know what that means?18  
 
Parsons notes that Freud cites the same poem when discussing the oceanic 
feeling in Civilization and its Discontents, in a passage that touches upon yoga and 
mysticism: “[i]t would not be hard to find connections here with a number of obscure 
modifications of mental life, such as trances and ecstasies. But I am moved to 
exclaim in the words of Schiller's diver: ‘…Es freue sich/ Wer da atmet im Rosigten 
Licht’.”19 There was something about mysticism, associated with the East, that Freud 
seemed to have wanted to keep at a remove from himself. 
The disappointment in, and repudiation of India in these instances is based on 
a slippage between India and a religion found to be unsatisfactory or frightening. 
This slide between India and spirituality also characterises much of the writing in 
two recent volumes on psychoanalysis in India: Vishnu on Freud’s Desk and Freud 
Along the Ganges, where it takes the form of a slippage between tradition and 
Hinduism, Sanskrit and India’s past. Jeffery M. Masson's “Sex and Yoga: 
Psychoanalysis and the Indian Religious Experience”, and Wendy Doniger's “When 
a Lingam is Just a Good Cigar: Psychoanalysis and Hindu Sexual Fantasies” do not 
shy away from the allure of the exotic.20 Masson advocates the use of psychoanalysis 
in studying Sanskrit texts, himself finding in them 'reaction formations' and 
'defences'. Doniger's argument is that the processes of signification that 
psychoanalysis describes are universal, even if the contents are not. In her reading of 
Freud, though, the symbol always hides something sexual, and this reading shapes 
                                                
18. William B. Parsons, “Freud’s Encounter with Hinduism: A Historical- textual Overview” in 
Vishnu on Freud’s Desk: A Reader in Psychoanalysis and Hinduism, ed. by T.G. Vaidyanathan and 
Jeffery J. Kripal  (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 44. “The Diver” is a poem that “recounts the 
successful dive of a page into a whirlpool to retrieve a golden goblet. Challenged to repeat the feat for 
the hand of the king’s daughter, he accepts, plunges in, and is not seen again. Much of the fame of the 
poem is due to the vivid rendering of the raging waves.” Henry and Mary Garland, “Der Tauscher” in 
The Oxford Companion to German Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 882. 
19. Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud in 24 vols, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1961), 72-73. “Let him rejoice who breathes up here in the roseate light” Unattributed 
translation, SE 21:73. 
20. Jeffery M. Masson, “Sex and Yoga: Psychoanalysis and the Indian Religious Experience”; Wendy 
Doniger,  “When a Lingam is Just a Good Cigar: Psychoanalysis and Hindu Sexual Fantasies” in 
Vishnu on Freud’s Desk. 235-249; 279-303. 
13	
	
her discussion of the symbolism of the ‘lingam’ in various myths and stories, though 
the essay does not make clear how that relates to the 'Hindu sexual fantasies' of the 
title. 
Sudhir Kakar and Alan Rolland, two practising psychoanalysts who have 
written about psychoanalysis in India also seem in a hurry to arrive at, and diagnose 
the particularity of the Indian/Hindu psyche.21 Hortense J. Spillers made the 
important point that the universalism of psychoanalytic theory must be “invigilated 
at its limit” in order to avoid “assimilating other cultural regimes to its modes of 
cultural analyses too quickly and without question.” 22 Even bearing this in mind, I 
find that work by Kakar and Rolland, in its uncritical account of the ‘Indian’, 
prevents rather than encourages such investigation. In this dissertation I hope to 
show that when the history of psychoanalysis in India is approached outside of the 
terms of this glissade between India and mysticism, a new set of questions open up 
through which we can read this encounter both historically, and in terms of a critical 
engagement with psychoanalytic theory. 
The traffic in goods, the place of gods, and time—as a belief in progress as 
well as the intimations of its impossibility, are key to an account of psychoanalysis 
in India. Also unavoidable in any discussion of psychoanalysis as an institution is the 
question of what it meant to be Freud's students—never an easy question, let alone 
position, and one that was particularly complicated at the time of H.D.'s analysis—
when swastikas rained like confetti on the streets of Vienna. By the time of H.D.’s 
analysis, Freud had given, in Civilization and its Discontents, an account of the 
psyche in which the agency which is meant to be the voice of conscience is 
intolerant, harsh and demanding of increasing sacrifice. Guilt arose not just from fear 
of an external authority, but also from the authority that had been internalised as part 
of the psyche: “threatened external unhappiness–loss of love and punishment on the 
part of the external authority – has been exchanged for a permanent internal 
unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt.”23 Here, Freud's description of the 
                                                
21. See Alan Roland, “Multiple Mothering and the Familial Self” in Freud Along the Ganges: 
Psychoanalytic Reflections on the People and Culture of India ed. Salman Akhtar and Pratyusha 
Tummala Narra (New Delhi: Stanza, 2008) 79-90; Sudhir Kakar, “Clinical work and cultural 
imagination”; Alan Roland, “Shakuntala” in Vishnu on Freud’s Desk, 216-231; 401-424.  
22. Hortense J. Spillers, All the Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your 
Mother: Psychoanalysis and Race,” in Female Subjects in Black and White: Race, Psychoanalyis, 
Feminism ed. by Elizabeth Abel, Barbara Christian, Helene Moglen (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 138-139. 
23. Freud, “Civilization and its Discontents,” SE 21:128. 
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superego sounds like his description of the leader-as-tyrant in Moses and 
Monotheism: “jealous, severe and ruthless”24 and “domineering, hot tempered and 
even violent.”25 
Literary critic and biographer of Freud’s last years, Mark Edmundson, writes 
that just as Freud was offering this radical critique of authority, he was also 
complicit with the consolidation of authority in the persona of Sigmund Freud, as 
well as its entrenchment in the International Psychoanalytical Association.26 
However, the ineluctable ambivalence towards authority remained unacknowledged 
and unanalysed in the manner in which the institutionalisation of psychoanalysis 
took place. This view is shared by Moustapha Safouan, an Egyptian psychoanalyst 
and Freud translator. He argues that the process of the institutionalisation of 
psychoanalysis performed “the myth promoted by Freud in Totem and Taboo, of a 
'fraternal' deal dictated by a murder not so much actual as unable to be 
acknowledged, or rather able to be so even though it had not actually taken place; it 
was the end-point of a set of convergent repressions.”27  
If psychoanalytic institutions could act as though they were oblivious to the 
insights of psychoanalysis,  then perhaps the question to ask of Freud's ‘Indian 
students’ is not why they were found to be unsatisfactory, but what it was that was 
wanted of them, which they failed to provide. This brings us up against the question 
of how an object is recognised, or constituted through what may be wanted of it. The 
question then, at its broadest can be: what did psychoanalysis want? A question that 
is complicated by the contradictoriness of the object psychoanalysis–who, or what, 
was psychoanalysis, and who spoke in its name?  
 
‘Will It Not Be Better’? 
In 1921, Girindrasekhar Bose, a Calcutta doctor and lecturer in 
“psychoanalysis and abnormal psychology” at the University of Calcutta, wrote to 
                                                
24. Freud, “Moses and Monotheism,” SE 23:33. 
25. Freud, “Moses and Monotheism,” SE 23:63. All of these qualities are attributed by Freud to the 
first Moses, a man who was so demanding and ruthless as a leader that he was killed by his 
followers–yet the one who was the proponent of an idea of living truth and justice (Ma'at) that 
survived him. Ambivalence, it seems, is always to be found associated with ethical ideals. 
26. See Edmundson, The Death of Sigmund Freud. 
27. Moustapha Safouan, Jacques Lacan and the Question of Psychoanalytic Training, trans. 
Jacqueline Rose (London: Macmillan, 2000), 62-63.  
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Ernest Jones.28 He asked about the International Psychological [sic] Association, 
about which he'd heard from Freud—its conditions of membership, and whether a 
branch could be established in Calcutta.29 In his reply, Jones wrote: “the conditions 
to any given local society becoming affiliated to the International Society depends on 
my having reason to think that it contains members doing serious work along 
psycho-analytical lines. If you are able to start such a society in Calcutta (and may I 
suggest that you use the title Indian rather than Calcutta) I shall be extremely 
interested to hear of its progress.”30 
It did not take long for Jones to find reason to think that 'serious work along 
psycho-analytical lines' was being carried out. Within seven months the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society was in existence. The group of men who formed the first 
cohort of the Indian Psychoanalytical Society were Calcutta intellectuals, with the 
exception of the English members of the Indian Medical Service. Or, as Shruti 
Kapila writes: “psychology in India owed much to Calcutta, the ‘undisputed centre 
of national science’.”31 Indeed the ‘Preface’ to Girindrasekhar Bose's Svapna thanks, 
amongst others, his brother Rajshekhar Basu, reknowned as a writer of satire under 
the pen name 'Parshuram' and Acharya Prafulla Chandra Ray, the author of The 
History of Hindu Chemistry.32 M.N. Banerji, the first secretary of the society, was 
also Bose's publishing agent. That the Calcutta Society drew its members from a 
small, influential section of the people who lived in Calcutta may be an obvious 
point, but it becomes more significant given Jones's suggestion that the Society be 
called the 'Indian' rather than the 'Calcutta' society. 
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Calcutta indicated a city, a geographical location, but it also served to mark a 
particular place in empire, and in the time of the nation.33 Calcutta was a metropolis, 
in contrast to provinces understood as backward, and it remains a question who the 
Calcutta psychoanalysts saw themselves as closer to – psychoanalysts practicing in 
Europe, or the inhabitants of the backward provinces of India. In a move that was the 
reverse of metonymy, through Jones’ suggestion to Bose, the whole that was still 
being imagined (as well as administered, annexed and taxed) into existence – India – 
was made to stand in for a part, Calcutta. The expansive title of the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society was spread like a mantle across those who had begun by 
identifying themselves with a city, Calcutta. 
After the Indian Psychoanalytical Society was established, the following 
remark by Girindrasekhar Bose was included in a report published in the 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis:  
 
in India psycho-analytical investigations were likely to yield very fruitful 
results both from the scientific and therapeutic standpoints. The mental cases 
practically went untreated and the immense variety of social and religious 
customs, some of them of extremely ancient origin and others comparatively 
recent with the people existing in different grades of civilization from the 
most primitive to the most modern, offered an immense field for the psycho-
analyst.34 
 
It is worth remembering, as the historian Bodhisattva Kar points out, that in 
1905 during the nationalist agitation in Bengal, “the spite of the Bengali nationalist 
press was often directed more to the savage Assamese neighbours than to the 
civilized British masters.”35 In a book published in 1945, forty years after the 
agitation, Bose, discussing the 'murder instinct', would write: “[i]n the child or in the 
savage its manifestations are more or less open. The child takes delight in killing 
birds and insects and the savage goes out for head hunting merely for the pleasure of 
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it.”36 This comment by Bose indicates an investment in the distinction between 
‘savage’ and ‘civilised’, which, as I suggest in the following chapters, was a key 
concern among colonial psychoanalysts. If there was something imperial in the tone 
of Jones's reply to Bose, then the Indian analyst seemed quite willing at times to 
perform what was to expected of him—if the Indian analysts were situated in a place 
that was thought to be prior, they could offer their world up as valuable to scientific 
investigation, while sharing in a teleological understanding of psychoanalysis.37  
If we now turn to later discussions of Bose, we find that another dualism, 
between ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ informs much of this writing. There is an 
iterative quality to the terms that are used by critics to describe Girindrasekhar Bose: 
he is repeatedly introduced as a psychoanalyst, the first 'Indian’ or ‘non-western’ 
one. Ashis Nandy calls him “the Savage Freud”, while for Christiane Hartnack he is 
“the doyen of Indian psychoanalysis.”38 The term ‘Indian’ is used uncomplicatedly, 
often in opposition to some idea of the ‘western’. Christiane Hartnack's book 
Psychoanalysis in Colonial India is divided into two parts: “British Psychoanalysts 
in Colonial India” and, “The Work of Indian Psychoanalysts”. Bose is categorized as 
an ‘Indian’ psychoanalyst. When the Indian Psychoanalytical Society was affiliated 
to the International Association, Bose was still a member of the British 
Psychoanalytical Society.39 The Indian Psychoanalytical Society did not distinguish, 
in its categories of membership, between British and Indian. The British 
psychoanalysts discussed by Hartnack all belonged to the Indian Psychoanalytical 
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Society. If Hartnack's distinctions are based, then, on nationality or ethnicity, then 
surely these should be questions rather than pre-given categories?   
Hartnack's distinction serves, in her argument, to mark the consequences in 
psychoanalytical work of the differences in nationality/ethnicity of the members. In 
assuming these categories to have been already constituted and available to the 
people she writes about, her book obfuscates questions of self-representation and 
identification which are particularly important to psychoanalysis if it is to be 
understood as a theory of mental representations (and their undoing). This move 
requires the elision of the similarity in the questions that interested the various 
psychoanalysts working at the time, and the conceptual categories they used: we 
have already noted how Bose subscribed to the binary opposition between primitive 
and civilised. In this attempt at strict separation between Indian and western 
psychoanalysis, it is as though entire parts of Bose's work  are being absorbed into 
the trope of resistance to Western knowledge.40 In making this separation, Hartnack, 
perhaps unwittingly, comes close to sounding like Ernest Jones, writing to Bose in 
1922: “[w]ill it not be better for you to transfer your allegiance from the British to 
the Indian group, as one cannot belong to more than one at a time.”41 
Ashis Nandy does note that “provocative and arrogant psychoanalytic 
summary trials of the Indian culture and personality” were put forward as much by 
Indian analysts as they were by analysts of British origin affiliated to the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society.42 However, it is as though the resistance to a dominant 
western knowledge which Nandy cannot find explicitly articulated in Bose's writing 
has to be recuperated from elsewhere. Thus Nandy argues that Bose's “disembedding 
the discipline [psychoanalysis] from its cultural moorings in the West to relocate it in 
Indian high culture and in the bicultural lifestyle of the urban middle classes in 
colonial India” was a form of “unintended dissent”– and that this ‘unintended 
dissent,’ though “partial” due to Bose's cultural position, was responsible for his 
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“intellectual robustness”.43 Given Bose's comment on the head hunting savage, and 
his categorization of people into ‘different grades of civilization’ it is well worth 
asking at this point which ‘savage’ the title of Nandy's essay: “The Savage Freud: 
The First Non-Western Psychoanalyst and the Politics of Secret Selves in Colonial 
India”–refers to.  
Benjamin Zachariah, in his biographical essay on Acharya Prafulla Chandra 
Ray, writes that “if we search in writings of Ray, or of many Bengali buddhijibi, for 
a confident, clearly articulated view of who they were, how they stood in relation to 
the ‘nation’ or to other potential loyalties, we might be missing the very ambiguity 
that truly illustrates our problem.”44 It is as though commentaries on Bose's work are 
working on the assumption that it could be better—will it not be better—if the work 
was less ambiguous, if there was an unambivalent critique of colonialism to be found 
in it. I suggest that the desire to fit members of the Indian Psychoanalytical Society 
into the frame of anti-colonial protest is the twin of the stereotyping, reductive ways 
in which the colonial administration produced information about its ‘native’ subjects. 
In both cases, contradiction is excised, and the self rendered flat—denied its inner 
argument and division. 
Jones' ‘will it not be better for you’ is one person making a suggestion to 
another, yet the suggestion is made through phrasing that suggests that the speaker 
not only knows the other person's best interests, but also has them at heart. In an 
interaction with another person, such an authoritative claim to knowledge of the 
other's interest can be met with a response, even if the response is structured by 
imbalances of power and unequal access to language. However, if such an utterance 
is made towards a text or historical material, it becomes remarkably easy, in the 
absence of a response, to shape the material to one's will. In this case, to emphasise 
those parts of Bose's work that are easier to align to the idea of a native resistance to 
western knowledge, and to suppress those that may challenge this construct.  
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‘Your Far Off Country’ 
Bose had the honour of being the President of Indian Psychoanalytical 
Society, and one of the editors of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, but 
his work never received engaged criticism.  On receiving a copy of Girindrasekhar 
Bose's first book, Concept of Repression, Freud wrote that he was “glad to testify to 
the correctness of its principal views and the good sense appearing in it” but in both 
his letter to Bose and the blurb he wrote for the publisher, what stands out is his 
surprise at where the book came from: “[m]y surprise was great that psychoanalysis 
should have met with so much interest and recognition in your far off country” and 
again, “[i]t was a great and pleasant surprise that the first book on a psychoanalytic 
subject which came to us from that part of the world (India) should display so good a 
knowledge of psychoanalysis”.45 A decade later, Freud wrote to Bose again, 
expressing his regrets for not having paid attention to Bose's work earlier: “I suspect 
your theory of opposing wishes is practically unknown among us and never 
mentioned or discussed.”46 Bose's location in India functioned in such a way that the 
place in which the writing was produced  served as the master sign under which all 
his work was positioned, and for different reasons served to obscure it both in the 
international psychoanalytic community to which Bose tangentially belonged, and in 
appraisals of him by postcolonial scholars. It is as though both these forms of interest 
in Bose avoid inhabiting the difficulty of assimilating his work: first to 
psychoanalysis, and then to anti-colonial politics.  
Moustapha Safouan writes that psychoanalysis, threatened by the institutional 
and personal attacks on it during the ascendancy of Nazism, created a hierarchical 
and bureaucratic structure as a defence—a bureaucracy, Safouan writes, only too 
comfortable in the way it took on the metaphors of colonial administration. He 
describes how The International Psychoanalytic Association  grants recognition to 
regional organisations which are “responsible for the recognition of new societies 
and training facilities in [their] ‘geographical area’. These societies are defined as 
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affiliate societies, but are not directly recognised by the IPA. Which means that the 
‘geographical area’ constitutes a ‘game preserve’ of the regional association.”47                                                                                  
Writing to Freud in 1912, Ernest Jones mentions the papers contributed by 
Freud and Jung to a congress in Australia. He says, rather jubilantly, “[t]here now 
remains only Brazil, China and Greenland to be penetrated. Still I do think with all 
the opposition that we shall suffer like Alexander for want of worlds to conquer.”48 
Implicit here is the idea that psychoanalysis, once it had established itself, would 
stay in place.  His use of the pronoun 'we' suggests Jones is speaking for both Freud 
and himself (Jones signs off in the letter, “yours ever always”), or speaking perhaps 
in the name of psychoanalysis. Either way, Jones seems untroubled by the image of 
greedy imperial expansion that he conjures. Yet, in his enthusiasm for conquering, 
Jones seems to have forgotten the trials faced in the governance of large empires, 
and the combination of brutality and neglect required to keep them together, 
something all too apparent in the way in which the history of psychoanalysis in India 
speaks to British colonial practices. 
While Jones et al may have intended their references to geographical 
conquest as metaphors for psychoanalytic expansion, in the following chapters we 
will have the opportunity to note that border demarcation and actual armed conquest 
was an all too real part of the context in which psychoanalysis was practiced and 
received in India. Not only did it shape how colonial anthropologists in the North 
Eastern Frontier of India imagined the ‘primitive’, it also appears in the ‘native’ 
dreams that these anthropologists set out to collect. In the diaries of Claud Daly, a 
military man posted in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan, who later 
trained to be an analyst, fantasies of psychoanalysis as imperial conquest are 
soldered to the practice of leading armed raids against the Pathan tribes who resisted 
British authority. 
Girindrasekhar Bose was a psychoanalyst who had never been through an 
analysis himself. He was also the training analyst for most of the analysts who came 
to be affiliated to the Indian Psychoanalytical Society. It would seem that Bose had 
been accepted as analyst on the basis of his theoretical work (even though, as we 
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have seen, this work was never seriously engaged with) as well as the geopolitics 
which placed him far away from Europe, in a place which both seemed desirable to 
include in the official psychoanalytic network, but also far away enough for analytic 
and institutional irregularities to be ignored. A later exchange between Jones and 
M.N. Banerji, Secretary of the Indian Psychoanalytical Society, makes clear where 
the 'centre' of psychoanalysis was understood to be. If analytic training was to be 
conducted properly in India, then according to Jones, “[w]hat is more urgently 
needed in India beyond all doubt is that any one of you, provided he has the 
necessary gifts, should proceed to Europe for full training. You would then be able to 
better judge of the differences in standard and technique than is now possible with 
the relative isolation from which you suffer.”49 
Jones' remark flags a contradiction. It was this 'relative isolation' that kept the 
Indian Psychoanaltyical Society from meeting the 'standards' of psychoanalysis in 
Europe:  
 
I very fully appreciate all that you say about the variation of standards in your 
Society. All that you say has, I think, held and to some extent still holds, of 
other Societies.[...] On the other hand, the Societies more favourably situated 
than yours have had the opportunity of raising their standards very 
considerably and are intent on still doing so. The fact that there have been all 
the difficulties you mention in the past must not deter us in this respect, or 
prevent us from pushing on in the future.50  
 
At the same time, this very isolation made the IPS a valuable outpost for a 
psychoanalysis that imagined itself as pushing on in the future. Jonathan Lear writes 
that having 'standards' may be a way of avoiding the difficult question of how a 
profession may conduct itself: “because the standards present themselves as having 
already answered the question”—but what is of interest here is also how Jones' 
professional standards seem to merge with the standards that nations hoist.51 In the 
raising of standards (or marching under them) psychoanalytic insights about how 
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there can be no uncomplicated pushing on in the future, were jettisoned, as was the 
psychoanalytic critique of the idea that the past waits around the corner waiting to 
direct the steps of the future. Lear’s critique of predetermined ‘standards’ as 
blocking real questioning or thought evokes the work of Wilfred Bion, a 
psychoanalyst who spent his childhood in colonial India, and in whose work, 
discussed in Chapter 3, I find a counterpoint to the imperial fantasies of colonial 
analysts. 
 
 The Talking Cure in the ‘Tropics’ 
Towards the end of Freud's life, the following statement was published in an 
Australian newspaper : 
 
Professor Sigmund Freud, world-famous psychologist, who was ejected from 
Austria by Hitler’s orders, is writing a new book. In his study in a red-brick 
Hampstead house, he is busily engaged, day and night, on what his friends 
expect will be his greatest book. Its theme is a closely guarded secret. But 
those in closest touch with the 82-year-old thinker believe that it will be a 
study of the Nazi psychology, which will provide a shattering answer to Mein 
Kampf. Hitler’s mentality, it is believed, will be shown up as a 
conglomeration of morbid repressions and neuroses.52 
 
Through a fantastic reconstruction of the time of Moses in Egypt, Freud’s last 
book, Moses and Monotheism analyses the identity of the Jewish people. Writing 
about the history of a persecuted people, Freud allows them both a capacity for 
violence and the possibility of recognising the other within. Though the portrait of 
the ‘great man’ in Freud’s last text, Moses and Monotheism, can be read as being 
shadowed by Hitler, at a time when it would have seemed most legitimate and 
indeed obvious to analyse the persecuting other, Freud chose to look at himself as a 
Jew as much at what was going on around him. The text involves itself in the 
question of what it means to live a history, and can be read as a form of 
psychoanalytic reflection that was a way of taking responsibility within the 
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threatening confines of a historical moment. Here, as in many of his previous works, 
Freud concerns himself with our desire for, and use of history: “[l]ong-past ages 
have a great and often puzzling attraction for men's imagination. Whenever they are 
dissatisfied with their present surroundings- and this happens often enough—they 
turn back to the past and hope that they will now be able to prove the truth of the 
unextinguishable dream of a golden age”.53 Both H.D. and Freud were interested in 
the question of the past—the shards and statuettes of past civilizations, their myths 
and religions. Their return to history was not to find a ‘golden age’ but to place a 
question over what was understood as the past—whether as the safe bedrock of 
tradition to which civilisation referred itself, or as a dangerous primitivity that had 
been long left behind.  
We have seen how tropes of conquest circulated amongst practitioners of 
psychoanalysis. Writing to Bose in 1931, Freud would say “[t]he statuette is 
charming. I gave it the place of honour on my desk. As long as I can enjoy life it will 
recall to my mind the progress of psychoanalysis, the proud conquest it has made in 
foreign countries, and the kind feelings for me it has aroused in some of my 
contemporaries at least.”54 In explicit tension with these expansionist fantasies is the 
way in which Freud's writing in this last work gives identity the gift of being 
constituted by the stranger. In Moses and Monotheism, the origins of monotheism 
are referred back in time, and away from Europe–Moses is an Egyptian taking 
forward an Egyptian religion, which itself came from outside Egypt: “it is possible 
that direct incitements to monotheism even made their way in from Syria.”55 The 
founding of an identity, in this account, can only refer itself to an other which refers 
to an other in turn.  
This is a narrative of identity dismantling itself even as it tries to learn its 
own contours, but Freud is alert and unsparing in his account of how this very 
instability may feed a desire for violent consolidation, and that the relation to the 
strangers and others who constitute an identity is, at the very least, ambivalent.56 It is 
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a central contention of this thesis  that both strands are woven together in the manner 
in which psychoanalysis presents itself in India. Like H.D. with the statuette, 
psychoanalysis in India seems both compelled and repelled by its strangers, whether 
city-dwelling Indians, primitive tribes, or criminals. Psychoanalysis theorises the 
ambivalences that it also enacts. The encounter between psychoanalysis and India 
suggests that this ambivalence demands neither excision, nor resolution as many of 
the figures discussed here attempt, but a reckoning with both internal and social 
divisions, the complexities of the mind, and the deposits of history. 
 Already in this introductory discussion we have come across the key themes 
that accompany my account of the history of psychoanalysis in India. The distinction 
between European and non-European, provincial and metropolitan that accompanies 
so much of the institutional history of psychoanalysis, was, in India, organised 
around the binary of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’. The historical narratives that follow 
are a testament to the powerful allegiances called forth by the idea of ‘civilisation’ 
and the extent to which its adherents would go to defend and further it. The 
‘primitive’, in the meantime, was produced as an ‘other’: the object of intense 
epistemological curiosity, the site of a persistent nostalgia for a wild past, and the 
recipient of state sanctioned violence. In this dissertation, psychoanalysis is the 
object of historical investigation, and part of my task has been to offer an hitherto 
untold account of various engagements with psychoanalysis in colonial India. 
Psychoanalytic writing by Freud is also the topic of literary inquiry into how it  
engages with, and is inflected by, colonialism. In addition to this, in the chapters that 
follow, psychoanalysis is a means of interpreting and reading key texts. I have found 
it productive to draw upon psychoanalysis in more than one capacity, as the 
questions I address in thesis are the result of its being both the object of study and a 
form of reading and interpretation. 
In the first chapter, I offer a reading of Freud’s work refracted through key 
questions posed by the history of psychoanalysis in India. In the Introduction to the 
Psychoanalysis of Race, Christopher Lane writes: “[h]owever tarnished the origins 
of psychoanalysis now seem to us by their interest in the ‘savage’ and ‘primitive,’ to 
assume that this material’s recovery releases the unconscious from inquiry is, I think, 
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a grave mistake.”57 I agree, and would add that an interest in the question of the 
‘savage’ and ‘primitive’ is in itself no cause for arraignment, and even when the use 
of these terms carries a negative judgement, engaging with their deployment can be 
revealing, as the essays in Lane’s volume suggest.58 In this dissertation, I have found 
it revealing to return to Freud’s account of both civilisation and the figure of the 
‘primitive’.  
In Freud’s writing, I suggest, ‘civilisation’ is imbued with a fundamental 
ambivalence, which makes it incommensurable with the colonial invocation of it as 
goal and ideal. Similarly the ‘primitive’ becomes Freud’s way of negotiating 
complex questions about death, temporality, and ambivalence, through which Freud 
can be said to elaborate an ethics of psychoanalysis. As I mentioned earlier in the 
context of the tension between psychoanalytical theory and the psychoanalytical 
institution, through his account of the superego, Freud posited a radical critique of 
authority. In addition to discussing Freud’s theorisation of the superego in the first 
chapter, I also read his writing on group psychology as an exploration of the 
seductions and perils of authority. Sexuality, and Freud’s discussion of it as a 
challenge to both identity and mastery, is another aspect of Freud’s work taken up in 
this chapter and, along with his writing on civilisation, the ‘primitive’, and groups, is 
read here as an aspect of his thinking that blocks its appropriation for colonial ends. 
The following chapters present the historical material that has given shape to 
this reading of Freud. In the second chapter, I discuss the work of two analysts who 
tried to square their interest in psychoanalysis with their allegiance to colonial 
endeavours. For Lt. Col. Claud Daly of the Supply and Transport Corps, this meant 
seeing psychoanalysis as identical to civilisation, though as we shall see, both his 
dream diaries and his published psychoanalytical writing attest to the difficulties of 
such an attempt. His work is read alongside the autobiographical writing of Owen 
A.R. Berkeley Hill, the Superintendent of the Ranchi European Mental Hospital. 
Writing by these two analysts is involved in questions of race and empire, and it is 
possible to read it as an attempt to fashion a masculine, masterful colonial persona, 
one that would be capable of being in possession of itself while controlling, even 
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subjugating others, be they women, servants or entire native populations. It is key to 
my argument in this chapter, and in the entire thesis, that such attempts as mastery 
fail. In writing by these colonial analysts, what is found undesirable and intolerable 
about the self makes a return, undoing the image they try to construct of themselves. 
The consequences of such attempts at mastery are described by the 
psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion, in his autobiographies and theoretical work, which are 
the subject of Chapter 3.  Bion spent his childhood in British India, and I find in his 
writing a powerful anti-colonial strain. Not only does Bion’s writing offer a mode of 
thinking and remembering the colony that is the obverse of Daly and Berkeley Hill’s 
writing, his theoretical work on the processes of thinking and groups also offers 
insights into the historical narrative discussed in the other chapters. Bion and Freud’s 
thinking on group identity has allowed me to think of national, racial and religious 
affiliations as forms of group identification that can be both fleeting and unyieldingly 
rigid. This is a crucial contradiction and one which I think the psychoanalytic 
thinking on groups is particularly capable of taking on board. As the thesis discusses 
a time when the political situation was witness to the formation and consolidation of 
many group affiliations, the alertness of psychoanalysis to the complexities of such 
identifications is helpful in acknowledging that national, religious or colonial 
allegiances are neither eternal nor inevitable.  
In the fourth chapter, I return to the theme of colonial mastery, in relation to 
the practice of anthropology in the province of Assam, particularly the Naga and 
Garo Hills regions. Anthropological practitioners who were also colonial officials 
quilted together administrative imperatives and the enterprise of collecting and 
cataloguing the ‘primitive’, notably in their response to ‘head-hunting’. Once again, 
as in the case of Daly and Berkeley Hill, we find that what they tried to excise from 
their ‘civilised’ selves made a return in their writing, and the form that their 
administrative measures took. Yet this history is also a reminder that a failure of 
mastery, a dissolution of a cherished self-image can call forth unrestrained 
aggression. Colonial responses to head-hunting return us to the problem of the 
superego, to the way in which morality and self-righteousness can sanction brutality 
against others seen to be threatening in their difference and no less in their 
proximity, in what they throw light upon in the ‘civilised self’. 
H.D.’s exchange with Freud, the circumstances in which the IPS was set up, 
and Girindrasekhar Bose’s own correspondence with Freud, as well as the historical 
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narratives detailed in the following chapters suggest that in many ways the exchange 
between psychoanalysis and colonial India was a series of missed encounters. Those 
who expressed an interest in psychoanalysis, or claimed to speak in its name, were 
rarely able to use their experience of the colony to reflect on psychoanalytic 
thinking, and neither did their contact with psychoanalytic ideas lead them to 
question their place in the colonial project. One of the strange characteristics of these 
accounts is just how close colonial figures, as well as Indian psychoanalysts, 
sometimes come in their writing to a form of radical insight into their milieu and 
themselves, and yet are not able to articulate it. Wilfred Bion was a notable 
exception, and an important one in that his work is a reminder of the possibilities of 
insight and transformation inherent in an historical moment.  
And yet it is my contention that in spite of these missed encounters, the 
history of psychoanalysis in India can be read to reanimate psychoanalytic questions, 
and in this dissertation I attempt to do this in relation to the theorisation of mastery, 
the problem of the superego, and the category of the primitive. The colonial context 
of psychoanalysis in India irrevocably involves the psyche in questions of politics. In 
this dissertation, this entanglement is nowhere more apparent than in the case of 
Gopinath Saha, a nationalist ‘terrorist’ whose courtroom trial is the focus of the final 
chapter. Girindrasekhar Bose was the expert witness in the defence’s insanity plea, 
and his testimony places him in direct dialogue with both nationalist politics, most 
notably in relation to the figure of Mother India, invoked by Saha as the inspiration 
and cause of his actions. 
In addition to psychoanalytic and historical sources, literary writing has been 
crucial in offering this account of psychoanalysis in India. Some of the texts I turn 
to, such as Anandamath in Chapter 5, are part of the historical milieu being 
discussed, and played a key role in shaping it. A short story by the anthropologist 
J.P. Mills, titled “Shakchi” is discussed in Chapter 4. Discovered in the course of 
research in the colonial archive, it troubles attempts to make a neat distinction 
between historical material and literary text. Other key sources, such as diaries, 
letters and autobiographies, and anthropological texts, all occupy a similarly 
indeterminate space between what would be considered the domain of the historian 
and the domain of the literary scholar. My strategy, in this dissertation, has been to 
read them, first and foremost, for the manner in which they are written. Other texts  
discussed in this thesis, notably Temsula Ao’s short stories, Rabindranath Tagore’s 
29	
	
Gora and Mahasweta Devi’s “Breast Giver” offer themselves as a response to a 
dismal history. They are both in touch with some of the same difficulties, and 
radically distinct in their way of presenting them, from the psychoanalytic and 
colonial figures. They enunciate, as I will suggest in the following chapters, both a 
radical questioning of, and an ethical reckoning with the historical and political 
situations they engage with.  
Though literature, in these instances, is read as an antidote to political 
orthodoxy and as a means of questioning rigid and exclusionary forms of identity, I 
hope the discussions in the following chapters will make clear that I do not attribute 
a redemptive quality to literature in general. Indeed, my discussions of Anandamath 
and “Shakchi” suggest that the production of literary texts can co-exist with and 
participate in incitements to violence. If there is a special, or rather, a particular place 
accorded the literary in this thesis then it is not due to any inherently redemptive or 
politically progressive quality to be found in it. Rather, in the context of this thesis, 
the relation to fantasy in the acts of reading and writing fiction, the possibility of 
inhabiting what would otherwise be considered impossible or mad subjectivities and 
temporalities, and the dramatization of the slippages of meaning inherent in 
language, are what endow literary texts with a distinct place in the following 
chapters. These characteristics are of course not unique to literary texts and as we 
shall see, are indeed sometimes shared with the other kinds of writing discussed in 
this dissertation, but they are heightened, highly developed in the literary work.  
Questions of fantasy and attention to language are privileged modes of 
interpretation as far as literary texts are concerned. In approaching psychoanalysis 
through literature and literary interpretation I borrow from the work of the literary 
scholars Leo Bersani, Malcolm Bowie and Shoshana Felman, whose readings of 
Freud as a contradictory, unsettled thinker have shaped the account of his work 
offered in the following chapter, and helped me find a route into reading the other 
sources. I have found this a suggestive and rewarding way of approaching the history 
of psychoanalysis in India. It has helped make room for what Anne Anlin Cheng, in 
her urgent and evocative book The Melancholy of Race, calls “the immaterial, 
pressing, unquantifiable elements that go into the making of ‘reality’”.59 Finally, 
Jacqueline Rose’s essay “Freud in the ‘Tropics’” has been a shaping influence on 
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30	
	
this dissertation, as it first opened up for me the possibility of a reading of Freud in a 
colonial context that was neither an indictment, nor an exoneration, but a way of 
putting psychoanalysis in conversation with urgent historical and political 




                                                
60. Jacqueline Rose, “Freud in the ‘Tropics’” in On Not Being Able to Sleep (Princeton, Princeton 




Freud in the Colony 
The quest for paradise has always and everywhere led to the creation of hell on 
earth. Is there an incontrovertible law at work there? That would be worth looking 
into. It would also be worthwhile to consider why the belief so prevalent here—that 
there is a solution to every problem, a remedy for every ailment, a relief for every 
suffering, a cure for every sickness—creates a feeling of unreality, even uncanniness, 
and can easily tip over into madness. 
I insisted you couldn’t have one without the other—misery and grief were the lining 
of Dr Freud’s overcoat—but Francesco wanted his joie de vivre and optimism and 
assertiveness pure, without the shadow of melancholy, defeat, and failure. Without 
the background of German history, in other words, I said. 
-Christa Wolf, City of Angels or, The Overcoat of Dr. Freud 
 
In the Ernest Jones papers at the Sigmund Freud Archives in the Library of 
Congress, Washington, in a file of newspaper clippings is an article that reads: 
A lecture was announced at Ithaca, New York State, “by an intimate 
friend and pupil of Freud” and it was given to a packed and brilliant 
audience. The friend and pupil of FREUD naturally discoursed on dreams. 
“A dreamer,” he said, “naturally does not know what he dreams but he does 
not know what he knows and therefore believes what he does not know.” It is 
a very true account of some psychology, but the audience did not recognise 
the kind of truth that was in it. They were not aware that the lecture was a 
parody. […] The Freudian psychology is both exciting and difficult to 
understand; it is therefore misunderstood by many people who wish for 
excitement. And the misunderstanding is not prevented by FREUD himself, 
who, though a man of genius, has also a turn for reducing his own theories to 
an absurdity and no great gift of lucid exposition.61 
Facetious as the tone of the article might be, it captures something of the 
response that Freud’s work has received over the years: both its dismissal, and the 
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32	
	
‘excitement’ and adherence that it has aroused. Scholarship on Freud is particularly 
divisive, and as Jonathan Lear has pointed out, the accusations against him often 
contradict each other entirely, a case in point being the debates over the seduction 
theory that Freud abandoned.62 
The newspaper’s typographical conventions may have led them to capitalise 
Freud’s name in this article, but this only underscores the curious status of Freud in 
the history of psychoanalysis. In his essay “What is an Author” Michel Foucault 
describes Freud and Marx as the “founders of discursivity”.63 Freud’s name and 
work are tied to psychoanalysis in that those working in the field return to his work 
and take a position on it: [t]o say that Freud founded psychoanalysis does not 
(simply) mean that we find the concept of the libido or the technique of dream 
analysis in the works of Karl Abraham or Melanie Klein; it means that Freud made 
possible a certain number of divergences—with respect to his own texts, concepts, 
and hypotheses—that all arise from the psychoanalytic discourse itself.64 These 
possibilities for divergence may have something to do with the contradictions in 
Freud’s own positions. As Jonathan Lear writes:  
[i]n one way, he is the advocate of the unconscious; in another, he is 
himself filled with Enlightenment optimism that the problems posed by the 
unconscious can be solved; in yet another, he is wary of the dark side of the 
human soul and pessimistic about doing much to alleviate psychological 
pain. He is Tiresias and Oedipus and Sophocles rolled into one.65  
If Freud is a figure of authority, a founding father, then the contradictory, 
self-interrogating nature of his writing adds a dimension of indeterminacy to this 
authority. One cannot simply ‘follow’ Freud, because to do so would beg the 
question of which Freud it is who is being followed. Reading Freud foregrounds the 
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interpretative nature of an act of reading. Literary critic and queer theorist Leo 
Bersani, in his discussion of Civilization and its Discontents, draws attention to the 
tension between the “upper body” of Freud’s texts and his footnotes: “these 
secondary thoughts, these afterthoughts, these bottom-of-the-page thoughts”.66 These 
extensive notes do much more than cite or explain—they carry out an argument with 
the main, upper text, sometimes elaborating theories of their own. They are a 
valuable reminder to the reader that Freud’s thinking is often split, pulled in 
seemingly irreconcilable directions. This, as well as the nature of the object of 
psychoanalysis, the unconscious, means that psychoanalysis cannot arrive at 
conclusions once and for all, only producing provisional knowledge about its object 
in a process of ongoing interpretation. Bersani writes: “[p]sychoanalysis is an 
unprecedented attempt to give a theoretical account of precisely those forces which 
obstruct, undermine, play havoc with theoretical accounts themselves.”67 He 
suggests that failure is constitutive of psychoanalytical thinking, because a theory of 
desire cannot be dissociated from recklessly self-defeating moves in the performance 
of the theory.  
In this thesis, psychoanalysis is not a unitary entity. It is both an historical 
referent and a form of analysis. I have been led to my reading of Freud by the 
historical material and literary texts discussed in this thesis. Freud’s writing often 
nibbles away at his positions of mastery, and the history of psychoanalysis in India 
has taught me to value this contradictoriness, this possibility of interpretation and 
revision. This speculative openness and internal dissent presents a stark contrast to 
the positions of colonial epistemological authority that we will encounter in the 
following chapters. The historical details have allowed me, as it were, to excavate, 
for my purposes, a Freud whose thinking is conversation with (even if this 
conversation takes place at times at the edge of the text, at the limits of his 
awareness) with the history of colonisation. In this opening chapter, I discuss 
Freud’s writings on the ‘primitive’, his tortured account of ‘civilisation’, his theories 
of sexuality and his writing on group psychology as four fundamental aspects of his 
work that resist appropriation for colonial ends. It is these Freudian insights that I 
have found indispensable in negotiating this history, in confronting its significance, 
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and to which I return in the following chapters. 
At the same time, in the following chapters, I will be turning to 
psychoanalytic concepts as a way of interpreting and approaching both historical 
events and literary texts. I can only do this by understanding Freud’s work, not as a 
master discourse of interpretation, but as a form of writing which can be read for the 
ways in which it is inflected by colonialism, yet also critical of its impulses.68 In 
many ways, Freud’s texts lend themselves to such a reading because of their “defiant 
assumption of literarity”, as the renowned Proust scholar Malcolm Bowie puts it in 
his discussion of Civilization and its Discontents.69 He writes: “Freud remembers too 
much, puts too much in, for his own good as a scientist or as a moralist. In the 
process he rejoins another company of exceptional individuals whose business it is 
to elaborate and amplify beyond the needs of instrumental reason or theoretical 
coherence. He rejoins that special company of rememberancers, memorialists and 
archivists we know as artists or creative writers.”70 It is because Freud’s 
psychoanalytic writings share something of the indeterminacy of both historical 
narratives (based on an incomplete archive) and literary texts (foregrounding the 
ambiguity of language) that I have found it possible to put the three together, to let 
them interpret each other.71 
“The history of the subject” writes the literary scholar Diana Fuss in 
Identification Papers, is “one of perpetual psychical conflict and of continual change 
under pressure. It is a profoundly turbulent history of contradictory impulses and 
structural incoherencies”.72 Psychoanalysis allows for the subject of history to be 
conceived as divided, non-identical with itself. Or as the film theorist Joan Copjec 
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puts in her book Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists, psychoanalysis 
questions the idea of a subject of historical investigation who exists “behind the 
facts” and who “has unique access to his or her own psychological intentions”.73 
Instead, it posits a subject unknown to herself/himself, who acts in unexpected ways 
that are beyond the determinations of sociology. I have found this particularly 
helpful in thinking about the people and incidents discussed in the following 
chapters. In my attempts at putting together an account of psychoanalysis in India, I 
have found that colonial anthropologists, Indian psychoanalysts, and revolutionary 
nationalists, to mention just some of the figures who appear in this thesis, could be 
puzzled and taken aback by themselves, even when attempting to embody absolute 
authority. The traces of this puzzlement, this occasional absence from the self, are 
there in the material that they’ve left behind for the historian. 
The subject may be absent from itself, but it is always involved with another: 
“In the individual’s mental life someone else is invariable involved, as a model, as an 
object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology, 
in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at the same time social 
psychology as well”, writes Freud.74 The following chapters take up the question of 
the relationship to an other, which is thrown into relief by historical circumstances. 
Discussions of the primitive as epistemological other, the uncanny double, the 
neighbour, and the problem of group relations show how this question also 
accompanied much of Freud’s writing. The newspaper clipping in Ernest Jones’ file 
describes a confusion of voices—who spoke authentically in the name of Freud? 
We’ve noted that Freud did not speak in a unitary voice. Jacqueline Rose, in her 
essay “Mass Psychology” describes how Freud, in his “A Note on Anti Semitism” 
quotes extensively from an article about whose source he is unclear, and which may 
have been written by Freud himself, then attributed to a non-Jew, and subsequently 
quoted by the author himself. “But whether these are Freud’s words or not,” Rose 
writes, “the effect is the same. Either way, by copiously citing or by inventing, the 
distinction breaks down, the two fuse. As they must if race hatred is ever to end, Jew 
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and non Jew speak with one voice, cross over to the other’s place.”75 
A Question of Translation, a Matter of Construction* 
Less than two months after Freud’s death, the analyst Hanns Sachs wrote to 
Ernest Jones to “applaud the decision” that “a complete, uniform and faultless 
edition of Freud’s works would be the best memorial”.76 Writing about the difficulty 
in finding specific passages in Freud’s published works (which did not have an 
index), Sachs was of the opinion that “a complete collection of all Freud’s work, the 
small articles included, uniform not only outwardly but also in the style of 
translation and the use of terminology (in the widest sense) is certainly an 
indispensable necessity.”77 There exists already a considerable body of work that 
addresses the question of the difficulties in translating Freud, and the merits and 
inadequacies of The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud. 78 
This, along with our discussions of Freud as a contradictory thinker only underscores 
the difficulties in way of preparation of a ‘uniform and faultless’ edition. The desire 
for consistency, to create a fitting memorial to Freud, takes us back to Moustapha 
Safouan’s suggestion, which I discuss in the Introduction to this thesis, that the way 
in which psychoanalysis institutionalized itself was a response to the ambivalence 
towards its founding father. 
The translation project was not without its own imperial and racial 
assumptions. When it was first envisaged, the attractiveness of a Standard Edition in 
English, over any other language, was linked to its status as the language of Empire: 
in his letter Sachs suggests that there would be many people in the ‘British Empire’ 
willing to take out a subscription to the Standard Edition. Another analyst, Franz 
Alexander, in a letter responding to Jones’ suggestion of a Standard Edition, 
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described it as the “monumental” edition, distinguishing it from the “popular dollar 
edition” of Freud’s Collected Papers.79 “The other day a colored Pullman porter,” 
Alexander wrote to Jones, “who somehow learned that I was a psychiatrist, began a 
conversation with me about Freud”, suggesting that the consumers of the two 
editions were likely to be entirely different sets of people.80 Yet issues of race and 
imperialism are also internal to the translations in the Standard Edition and have 
significant consequences for how a reader encountering Freud in English interprets 
his discussion of the ‘primitive’.  
Freud does not have a stable term with which he refers to ‘primitives’, rather, 
he uses a variety of words and phrases. Nowhere is this heterogeneity more on 
display than in Totem and Taboo [1913].  The phrases Freud uses here include ‘den 
Menschen der Vorzeit’ (people of a former time), ‘Naturvölker’ (people in a state of 
nature), ‘Wilden’ (wild, savage) and ‘Primitiven’ (primitive).81 Freud’s text is 
subtitled: “Einige Ubereinstimmungen Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker” 
[“Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Life of Savages and Neurotics”]. 
On the opening page, he writes that the “‘Psychologie der Naturvölker’” (in quotes 
in the original) can be compared to the “Psychologie des Neurotikers”.  The term 
‘Naturvölker’ carries within it the history of being used as a philosophical construct. 
‘Naturvölker’ (translated into English in the Standard Edition as “primitive peoples”, 
with no accompanying quotes) is a term that carries the resonances of the 
Enlightenment, when it was deployed in the philosophy of the time to indicate 
people in a ‘state of nature’. There is an indeterminacy in the text of Totem and 
Taboo: are neurotics compared to ‘Wilden’—present day contemporary ‘savages’, or 
to ‘Naturvölker’, to the idea of people in a state of nature? The translation resolves 
the issue in favour of the former interpretation: ‘primitive peoples’ in English 
suggests actual people rather than a philosophical concept. 
Using separate terms for “prehistoric man” [den Menschen der Vorzeit] and 
“savages” [Wilden] in Totem and Taboo allows Freud to introduce a distinction 
between the contemporary ‘savage’ and the ancestors of man, who belong to an older 
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past.82 It is this distinction that is lost in the English translation of Civilisation and its 
Discontents [1930]:  
Der Urmensch hatte es in der Tat darin besser, da er keine 
Triebeinschränkungen kannte. Zum Ausgleich war seine Sicherheit, solches 
Glück lange zu genießen, eine sehr geringe. Der Kulturmensch hat für ein 
Stück Glücksmöglichkeit ein Stück Sicherheit eingetauscht. Wir wollen aber 
nicht vergessen, daß in der Urfamilie nur das Oberhaupt sich solcher 
Triebfreiheit erfreute; die anderen lebten in sklavischer Unterdrückung. Der 
Gegensatz zwischen einer die Vorteile der Kultur genießenden Minderheit und 
einer dieser Vorteile beraubten Mehrzahl war also in jener Urzeit der Kultur 
aufs Äußerste getrieben. Über den heute lebenden Primitiven haben wir durch 
sorgfältigere Erkundung erfahren, daß sein Triebleben keineswegs ob seiner 
Freiheit beneidet werden darf; es unterliegt Einschränkungen von anderer Art, 
aber vielleicht von größerer Strenge als das des modernen Kulturmenschen.83  
 [In fact, primitive man was better off in knowing no restrictions of instinct. 
To counterbalance this, his prospects of enjoying this happiness for any length 
of time were very slender. Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his 
possibilities of happiness for a portion of security. We must not forget, 
however, that in the primal family only the head of it enjoyed this instinctual 
freedom; the rest lived in slavish suppression. In that primal period of 
civilization, the contrast between a minority who enjoyed the advantages of 
civilization and a majority who were robbed of those advantages was, 
therefore, carried to extremes. As regards the primitive peoples who exist to-
day, careful researches have shown that their instinctual life is by no means to 
be envied for its freedom. It is subject to restrictions of a different kind but 
perhaps of greater severity than those attaching to modern civilized man.]84  
Here, both ‘Urmench’ and ‘heute lebenden Primitiven’ are translated as 
‘primitive man’ and ‘primitive peoples’ respectively, even though Freud makes a 
conceptual distinction between the fantasised primitive ancestor of human pre-
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history, the ‘Urmensch’, and the ‘primitives’ of today— ‘den heute lebenden 
Primitiven’. This distinction is clearly marked in the text by the separate words used, 
yet the translation does not reflect this, even though other words prefixed with ‘Ur’ 
in this paragraph: ‘Urfamilie’ and ‘Urzeit’, are both translated as ‘primal family’ and 
‘primal times’.  
The translation of ‘Kultur’ in the “Das Unbehagen in der Kultur” as 
‘Civilisation’ also has implications for the question of how Freud conceptualised the 
distinction between primitive and civilised. An editorial note to The Future of an 
Illusion [1927] justifies this translation: “it seems unnecessary to embark on the 
tiresome problem of the proper translation of the German word ‘Kultur’”, by quoting 
Freud’s remark from the text that he did not make a distinction between ‘culture’ and 
‘civilisation’.85 Freud wrote: “Human civilization, by which I mean all those respects 
in which human life has raised itself above its animal status and differs from the life 
of beasts—and I scorn to distinguish between culture and civilization […]”.86 The 
sociologist Norbert Elias, in his magisterial work The Civilizing Process, describes 
how ‘Zivilsation’ and ‘Kultur’ were antithetical words in a German context. The 
former indicated “superficiality, ceremony, formal conversation”, the latter 
“inwardness, depth of feeling, immersion in books, development of the individual 
personality”.87 In the French and English uses of the word, Elias argues, the concept 
of ‘civilisation’ “sums up in a single term their pride in the significance of their own 
nations for the progress of the West and of humankind” while in German 
‘Zivilisation’ indicates “something that is indeed useful, but nevertheless only a 
value of the second rank”.88 When Freud dismisses the distinction between ‘Kultur’ 
and ‘Zivilisation’ in German, he is jettisoning a separation between surface and 
depth, not endorsing ‘civilisation’ as it is used in English. 
Raymond Williams describes how ‘civilisation’ came to be associated with 
“modern social process”—both its achievements and ills. In English, the word 
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carries strong resonances of “an achieved condition of refinement and order”, often 
opposed to the state of barbarism—and is a word that till this day carries a normative 
charge.89 In nineteenth century German works on the topic, ‘Kultur’ included plural 
modes of organising society, a concept that was taken up in ethnology and 
anthropology. In English language works, ‘culture’ since the mid nineteenth-century 
denoted “distinct ways of life, which need to be studied as wholes.”90 Some of the 
questions that “Das Unbehagen in der Kultur” raises, such as man’s relationship to 
modern technology, may seem specific to societies that participated in industrial and 
technological expansion.91 But Freud is as concerned with problems to do with the 
organization of people into societies with their attendant codes and prohibitions, 
irrespective of their industrial development (‘all those respects in which human life 
has raised itself above animal status’). In the English translation, the universality of 
Freud’s question is occluded by using the word ‘civilisation’ because of its 
normative usage as well as its associations with modernity, despite Freud’s 
insistence that ‘savages’ have their own elaborate institutions. The discontent 
[Unbehagen] that Freud attributes to man’s existence in culture includes all 
culture—not just the West. A consequence of this translation is that the primitive 
appears not to be the subject of Freud’s arguments about culture, but placed outside 
of it. 
Freud did indeed make a distinction between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ but 
the distance between the two is never fixed in his writing. In the very texts where he 
collapses the two into each other, he also warns the reader against any such 
assimilation of the ‘savage’ to the prehistoric. Freud’s Totem and Taboo begins by 
assimilating some residents of the Non-European world to the anteriority of human 
history:  
es leben Menschen, von denen wir glauben, daß sie den Primitiven noch sehr 
nahe stehen, viel näher als wir, in denen wir daher die direkten Abkömmlinge 
und Vertreter der früheren Menschen erblicken. Wir urteilen so über die 
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sogenannten Wilden und halbwilden Völker, deren Seelenleben ein 
besonderes Interesse für uns gewinnt, wenn wir in ihm eine gut erhaltene 
Vorstufe unserer eigenen Entwicklung erkennen dürfen.92 
[ There are men still living who, as we believe, stand very near to primitive 
man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore regard as his direct heirs 
and representatives. Such is our view of those whom we describe as savages 
or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if 
we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our 
own development.]93  
 
Yet discord and contradiction are built into Totem and Taboo. This is already 
in evidence in the sentence quoted, in which Freud’s hesitations and qualifications: 
‘as we believe’; ‘whom we therefore regard’; ‘such is our view of those whom we 
describe’; ‘if we are right’—qualify and delay Freud’s claim. In fact the Standard 
Edition translation omits the double distancing in the German, which is made clear 
in the new translation by Shaun Whiteside: “there are people alive whom we think of 
as being still very close to primitive man, much closer than we are ourselves, and for 
this reason we see them as direct descendants and representatives of earlier human 
beings.”94 Already, this extract is beginning to sound like a description of the 
western man’s perception of men who are close to ‘the primitives’ [den Primitiven], 
who themselves, the sentence suggests, are distinct from ‘earlier human beings’ 
[früheren Menschen]. In fact the verb ‘erblicken’ conveys the impression of 
something glimpsed or caught sight of. When Freud says that we catch sight of 
earlier human beings in men whom we believe to be close to primitives, it is unclear 
whether this is due to something that exists to be seen, or something that we want to 
see. 
 It was in an attempt to elucidate “some unsolved problems of social 
psychology”—the phrase in German is ‘Völkerpsychologie’—that Freud made his 
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most extensive use of anthropological material. 95 Yet in a footnote, Freud offers a 
warning to just such an enterprise. The question of translation returns here with the 
word ‘Völker’ which can be rendered as people, race, tribe or nation. 
 
Man darf nicht daran vergessen, daß die primitiven Völker keine jungen 
Völker sind, sondern eigentlich ebenso alt wie die zivilisiertesten, und daß man 
kein Recht zur Erwartung hat, sie würden ihre ursprünglichen Ideen und 
Institutionen ohne jede Entwicklung und Entstellung für unsere 
Kenntnisnahme aufbewahrt haben.96 
 
[It should not be forgotten that primitive races are not young races but are in 
fact as old as civilized races. There is no reason to suppose that, for the benefit 
of our information, they have retained their original ideas and institutions 
undeveloped and undistorted.]97 
 
Here, ‘primitiven Völker’ is translated into English as ‘primitive races’ even 
though at the beginning of the text, ‘Völkerpsychologie’ is rendered as ‘social 
psychology’ instead of ‘race psychology’. The translation not only renders ‘Völker’ 
as ‘races’, but also includes the word one more time in the translated footnote than in 
the German; ‘die zivilisiertesten’ is translated as ‘civilised races’ when the German 
could also be read as not having an object, as just ‘the civilised’. The translation adds 
the dimension of race to the distinction that Freud makes between primitive and 
civilised. Freud here reinforces the idea that ‘primitiven Völker’ are objects of 
epistemological desire for the modern man, who may want them, for the benefit of 
our information, to be ‘a well preserved picture of an early stage.’  
In a manner far ahead of his time, Freud also acknowledges all the problems 
with the anthropological ‘information’ he uses in his text. Anticipating later critiques 
of texts such as The Golden Bough, and of Frazer’s ‘armchair’ anthropology, Freud 
writes that anthropological ‘information’ is interpreted by people who are removed 
from the ones who collected the material in the first place. He then flags the 
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language question: “[t]he observers are not always acquainted with the native 
language but may be obliged to rely on the help of interpreters or to conduct their 
inquiries through the medium of pidgin English.”98 As if this were not enough, Freud 
goes on to ask why the savage would share intimate details with his foreign 
interlocutors, instead of offering misleading information.  
The idea of the ‘primitive’ undergoes further deconstruction in another 
footnote, which is concerned with the problem of origins. In the very first section of 
the text, Freud describes how difficult it is to establish what is truly prior—
‘Ursprüngliche’.   
 
Man darf aber nicht vergessen, daß auch die primitivsten und konservativsten 
Völker in gewissem Sinne alte Völker sind und eine lange Zeit hinter sich 
haben, in welcher das Ursprüngliche bei ihnen viel Entwicklung und 
Entstellung erfahren hat. So findet man den Totemismus heute bei den 
Völkern, die ihn noch zeigen, in den mannigfaltigsten Stadien des Verfalles, 
der Abbröcklung, des Überganges zu anderen sozialen und religiösen 
Institutionen, oder aber in stationären Ausgestaltungen, die sich weit genug 
von seinem ursprünglichen Wesen entfernt haben mögen. Die Schwierigkeit 
liegt dann darin, daß es nicht ganz leicht ist zu entscheiden, was an den 
aktuellen Verhältnissen als getreues Abbild der sinnvollen Vergangenheit, was 
als sekundäre Entstellung derselben gefaßt werden darf.99  
 
[But it must not be forgotten that even the most primitive and conservative 
races are in some sense ancient races and have a long past history behind them 
during which their original conditions of life have been subject to much 
development and distortion. So it comes about that in those races in which 
totemism exists today, we may find it in various stages of decay and 
disintegration or in the process of transition to other social and religious 
institutions, or again in a stationary condition which may differ greatly from 
the original one. The difficulty in this last case is to decide whether we should 
                                                
98. Freud, “Totem and Taboo,” SE 13:102. For a discussion of Frazer’s text, see Robert Fraser, The 
Making of The Golden Bough: The Origins and Growth of an Argument (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1990). 
99. Freud, “Totem und Tabu,” GW 9:6-7. 
44	
	
regard the present state of things as a true picture of the significant features of 
the past or as a secondary distortion of them.]100 
 
Freud begins Totem and Taboo by suggesting that we can turn to the primitive 
for an understanding of the past: “their mental life must have a peculiar interest for 
us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own 
development”.101 But he then mocks such a claim, saying that there is no reason to 
suppose that the ‘primitiven Völker’ have, for the benefit of the modern observer, 
kept their ideas and institutions in a state of stasis. Then, he questions the very idea 
of an ‘early stage of development’ that can be recovered, that is preserved and 
available for observation. It is no surprise then, that in another footnote towards the 
end of his text he will write that “[t]he determination of the original state of things 
inevitably remains a matter of construction.”102  
In one of the most sustained discussions of the place of the primitive in Freud’s 
work, Aborignal Populations in the Mind, Celia Brickman writes that for “Freud, as 
for the evolutionary anthropology from which he borrowed, the ‘primitive’ referred 
to the earliest and most rudimentary stages of a universally conceived psychological 
development, as well as to ‘savages’ considered, by virtue of their differences from 
European cultural norms and their darker skins, to be less culturally advanced than 
their European cousins.”103 I find that this not the case. While Freud, at times, may 
seem to be party to a desire to equate the figure of the primitive to an ancient past, he 
both deconstructs such a desire and recognizes the primitive’s claim to having an 
history rather than being the historical. Brickman argues that “the ‘primitive’ is the 
key to the racial economy of psychoanalysis, the watchword of a psychologizing 
discourse behind which is concealed an ideology of race.”104 It remains a question 
for me whether Freud’s prejudices line up along the divisions of race, and instead of 
searching for evidence of racism, I am interested in what in Freud’s thinking allows 
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him to challenge and destabilize these prejudices. Totem and Taboo alerts us to the 
contradictory and vexed space the primitive occupies in psychoanalytic thought, and 
rather than see this as an instance of ‘an ideology of race’ masked by the 
psychoanalytic theorization, I suggest that the problem of the primitive in Freud’s 
work is linked to the question of origins, causality, and temporality, with which he 
also struggled in his other writing. It is here, in a mythological mode, that Freud tries 
to work out the problem of the ‘Ur’, the problem of the lost origin that nevertheless 
stays vital and influential in individual and group histories. 
This is especially clear in relation to the concept of repression. In his essay 
“Repression” [1915] written two years after Totem and Taboo, Freud made a 
distinction between ‘primal repression’, and ‘repression proper’. The former is “a 
first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative 
of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious.”105 This process is called 
‘Urverdrängung’. Primal repression then acts with a magnetic force, drawing other 
content to it. Laplanche and Pontalis, in their discussion of ‘Urverdrängung’ point 
out that primal repression is “postulated above all on the basis of its effects”106 and 
its origin is to be sought in “very intense archaic experiences.”107 Here, we find in 
Freud’s writing, a way of explaining a process observed in the present through a 
reference to something in the past. But this is a peculiar kind of past—both 
irrecoverable and intensely vital.  
‘Urverdrängung’ (primal repression), ‘Urphantasie’ (primal phantasy), 
‘Urszene’ (primal scene), are all constructs used by Freud to explain the effects of 
events in the archaic past. The work of Freud as a theoretician, as well as the clinical 
practice of psychoanalysis is involved in studying the traces that these events have 
left in the psyche. The traces and effects are real and observable, but the event itself 
only survives in a distorted form. I argue that for Freud the ‘Urmensch’ was part of 
this series. This concern with the ‘Ur’ is testament to the crucial place that 
psychoanalysis accords history and the past. Yet while it is concerned with the past, 
the very idea of what the past is, is itself transformed by a psychoanalytic account of 
temporality. We can read Freud’s repeated attempts to grapple with what was 
primary and secondary, both in human history and in psychic repression, as an 
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attempt to take on board what psychoanalysis has done to temporality, both 
theoretically, and as a therapeutic process.  
The psychoanalytical concept of a ‘construction in analysis’ can help us further 
our understanding of Freud’s use of the ‘primitive’. I argue that, for Freud, the 
primitive was as much ‘a matter of construction’ [eine Sache der Konstruktion] as 
the ‘determination of the original state of things’.108 Freud argued that there were 
some incidents, phases of a childhood memory or fantasy that could not be recalled, 
yet which had to be postulated and reconstructed. In dealing with the unconscious as 
it emerges in the analytic encounter, the analyst is positioned differently from the 
patient regarding what is remembered. Freud writes that the analyst’s “task is to 
make out what has been forgotten, from the traces which it has left behind or, more 
correctly, to construct it.”109 A construction is effective when it can encourage the 
patient to produce more unconscious material. Like the speech of the analyst, the 
construction may call forth something from the unconscious even when what has 
been constructed is factually incorrect: “our bait of falsehood had taken a carp of 
truth.”110 
Freud locates the value of the construction in its ability to contain a potentially 
transformative truth—the measure of which can only be given by the one to whom it 
is offered. Writing of the kernel of truth that the construction may contain, Freud 
compares its vitality to that of a delusion or hallucination, which, he argues, also 
contain ‘historical truth.’111 Elaborating on this idea of ‘historical truth’, Freud writes 
that it has “a compulsive character: it must be believed. To the extent to which it is 
distorted, it may be described as a delusion; in so far as it brings a return of the past, 
it must be called the truth.”112 Thus for Freud the truth was not so much the past 
accurately remembered, as it was the vital, recurring quality of the past. 
Yet this past is constantly revised, reconstituted by the present, by the 
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circumstances of remembering. Describing the work the analyst does in order to 
offer to the analysand a reconstruction of her past, Freud writes that it is very 
difficult to ascertain the time to which a fragment belongs. He compares an analytic 
construction to an archaeological investigation, writing that “[o]ne of the most 
ticklish problems that confronts the archaeologist is notoriously the determination of 
the relative age of his finds; and if an object makes its appearance in some particular 
level, it often remains to be decided whether it belongs to that level or whether it was 
carried down to that level owing to some subsequent disturbance.” 113 Freud’s 
language and concerns here are strikingly similar to those he expressed in Totem and 
Taboo, when he found it difficult to establish the ‘primitivity’ of the people he was 
discussing. Yet it is this very difficulty posed by the mobility of the past that the 
psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas sees as a source of freedom:  
Historical thinking is a psychic function. Reviewing the past, retrieving finite 
details from it and giving them new, indeed contemporary, meanings, 
detraumatizes the subject who suffers from the ailments of many a thing done. 
[…] The dumb facts of an existence still lie in their chronological place, 
weighing heavily upon personal development. Doing history, however—
reviewing this past and thereby transforming it—is a psychic function always 
alive to changed ways of seeing the world that will occur in the patient.114  
The very irresolution that Freud inhabits, and struggles with in his dealings 
with the past, may then be, following Bollas, the best way to survive, the most 
liberating response to this past. Towards the end of his life, in Moses and 
Monotheism, Freud himself described Totem and Taboo as a construction. He was 
responding to criticisms of his work, which pointed out that the anthropologists 
whose work he relied on had been discredited, their theories rejected: 
In 1912 I attempted, in my Totem and Taboo, to reconstruct the ancient 
situation from which these consequences followed. To this day I hold firmly to 
this construction. I have repeatedly met with violent reproaches for not having 
altered my opinions in later editions of my book in spite of the fact that more 
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recent ethnologists have unanimously rejected Robertson Smith's hypotheses 
and have in part brought forward other, totally divergent theories. I may say in 
reply that these ostensible advances are well known to me. But I have not been 
convinced either of the correctness of these innovations or of Robertson 
Smith's errors. A denial is not a refutation, an innovation is not necessarily an 
advance. Above all, however, I am not an ethnologist but a psycho-analyst. I 
had a right to take out of ethnological literature what I might need for the work 
of analysis.115  
 
To date, Freud’s arguments are challenged on the grounds of his references to 
out-of-date anthropologists (Frazer, Robertson-Smith) and biologists (Lamarck). 
Such a reading, in my opinion, misses the point of what Freud was trying to do with 
these theories, the transformation they undergo in his writing. In distancing himself 
from ethnology and claiming that he has a ‘right’ to take what he needs from the 
ethnological writing, he indicates an associative, literary approach to anthropological 
material, underscoring the interpretative aspect of psychoanalytic thinking.  I would 
argue that the primitive serves as a construction, a fabricated ground through which 
Freud tries to understand some of the most persistent questions in his elaboration of 
psychoanalysis. Never a very stable ground, the figure of the primitive as Freud 
constructs it, embodies the complexities that psychoanalysis introduces into our 
understanding of history, and as I will discuss in the following section, of death and 
ambivalence.  
 
The Uncanny Primitive 
Amongst Freud’s most famous essays, “The Uncanny” [1919], published in 
the wake of the First World War, discusses the curious etymology of the German 
‘unheimlich’, and E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story “The Sandman”. Freud finds in the word 
‘heimlich’ two contrary meanings—both the familiar and the homely, and that which 
is strange and potentially threatening: “[t]hus heimlich is a word the meaning of 
which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its 
opposite, unheimlich.”116 Freud associates Schelling’s definition of the uncanny: 
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“everything is unheimlich that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has 
come to light” with a return of the repressed. 117 Hoffmann’s short story allows him 
to note other aspects of the uncanny: it is aroused by objects that may be either alive 
or dead, and by the idea of the double. The uncanny, as Julia Kristeva puts it in 
Strangers to Ourselves, is “an immanence of the strange within the familiar”.118 
Freud wrote “The Uncanny” just a year before Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
[1920], at a time when European cities were saturated with the absence of those who 
had gone to war and never returned. It is in the latter text that Freud expresses 
resolutely anti-progressivist, anti-evolutionary views: “[t]here is unquestionably no 
universal instinct towards higher development observable in the animal or plant 
world, […] it is often merely a matter of opinion when we declare that one stage of 
development is higher than another, and on the other hand biology teaches us that 
higher development in one respect is very frequently balanced or outweighed by 
involution in another.”119 He had expressed similar sentiments about social 
institutions in an essay written during the war, in which he commented on the feeling 
of disillusionment that Europeans felt seeing what their fellow citizens were capable 
of during wartime: “our fellow-citizens have not sunk so low as we feared, because 
they had never risen so high as we believed”.120 Commenting on how this 
tumultuous recent history inflects “The Uncanny”, the literary critic Hugh Haughton 
writes: “[a]s the literature of the Gothic developed in the wake of secular 
Enlightenment liberalism, revealing the haunting persistence of the architecture, 
religious beliefs and superstitious terrors of the un-Enlightened past, so 
psychoanalysis after the First World War increasingly conjours up a Gothic closet, 
an uncanny double, at the heart of modernity.”121  
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Reading Freud’s essay on the uncanny, the reader encounters the themes of 
death and ambivalence. A feeling of the uncanny arises in relation to death because 
we have no way of mastering the knowledge of death: “the proposition ‘All men are 
mortal’ is paraded in text-books of logic as an example of a generalization, but no 
human being really grasps it, and our unconscious has as little use now as ever for 
the idea of its own mortality.”122 For ‘modern’ people (Freud’s word is “educated”) 
there is something uncanny about death because we have repressed the “highly 
ambiguous and ambivalent” attitude towards the dead, and replaced it with “an 
unambiguous feeling of piety.”123 In Totem and Taboo, Freud had linked 
ambivalence and death: “[a]nyone who investigates the origin and significance of 
dreams of the death of loved relatives (of parents or brothers or sisters) will be able 
to convince himself that dreamers, children and savages are at one in their attitude 
towards the dead- an attitude based upon emotional ambivalence.”124 Freud arrives at 
this link between ambivalence and death after studying the taboos around death 
observed by ‘primitives’. 
Yet this link between death, ambivalence, and primitive would only be fully 
articulated during the First World War, described by Freud, in an essay titled 
“Thoughts for the Times on War and Death”, as “bloody and more destructive than 
any war of other days, because of the enormously increased perfection of weapons of 
attack and defence”.125 In this essay, in a section titled “Our Attitude Towards 
Death”, Freud writes that modern people “showed an unmistakable tendency to put 
death on one side, to eliminate it from life”.126 Further, the death of others was 
accompanied by an attitude of piety, overlooking the person’s misdeeds and 
suspending criticism of them so much so that it seemed that “consideration for the 
dead, who, after all, no longer need it, is more important to us than the truth, and 
certainly, for most of us, than consideration for the living.”127 Turning then to the 
figure of the primitive, Freud writes that the primitive retained, acknowledged the 
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ambivalence towards the dead: “these beloved dead had also been enemies and 
strangers who had aroused in him some degree of hostile feeling.”128 It was 
acknowledgement of this ambivalence, “beside the dead body of the loved one”, that 
led to the first ethical commandment against killing. “[A]cquired in relation to dead 
people who were loved, as a reaction against the satisfaction of the hatred hidden 
behind the grief for them” Freud writes that this prohibition was then “gradually 
extended to strangers who were not loved, and finally even to enemies.” This ethical 
attitude was lost to civilized man: “When the furious struggle of the present war has 
been decided, each one of the victorious fighters will return home joyfully to his 
wife and children, unchecked and undisturbed by thoughts of the enemies he has 
killed whether at close quarters or at long range.” In contrast to this, Freud says that 
‘savages’, 
are far from being remorseless murderers; when they return victorious from 
the war-path they may not set foot in their villages or touch their wives till 
they have atoned for the murders they committed in war by penances which 
are often long and tedious. It is easy, of course, to attribute this to their 
superstition: the savage still goes in fear of the avenging spirits of the slain. 
But the spirits of his slain enemy are nothing but the expression of his bad 
conscience about his blood-guilt; behind this superstition there lies concealed 
a vein of ethical sensitiveness which has been lost by us civilized men.129 
When the ‘primitive’ itself makes an appearance in the text of “The 
Uncanny”, it is once again in a discussion of our attitude towards death. Yet here, 
Freud does not endow the primitive’s attitudes towards death with an ethical charge, 
instead presenting them to the reader as something that can be ‘surmounted’: 
Let us take the uncanny associated with the omnipotence of thoughts, with 
the prompt fulfilment of wishes, with secret injurious powers and with the 
return of the dead. The condition under which the feeling of uncanniness 
arises here is unmistakable. We—or our primitive forefathers—once believed 
that these possibilities were realities, and were convinced that they actually 
happened. Nowadays we no longer believe in them, we have surmounted 
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these modes of thought; but we do not feel quite sure of our new beliefs, and 
the old ones still exist within us ready to seize upon any confirmation […] 
anyone who has completely and finally rid himself of animistic beliefs will 
be insensible to this type of the uncanny.130  
Our ‘primitive forefathers’ were duped, we have come a long way since then, 
and we are capable of further progress towards a rational self—Freud here seems to 
be in flight from his own account, at the beginning of this essay, of our inability to 
fathom death. Instead, he tries to create a distinction between that which has been 
surmounted, and that which is repressed. The distance between primitive and 
civilized is exercised here: “the animistic beliefs of civilized people are in a state of 
having been (to a greater or lesser extent) surmounted [rather than repressed].”131 I 
suggest that this attempt to separate out the primitive from the civilized, the 
surmounted from the repressed is testament to Freud’s attempt to come to terms with 
the violent actions of ‘civilised man’, the devastation surrounding him, while 
attempting to hold on to a benevolent, even hopeful view of civilisation—a crucial 
contradiction in Freud’s work that I explore in the following section. 
  Yet not unlike his other attempts to mark out a difference between the 
primitive and civilized, between past and present, Freud takes away with one hand 
what he gives with the other. Immediately after making this distinction between that 
which is surmounted and that which is repressed, he says that “the distinction is 
often a hazy one”.132 The ‘primitive’ may be occasionally be the fall guy in Freud’s 
attempt to hold on to a progressivist view of civilisation, but he cannot be done away 
with so easily. Psychoanalysis, Freud writes, dealing as it does with the unconscious, 
with problems of death and mourning “has itself become uncanny to many 
people”.133 In saying this, he suggests an intimacy between the primitive and 
psychoanalysis: it is as though the primitive is the double of psychoanalysis: they 
come to occupy the same uncanny place. In his discussion of the uncanny, the 
philosopher and film theorist Mladen Dolar connects it to the Lacanian concept of 
extimité, a dimension that “points neither to the interior nor to the exterior, but is 
located there where the most intimate interiority coincides with the exterior and 
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becomes threatening, provoking horror and anxiety.”134 This allows us to understand 
the simultaneous intimacy and excision of the primitive in psychoanalysis.  
The primitive in psychoanalysis has a privileged relationship to the 
unconscious. This is not the same as saying that the primitive is the unconscious. 
Rather, the construction of the primitive represents a mode of existence that respects 
and acknowledges unconscious mental processes, and is able to create a space for 
them in its way of perceiving the world. This sounds like the goal of psychoanalysis 
itself: “[w]o es war, soll ich werden”, offered by Freud as one of the ends of 
psychoanalysis in his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.135 Freud wrote 
that the ego (das Ich) had to be freed from takeover by the superego, allowing it go 
where the id was. Lacan took up this utterance as a cornerstone of his interpretation 
of Freud. According to him, this is the demand that psychoanalysis makes upon the 
subject—to come to be (werden)  in the place of its jokes, dreams and failures—the 
ways in which the unconscious insists.136 Reading this statement alongside our 
discussion of the primitive, we may add that the end suggested in this statement is to 
come to be in a place where mastery fails, like in the experience of ambivalence, 
which cannot be mastered but which must be accommodated, for which room must 
be made. 
Writing that various commentaries on the uncanny have tried to ascribe a 
content to it, Dolar argues that psychoanalysis is unique in not giving it a content, 
rather maintaining the uncanny as a limit to the possibilities of meaning. It is in this 
relationship of psychoanalysis to the uncanny that Julia Kristeva finds the 
possibilities of an ethical relationship with an other: “[w]ith Freud indeed, 
foreignness, an uncanny one, creeps into the tranquility of reason itself, and, without 
being restricted to madness, beauty, or faith anymore than to ethnicity or race, 
irrigates our very speaking-being, […] we know that we are foreigners to ourselves, 
and it is with the help of that sole support that we can attempt to live with others.”137 
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This question, of a relationship to an other, would continue to absorb Freud, and is at 
the heart of his troubled text, Civilisation and its Discontents. 
Civilisation: The Garrison in a Conquered City 
The concept of ‘civilisation’, just like that of the ‘primitive’, is key to an 
account of psychoanalysis in a colonial situation. As ideal and identification, 
‘civilisation’ floods the writings of the colonial psychoanalysts, anthropologists, and 
administrators whose work I discuss in the following chapters. The history of 
psychoanalysis in India, embedded as it is in a wider colonial context, bears witness 
to just how much could be legitimated by the invocation of this compelling, 
affectively magnetic term, into which congealed fantasy, desire, patriotism and 
imperial identifications. And yet, as we will have the opportunity to note at various 
points in this thesis, something comes unstuck in the attempt to weld psychoanalysis 
to colonialism. As I suggest in the following reading of Freud, psychoanalysis is too 
ambivalent and uneasy about ‘civilisation’ to endorse it as an ideal. In fact, I find 
that both theoretically and historically, Freud’s theories about civilisation are a 
powerful irritant to the civilising mission. 
In an essay titled “‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness” 
[1908], Freud made a link between culture and illness. The demands of sexual 
morality were too great (in the service of a fantasy of sexual difference, of feminine 
innocence, and virtue)—something had to give, so people fell ill. The conflict 
between sexual norms and sexual drives was unbearable, and it was in the 
frustration, and imprisonment of sexual drives that Freud located the ill effects of 
culture. Twenty two years later, in Civilization and its Discontents [1930], Freud 
offered an expanded account of man’s discomfort in civilisation.138 He is eloquent 
about this discomfort: “our possibilities for happiness are already restricted by our 
constitution. Unhappiness is much less difficult to experience.”139 The human 
subject lives under the constant threat of suffering: “from our own body, which is 
doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without pain and anxiety 
as warning signals; from the external world, which may rage against us with 
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overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally from our own 
relations to other men.”140 The world, and life are hard to bear and we cope, he 
writes, only through the help of “powerful deflections” and “substitutive 
satisfactions”, that is, with the help of day dreams and intoxicants. 141 Yet despite 
this multifarious suffering, Freud thinks we are reluctant to identify the cause of our 
discomfort. He arrives at this cause through a process of elimination. The fragility of 
our own bodies, and the force of nature, he writes, cannot be mastered. Here we must 
“submit to the inevitable”.142 What surprises Freud is that we do not immediately 
turn our attention to the remaining source of suffering, “the inadequacy of the 
regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human beings in the family, 
state and society.” We are trapped, it seems, by our own good intentions: “we cannot 
see why the regulations made by ourselves should not, on the contrary, be a 
protection and benefit for everyone of us.” 
Freud had offered a fuller critique of ‘state and society’, during the First 
World War, some fifteen years before he wrote Civilisation and Its Discontents. In 
“Thoughts for the Times on War Death”, he writes: 
 
 The individual citizen can with horror convince himself in this war of what 
would occasionally cross his mind in peace-time—that the state has 
forbidden to the individual the practice of wrongdoing, not because it desires 
to abolish it, but because it desires to monopolize it, like salt and tobacco. A 
belligerent state permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of 
violence, as would disgrace the individual. It makes use against the enemy 
not only of the accepted rules de guerre, but of deliberate lying and deception 
as well—and to a degree which seems to exceed the usage of former wars. 
The state exacts the utmost degree of obedience and sacrifice from its 
citizens, but at the same time it treats them like children by an excess of 
secrecy and a censorship upon news and expressions of opinion which leaves 
the spirits of those whose intellects it thus suppresses defenceless against 
every unfavourable turn of events and every sinister rumour. It absolves itself 
from the guarantees and treaties by which it was bound to other states, and 
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confesses shamelessly to its own rapacity and lust for power, which the 
private individual has then to sanction in the name of patriotism.143  
 
Not only is there something belligerent and power hungry about the State 
during wartime, even at the best of times it only represents the interests of the few. In 
his exchange with Albert Einstein on the question of war, Freud once again identifies 
the injustice inherent in our social arrangements. “The justice of the community” he 
writes in an essay titled “Why War” (1933), “becomes an expression of the unequal 
degrees of power obtaining within it; the laws are made by and for the ruling 
members and find little room for the rights of those in subjection.”144  
The exploration of the discontents of civilisation, Freud suggests, involves 
giving up the idealisation that our social institutions are benevolent and democratic. 
Yet one might also argue that Freud challenges this idealisation at the expense of 
another. He is too quick to accept, perhaps even to wish, that we have accepted as 
‘inevitable’ the vulnerability of our bodies, and the force of nature. Having lived 
through the First World War, Freud was witness to technological warfare, a great 
refusal to accept either human vulnerability or the untameable aspects of the natural 
world. Further, he himself could celebrate such human interventions into nature, 
even likening the work of psychoanalysis to the “draining of the Zuider Zee.”145 
Malcolm Bowie has drawn attention to how the text of Civilisation and its 
Discontents is riven with Freud’s ambivalence about civilisation. Freud mentions, in 
his text, much that he loves in high western, European culture, and is a 
“remembrancer” of this culture.146 Yet it is amongst his beloved artefacts that Freud 
comes up against an impossibility in civilisation, and then, as the theoretician of the 
death drive, he is also “a catastrophist, no longer the admirer and custodian of art-
objects but their scourge.”147 The text is witness to his unresolved struggle to find a 
stable ethical ground for civilisation. 
One of the most striking explorations of this difficulty is to be found in 
Freud’s discussion of the injunction to ‘love the neighbour’. Having found it 
impossible to ground a stable and benevolent civilisation in sexual love, Freud turns 
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to the “one of the ideal demands” of “civilised society”, the injunction to “love thy 
neighbour as thyself”.148 He lists the many barriers in the way of such love—why 
must I love an unworthy stranger, love is precious and would be wasted upon this 
person I do not care about, love given abstractly to “an inhabitant of this earth, like 
an insect, an earth-worm or a grass snake” would be love diluted.149 Further, this 
neighbour may just be hostile towards me, thinking “nothing of jeering at me, 
insulting me, slandering me and showing his superior power”.150 After describing 
these impossibilities in the way of neighbour-love, Freud offers this devastating view 
of human life: 
 
men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can 
defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures 
among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of 
aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential 
helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their 
aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without 
compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his 
possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. 
Homo homini lupus.151 
 
Aggression, Freud finds, “disturbs our relations with our neighbour”.152 Yet 
despite the disturbance that such aggression introduces into culture, “[i]t is clearly 
not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of the inclination to aggression.”153 It is 
this that leads Freud to recapitulate his thesis of the death drive, developed after the 
First World War in his text Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The experiences of shell-
shocked soldiers, of traumatic neuroses, and the observation of children’s play had 
led Freud to revise his former opinion that people are guided by the pleasure 
principle. Existing alongside the pleasure principle he had found a drive towards 
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repetition and death, a beyond of pleasure.154 Human subjects were capable, indeed 
driven to seek out pain and annihilation. Led back to this drive towards aggression 
by his argument in Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud writes that “it constitutes 
the greatest impediment of civilisation.”155 He then argues that “civilisation is a 
special process which mankind undergoes” and that this process is “in the service of 
Eros, whose purpose it is to combine single human individuals, and after that 
families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of 
mankind.”156 Civilisation then, according to Freud, is a struggle between Eros and 
Death. 
Yet just as things seem to be getting clarified into this opposition between 
Eros and Death, Freud finds that the problem of aggressiveness has returned. 
Thinking about how civilisation sets about to limit aggressiveness, Freud finds that it 
does so by internalising it: “it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself 
up over the rest of the ego as a super-ego, and which now, in the form of 
‘conscience’, is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh 
aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous 
individuals.”157 The superego sets itself up, Freud writes, like a garrison in a 
conquered city, keeping watch over things. But there is something insatiable about 
its demands: “[e]very renunciation of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of 
conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter’s severity and 
intolerance.”158 Freud had suggested earlier in the text that civilisation, Eros, was 
opposed to the drive toward aggression. Yet the sacrifice of aggressiveness that 
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civilisation demands ends up magnifying the capacity for aggression, creating the 
superego, which Leo Bersani calls a “monster of moralized violence”. 159  
The problem, Freud seems to be suggesting, is not just aggression, but our 
attempt to control it. Destruction is far worse when it cathects Eros: “[t]he 
satisfaction of these destructive impulses is of course facilitated by their admixture 
with others of an erotic and idealistic kind” Freud wrote in ‘Why War?’ adding that 
“[w]hen we read of the atrocities of the past, it sometimes seems as though the 
idealistic motives served only as an excuse for the destructive appetites and 
sometimes—in the case, for instance, of the cruelties of the Inquisition—it seems as 
though the idealistic motives had pushed themselves forward in consciousness, while 
the destructive ones lent them an unconscious reinforcement.”160 Freud is forging a 
critique of the superego, this upholder of ideals. The description of the superego in 
Civilisation and its Discontents is akin to the description of the cruel and hostile 
neighbour whom we are meant to distrust and fear. We are our own worst 
neighbours, Freud suggests, or to put it in another way—what we most despise and 
fear in the neighbour is already in us, is a part of ourselves.  
The superego sounds not only like the neighbour, but also like Freud’s 
description of the wartime belligerent state, which “exacts the utmost degree of 
obedience and sacrifice” from its citizens, but itself has the most aggressive lust for 
power.161 We take our ideals and institutionalize them. The State, the like superego, 
is a garrison. It is the responsibility of psychoanalysis, Freud writes towards the 
conclusion of Civilisation and its Discontents, to lessen the demands of the 
superego. This is psychoanalysis opposed to totalitarian authority, whether in the 
psyche or the State. Or, as Joan Copjec writes: “[m]oral order is established, 
according to psychoanalysis, not in obedience to some reasonable or compassionate 
command to sacrifice our pleasure to the state but because we recoil before the 
violence and obscenity of the superego’s encitement to jouissance, to a boundless 
and aggressive enjoyment.”162 We have come some distance from Freud’s position, 
in “‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness”, where the ill effects of 
culture are found to be concentrated in what it does to sexual expression. Though 
Freud’s later account of the discontents of civilisation is not limited to the difficulties 
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of an interpersonal sexual encounter, the sexual-libidinal remains a constitutive 
element in Freud’s account of civilisation, and, as I suggest in the following section, 
vital to understanding psychoanalysis in India. 
 
Polymorphous Perversity 
The colonial psychoanalysts I discuss in the following chapter share with 
Freud the idea that the sexual was a privileged site of interpretation, but theirs was a 
narrow interpretation of the sexual, and one endowed with normative content. 
Nevertheless, questions of sexuality that surface in their writing both confuse and 
disturb its intent. Their attempt to navigate the sexual in writing, despite all attempts 
at containment, troubles the project of offering an account of a masterful self in full 
possession of itself. In psychoanalysis, the concept of the sexual not only indicates 
that aspect of the subject that is most difficult to master, as I argue in the following 
discussion of Freud’s writings on sexuality, it is also a point in the theory that offers 
the greatest resistance to being tied to a normative account of the subject. Or as 
Freud puts it: “[i]t is precisely in the sphere of sexual life that we encounter peculiar, 
indeed presently insoluble, difficulties as soon as we try to draw a sharp line to 
distinguish mere variations within the physiological range from pathological 
symptoms.”163 This is crucial in a colonial context, as analysts speaking in the name 
of psychoanalysis, or cultural commentators drawing upon a psychological 
vocabulary, often used adjectives such as ‘infantile’, or ‘perverse’ as a way of 
pathologizing the native population and legitimating colonial authority. Attempts to 
put together a psychoanalytically informed colonial discourse, of which we will 
encounter many iterations in this thesis, are, I suggest, undermined from within by 
the treatment the categories of childhood and perversion receive in Freud’s writing, 
notably the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. At the same time, Freud’s 
arguments in this text also provide a vigorous antidote to the language of 
evolutionary condemnation in which ‘natives’ were described by colonial 
anthropologists, especially the Naga tribes I discuss in Chapter 4, or the dismissal of 
anti-colonial political organising as ‘perverse’, which I have the opportunity to 
discuss in Chapters 2 and 5. 
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Freud begins his Three Essays by challenging the contemporary idea of a 
“genital drive”, finding that such assumptions of a natural heterosexual genital 
sexuality “abound in errors, inaccuracies, and hastily drawn conclusions.”164 Instead, 
he argues that the range of practices and objects through which people negotiate their 
sexuality suggests a sexual drive that does not have a specific aim and is not 
genitally focussed.165 Further, the sexual drive has no proper object, the object and 
the drive are “merely soldered together.”166 It is a discussion of the category of 
perversion that allows Freud to arrive at these conclusions, but in doing so he 
transforms how perversion is understood. Freud finds that the acts and objects 
designated as perverse share far too much with ordinarily acceptable acts to merit 
conceptual distinction. Their categorisation as perverse owes itself to a feeling of 
disgust which is “purely conventional”, because “a man who passionately kisses the 
lips of a pretty girl may be disgusted at the idea of using her toothbrush, even though 
there are no grounds for supposing that his own oral cavity, for which he feels no 
disgust, is any cleaner than that of the girl.”167 Rejecting disgust as a basis for 
theorisation, Freud then finds that seemingly unconventional object-choices, such as 
a slipper or a lock of hair, which would be designated as fetishistic, share with 
culturally celebrated love the feature of the “psychologically necessary overvaluation 
of the sexual object, which inevitably extends to everything that is associated with 
it.”168 As Arnold I Davidson puts it in his consummate reading of the Three Essays: 
“[t]he notion of appropriateness has lost all of its conceptual plausibility because the 
concept of the sexual drive is detached from that of a natural object and aim.”169  
Freud offered this account of the sexual drive against the backdrop of an 
assumed natural, normal function of the sexual instinct amongst nineteenth century 
sexologists and psychiatrists. In their writing there had been “a virtual explosion of 
medical discussions about the sexual perversions.”170 Davidson points out that the 
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prevailing discussions of perversion, understood as the disturbance of a sexual 
instinct, were based on an “unargued unanimity both on the fact that this instinct 
does have a natural function and on what that function is.”171 Freud’s intervention 
was, in Davidson’s evocative phrasing, “conceptually devastating”.172 Instead of 
seeing perversions as the diseases of the sexual drive, Freud finds them illustrative of 
the drive’s fundamental nature. Instead of pathologising perversion, he locates it at 
the centre of human sexuality: “there is no healthy person who does not have any so-
called perverse addition to the normal sexual aim, and the universality of this finding 
is sufficient reason to show how inappropriate it is to use the word ‘perversion’ as a 
term of reproach.”173 In fact, later in the Three Essays Freud will describe the infant 
as “polymorphously perverse”, once again underscoring the universality of 
perversion.174 
The objectless, aim bereft character of the sexual drive is further underscored 
by Freud’s account of infantile sexuality. As Phillipe van Haute and Herman 
Westerink write in their Introduction to the English translation of Freud’s Three 
Essays, “the adjective ‘polymorphous’ underscores the idea that infantile sexuality is 
not structured by any innate principle or order.”175 The activity that Freud takes as 
the model for infantile sexuality, “sensual sucking”, doesn’t have a proper object: “A 
part of the lip itself, the tongue, or any other random part of the skin within reach —
even the big toe—may be taken as the object upon which sucking is carried out.”176 
This description of the infant’s satisfaction in sucking allows Freud to discuss two 
other aspects of sexuality: that it can take be autoerotic, that is, the infant can take 
satisfaction in a part of its own body, and that it seems to repeat a previous pleasure, 
that of sucking at the mother’s breast. Yet what was once connected to an other, and 
to a function (feeding), is capable of exceeding, and doing without both the original 
object and purpose in its quest for, and attainment of pleasure. Here we can see, in 
the account of the infants’ sensual sucking, the seeds of the key psychoanalytic 
concepts of narcissism and repetition, which will be crucial to Freud’s account of the 
human subject. Given the key explanatory position that Freud accords infantile 
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sexuality, it would be absurd to levy the charge of infantilism against someone, just 
as it would be to use perversion as an insult, but this is precisely what colonial 
psychoanalysts did in their writings about ‘native’ populations. 
Yet Freud does not leave his account of sexuality here. The Three Essays are 
an exploration of the multiple, proliferating manifestations of sexuality, testament to 
the inventiveness of the sexual drive, but they are also a narrative of loss. Freud is 
also concerned with how the polymorphous sexuality of the infant comes to be 
restricted and channelled. Freud’s account of the body, to borrow Joan Copjec’s 
phrase, “privileges the voluptuary dimension of corporeality.”177 It is a question for 
him how the polymorphously perverse infant, sensually sucking away, turns in an 
adult with a limited repertoire of sexual possibility. The text of the Three Essays was 
subject to major revisions, with Freud adding many new sections to the 1905 edition. 
The contradictory, divided nature of Freud’s writing, which has been a thread in my 
exploration of Freud, is fundamental to this text which is marked by what Leo 
Bersani has called a “beneficient discursive stammering”.178  In later editions of the 
Three Essays, Freud added a section on “Phases in the Development of Sexual 
Organization” in which he writes that the infantile sexual organisation transforms 
into “the so-called normal sexual life of the adult” where “the acquisition of pleasure 
is placed at the service of the function of reproduction”, a “single erogenous zone” 
dominates, and a particular sexual act is sought with a sexual object that is not one’s 
own body.179 He also identifies stages in sexual development: the pregenital 
organisations, ambivalence, and dual-phasic object choice. 
Various commentators on the Three Essays have questioned the ‘teleological’ 
account of sexual stages added by Freud to his account of human sexuality. Leo 
Bersani has drawn attention to the conflict in Freud between the two models of 
sexuality, the infantile and the teleological. It is clear that Freud never gives up the 
infantile model of sexuality, indeed that it occupies a privileged place in his account 
of human sexuality: “In speaking of the difficulty which psychoanalysis has in 
defining sexuality, Freud writes—in spite of himself?—as if infantile sexuality were 
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sexuality itself”.180 The editors and translator of the 1905 edition identify it as 
version more aligned to theories of feminism and a subversive account of sexuality. 
Yet I think it is possible, without compromising the subversive potential of 
acknowledging the polymorphous perversity at the heart of every human subject, to 
be interested in the question of how this inventive, insistent sexual drive allows itself 
to be channeled and marshalled, and whether such attempts to direct it are ever fully 
successful. Freud’s later additions to the Three Essays introduce the problems of 
identity and authority, which, as I noted in my Introduction, are germane to an 
exploration of psychoanalysis in a colonial context.  
The problem of authority links Freud’s thinking on civilisation to his 
accounts of childhood sexuality. Though Freud offered many variations on the 
trajectory of the Oedipus complex, he always acknowledged the mother was the 
primary object and attachment for the infant. Yet it is the fate of each infant to 
realise that there are rivals for the mother’s affection, primarily the father, and that it 
is not capable of satisfying the mother. This experience of rivalry and of the self’s 
inadequacy is intimately associated with how the body comes to be inhabited and 
sexuated. Freud writes that the boy fears a loss that the stronger rival, the father, will 
carry out, while the girl begins by accepting her loss and seeking compensation for 
it, in the hope that the father may provide her with a substitute for what she thinks 
she has lost. The penis comes to symbolize, for the boy, the object that can be taken 
away, and for the girl, the lost object. While it is beyond the scope of my discussion 
here to go into the details of this account, this summary already shows that all infants 
irrespective of where they line up in accordance with sexual difference, form a 
relationship to authority—whether one of fearing it, or of soliciting it, and that this 
shapes their identity as masculine or feminine subjects. 
Fantasies of authority were involved in how psychoanalysis was 
institutionalised in Europe, and established in India. Further, psychoanalysis in India 
was involved in questions of administration, empire, and the formation of a nation, 
and its history is bound up with how structures of power were negotiated and 
challenged. As we will see, colonial authority often presented itself as a paternal 
authority, frequently as a matter of course. This persistence of the paternal in the 
administrative, the familial in the governmental is illuminated by Freud’s writings, 
                                                
180. Bersani, The Freudian Body, 32. 
65	
	
which explore the question of authority, both in the childhood nursery and in the 
political rally. In the historical discussions in the following chapters and the 
subsequent account of Freud’s text on group psychology, questions of identity and 
authority accompany each other. 
 
Family Romance: Leaders and Fathers 
In his essay “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego”, Freud refused 
the hypothesis of a “herd instinct” or “group mind”, suggesting instead that the 
psychology of “man as a member of a race, of a nation, of a caste, of a profession, of 
an institution or as a component part of crowd of people who have been organized 
into a group at some particular time for some definite purpose” was intimately linked 
to situations where the influence was exercised by a single person, or a small number 
of people who were of immense importance.181 Libidinal ties are common to both 
these situations, and according to Freud, were at the heart of the constitution of a 
group. Yet what allows these ties to be organized into a group in which the usual 
aggression towards the neighbour is absent? In a group, individuals “behave as 
though they were uniform, tolerate the peculiarities of its other members, equate 
themselves with them, and have no feelings of aversion towards them.”182 Freud’s 
attempt to investigate this curious state of affairs leads him into an extended 
discussion of identification. 
Identification, Freud writes, is the earliest expression of “an emotional tie”, 
involving a kind of swallowing of the object, thus combining assimilation and 
annihilation.183 He then defines a group as “a number of individuals who have put 
one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently 
identified themselves with one another in their ego.”184 Yet something else is 
required to bring about this situation. Describing the Church and Army, Freud finds 
that to hold itself together, a group needs a leader “who loves all the individuals with 
an equal love”.185 Freud arrives at his definition of a group after discussing the states 
of being in love, and hypnosis. In both states, he suggests, what is prominent is a 
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compromise of the ability to apprehend reality. Freud links both these states to the 
psychological state of a group, assimilating the figure of the beloved and the 
hypnotist to the leader of a group. In the situations of being in love, as part of a 
group, or in hypnosis, reality may be filtered, distorted or constructed by the libidinal 
situation—the love object comes to occupy the place of the ego ideal. Bound by 
intense ties to the leader, (Freud suggests that the place of the leader can be taken by 
a leading idea) and to other members, the psyche of the individual in a group is 
“impoverished”.186 So, when the group collapses, there is panic. Yet authority brings 
forth ambivalence—the leader-father both provides and prohibits. Given that the 
members of a group orient themselves through the leader, and the dissolution of the 
group releases panic, this ambivalence is rarely acknowledged within the group. 
Freud returns to his mythology of the primal horde in his essay on group 
psychology. In his narrative, the primal father prevented the sons from satisfying 
their sexual desires so that these could be rechanneled into emotional ties with him 
and with the rest of the group: “He forced them, so to speak, into group psychology. 
His sexual jealousy and intolerance became in the last resort the causes of group 
psychology.”187 Returning to a description of present day conditions, Freud writes: 
“[w]e have seen that with an army and Church this contrivance is the illusion that the 
leader loves all of the individuals equally and justly. But this is simply an idealistic 
remodeling of the state of affairs in the primal horde, where all of the sons knew that 
they were equally persecuted by the primal father, and feared him equally.”188  
The question of the leader continued to trouble Freud till the end of his life. 
He returned to it in Moses and Monotheism, in his discussion of Moses, and in his 
attempt to sketch a portrait of ‘The Great Man’, someone who influences his fellow 
men with his personality, and with an idea that he puts forward. Freud writes:  
 
We know that in the mass of mankind there is a powerful need for an 
authority who can be admired, before whom one bows down, by whom one is 
ruled and perhaps even ill- treated. We have learnt from the psychology of 
individual men what the origin is of this need of the masses. It is a longing 
for the father felt by everyone from his childhood onwards, for the same 
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father whom the hero of legend boasts he has overcome. And now it may 
begin to dawn on us that all the characteristics with which we equipped the 
great man are paternal characteristics, and that the essence of great men for 
which we vainly searched lies in this conformity. The decisiveness of 
thought, the strength of will, the energy of action are part of the picture of a 
father—but above all the autonomy and independence of the great man, his 
divine unconcern which may grow into ruthlessness.189 
 
The ‘authority by whom one is ill-treated’ immediately calls forth the 
description of the superego in Civilization and Its Discontents, and Freud attributes 
to the great man the part of the superego in group psychology.190 Here, Freud 
continues to use the father as the model for the leader, as he does in Group 
Psychology when he turns to the hypothesis of the primal horde to test out his theory 
of groups. If a group shares, as Freud argues, both an ideal and a superego, then this 
would go some way in helping us understand why collectives can be so violent. The 
hatred that arises in a group towards the leader as prohibiting father needs to be 
routinely excised so that the group can keep the leader (which occupies the place of 
the ideal), and therefore itself, in place. Yet since the leader, the shared ego ideal, is 
also the superego, all the brutality that Freud attributed to the superego is sanctioned, 
even demanded by the leader. 
This is not an optimistic picture of collective life, or of parental authority. 
This is precisely why Freud’s diagnosis of leader-dependence in groups holds true 
not just for armies or churches but also sheds light on colonialism. In the following 
chapters, we will have a chance to discuss how colonial rule was not only presented 
in terms of parental authority, but also as allegiance to a leading idea: whether 
progress or civilisation. Freud not only queries these ideas, he also shows the 
violence that can be released when collective life is organized around them (for that 
matter, around any ideal). I would like to suggest that the mythology of the primal 
horde, wherein all authority is concentrated in a single figure, was not so much a 
description of present day ‘primitive’ societies, as a construction in analysis, in 
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which Freud attempts to understand the malaise of European political organization—
both within and outside Europe.  
Yet Freud “never criticized ‘group psychology’” writes Mikkel Borch 
Jacobsen, because he saw it as “the very essence of society”.191 Freud’s description 
of the attraction towards totalitarian authority is compelling, illuminating, but he also 
seems drawn towards such a structure of authority.  In Civilization and its 
Discontents he can only imagine civilisation organized around a leader: “there are 
difficulties attaching to the nature of civilization which will not yield to any attempt 
at reform. […] the bonds of a society are chiefly constituted by the identification of 
its members with one another, while individuals of the leader type do not acquire the 
importance that should fall to them in the formation of a group.”192 Borch Jacobsen 
also reminds us that Freud, in “Why War” wrote that people were innately, 
inevitably grouped into leaders and followers.  
In his essay “Family Romances”, Freud suggested that we like to construct 
fantasies in which we learn that our ‘real’ parents are exalted and powerful persons, 
from whom we have somehow been separated and handed over to our all too 
ordinary parents. These fantasies usually concern the father, as his relation to the 
child is more difficult to establish than the mother’s. However, Freud tells us, in 
constructing these stories we are only reaching back to a time when our own parents 
did indeed seem all powerful and awe-inspiring: “the happy, vanished days when his 
father seemed to him the noblest and strongest of men and his mother the dearest and 
loveliest of women.”193 Borch Jacobsen points out that Freud himself was keen to 
occupy the position of group-leader in the institutional history of psychoanalysis, 
participating in and constructing a family romance of himself as father-leader. And 
yet it is the myth of the primal father itself that presents the opportunity for the 
dissolution of such a posture of authority. For, as Borch Jacobsen reminds us, the 
authority of this primal father is retrospective, that is, it is the remorse that is felt at 
his killing which institutes the social bond. This is a vision of society held together, 
not by a totalitarian leader, but by shared acknowledgement of criminality, and a 
mourning of the past. 
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Ancestors and Ambivalence 
In his essay “The Unconscious” [1915], Freud wrote that “the contents of the 
unconscious may be compared to an aboriginal population in the mind.”194 Here, 
Freud sounds remarkably like the nganga (healer) John Chavafambira, the subject of 
Wulf Sachs’ study Black Hamlet (1937). Chavafambira healed people by 
communicating with his ancestors, who were voices to whom he could speak, and 
listen. I have tried to show that in Freud’s work, there is a remarkable affinity 
between the ethical dimension of psychoanalysis, and the figure of the primitive. A 
reading of Freud for colonial history, then, is not in spite of what Freud says about 
the primitive, rather, it is routed through this figure.  
In his seminar The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan discusses the 
ethical act of Antigone, heroine of Sophocles’ play. Her brother Polynices, declared 
an enemy of the City, has been “left unwept, unburied, a lovely treasure for birds that 
scan the field and feast to their heart’s content.”195Adamant that he be mourned and 
accorded the rituals due to the dead, Antigone stands up to the City, at the penalty of 
death. Walled alive in her tomb for performing the burial rites of her brother, 
Antigone speaks: 
“Never, I tell you, 
if I had been the mother of children 
or if my husband died, exposed and rotting— 
I’d never have taken this ordeal upon myself, 
Never defied our people’s will. What law, 
You ask, do I satisfy with what I say? 
A husband dead there may have been another. 
A child by another too, if I had lost the first. 
But mother and father both lost in the halls of Death, 
No brother could ever spring to light again. 
For this law alone I held you first in honor.”196 
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Lacan points out that “[o]ver the centuries the reasoning found in that 
extraordinary justification has always left people uncertain” and that even Goethe 
expressed the wish that these lines be found out to be a later addition to Sophocles’ 
play.197 Yet, as Lacan points out, it is not simply that Antigone’s brother is 
irreplaceable. As the son of Oedipus and Jocosta, he is the son of an unfortunate, 
criminal alliance. Her sister Ismene reminds Antigone of the criminality of their 
parents: “think how our own father died, hated” and “then mother…mother and wife, 
both in one”.198 It is this dimension of atrocity that Lacan identifies as the family Atè, 
writing: “Antigone chooses to be purely and simply the being of the criminal as such 
[…] Antigone perpetuates, eternalizes, immortalizes that Atè.”199 Like Freud’s 
primitive, Antigone mourns for the enemy of the city. Like the primitive mourning 
by the body of the dead enemy, she maintains her relationship with her ancestors, 
mourning and attending to what is criminal, in herself and another. 
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Know thy Neighbour? 
And another thing. I did not want to know this thing, but I did know all the same. 
-Deborah Levy, Things I Don’t Want To Know 
 
A young man sat in Freud’s house, looking at papers and talking. He felt somewhat 
concerned that the best part of lunch at his hotel would be gone by the time he got 
back, but he felt the desire to linger. He picked up his hat, noting that it was a nice 
one, and then felt uncertain about how to put it on—he turned the front of the rim up, 
then down. He put the hat down and then started talking, only to feel, again, that he 
should be leaving. He looked for his hat, but couldn’t find it. The hat he saw now 
was shabby, he couldn’t think of it as his. And Mrs Freud was saying something 
about meat, asking him whether he ate much of it, saying something about meat once 
a day. He thought that this must be a healthy regulation somehow connected to the 
Jewish religion, though he didn’t think the Freuds were practising Jews… 
 The year was 1921, the Freuds seemed to be in Simla, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Claud Daly woke up from his dream in the Chief Commissioner’s Province 
of Balochistan in British India.200 Balochistan was not an easy posting. Daly was 
posted in Quetta, close to the border with Afghanistan. This was an uneasy frontier, 
and the British had never quite been able to consolidate their influence there, settling 
instead for a tenuous acceptance of their authority by the frontier populations. This 
acceptance was secured by regular payments to the tribes in which the frontier 
populations were organised, as well as armed expeditions against those tribes that 
refused to acknowledge British authority. British forays into neighbouring 
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Afghanistan had always been spectacular failures, and so the bordering mountains 
had come to be seen as the ‘scientific frontier’ for India’s defence.201 
Freud theorised the unconscious as a realm where contraries exist side by 
side, where there are no barriers, no boundaries and no sense of time. In Quetta, in 
the fraught and tenuously held borderlands of British India, in a political and social 
landscape marred by divisions and boundaries, Claud Daly conducted his 
engagement with psychoanalysis. It is my argument in this chapter that he could only 
do so as a form of mastery, that is by trying to submit his unconscious to conscious 
knowledge. Dreams or fantasies had to be interpreted, so that they could be fully 
known and mastered, yet the diaries are also witness to how psychoanalysis thwarts 
attempts to align it to a project of mastery. Writing in pencil on the pages of army 
standard issue registers, Daly would write out dreams, followed by page upon page 
of his associations and interpretations. Sometimes, part of the diary would have been 
used for military training exercises, and then flipped over and turned upside down to 
begin a record of the dreams. His diaries take us to a place where the borders 
between history, politics and psychoanalysis are thin—if present at all.  
An officer in the Supply and Transport Corps, Daly had been introduced to 
psychoanalysis during the Great War, when he was sent to Ernest Jones for treatment 
of shell shock.202 It was Jones who sent him to Freud for analysis, hoping in this way 
to supplement Freud’s income, which was a concern at the time due to post war 
currency devaluation.203 Neither Freud nor Jones had a very high opinion of Daly. 
Jones called him “rather an ass”204 and Freud referred to him as “that fool Daly”.205 
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Still, Daly remained determined to become an analyst after he had “served his term 
in India”.206 
After analyses with Freud and Jones, Daly went to Budapest for an analysis 
with Sandor Ferenczi. Freud and Ferenczi also discussed their post-war financial 
troubles in their letters to each other. Freud mentioned how his income relied on the 
analysands sent by Jones: “but what will happen if Jones can’t send any more?” he 
wrote.207 Later, Daly was sent to Ferenczi for an analysis. He is usually mentioned in 
the letters of his analysts in relation to money—at first the post war financial 
troubles, later the money he asked one analyst to pass on to another. Both Daly and 
his money were much exchanged amongst his analysts. Reading the letters that they 
wrote, it is difficult not to notice their lack of concern for him as a patient. He seems 
to have been a blessing in that he was a source of income, and an inconvenience as 
an analysand. 
Daly’s bond with them was much more intensely emotional. All three of his 
analysts were important figures in his psychic life, and his diaries abound with 
passionate and involved accounts of them. One of Daly’s many anxieties was the 
lack of regard of his analysts for him—and this was mixed up with his complicated 
relationships with his parents and siblings.208 Far away from the European capitals in 
which he met his analysts, over a period of ten years, Daly’s writing suggests he was 
tying himself up in knots trying to think of ways in which he could secure their love, 
please them and have his ideas recognised by them. When he left military service in 
India he went to Vienna for analysis with Freud, and subsequently started practicing 
as an analyst.209 Like H.D., who wrote about her fantasies of being Freud’s heir, 
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Daly’s diaries, as I discuss in this chapter, also express his involvement in questions 
of succession and transgression in relation to Freud, both as analyst and as founding 
figure, and to the institution of psychoanalysis. 
In the Introduction to this thesis, I offered an account of how a fantasy about 
‘India’ came into circulation in psychoanalytic networks, and the institutional and 
theoretical consequences of the desire to establish psychoanalysis in what Freud and 
Jones referred to as a ‘faraway’ location. To explore these questions further, in this 
chapter Claud Daly’s diaries are read alongside the autobiography of Owen A.R. 
Berkeley Hill, a doctor and Superintendent of the Ranchi European Mental Hospital.   
The work of these two analysts, who spent considerable parts of their life in India, 
allows us to observe not just the fantasmatic elements of the location ‘India’, but also 
the ways in which the historical specificity of the location and its political situation 
confronted these analysts.   
Berkeley Hill’s autobiography, titled All Too Human, discusses his family 
life and career, as well as his service in the First World War. Both Claud Daly and 
Berkeley Hill were members of the Indian Psychoanalytical Society, and reading 
their autobiographical writing allows us to ask what form of psychoanalysis could be 
sustained by these two members of the colonial administration in British India. Daly 
and Berkeley Hill are linked by the time they spent in India, as well as through other 
social and professional connections. They both knew Ernest Jones. Berkeley Hill 
made his acquaintance sometime after the Boer war, when Jones shared a house on 
Harley Street with Wilfred Trotter. He was introduced to psychoanalysis by Ernest 
Jones, after he had already developed an interest in psychiatry during his time 
studying in Göttingen. Claud Daly, who was a teenaged soldier in the Boer War (he 
enlisted by lying about his age), would not make Jones’s acquaintance for another 
decade, until the next war he fought in. In the First World War, Daly served on the 
Western front in Europe, and Berkeley Hill in East Africa.  
In the work of both analysts, the reader encounters subjectivities shaped by 
colonialism and war, as well as the social codes and expectations of the time. 
Considering their writing allows us to observe the fascinating interplay between the 
demands and effects on the psyche of large scale social phenomena, and how these 
                                                                                                                                     
own diaries. This is an interesting mistake, as both Rickman and Daly began their analysis with Freud 
in the same year, both having been sent there by Ernest Jones. John Rickman, “Claud Dangar Daly Lt-
Col (Ret) 1884-1950,” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 31, (1950): 290-291. 
75	
	
interact with, and impact the internal imperatives of psychic processes, a question 
that accompanies each of the chapters in this thesis. One can observe both the 
constraints and the room for manoeuvre and witness how political and historical 
conditions became internal to the psyche—in the construction of fantasy and the 
direction of desire— and yet how there was a uniquely personal way of coming to be 
within, and responding to, these historical conditions. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Freud’s deliberations, in Civilisation 
and its Discontents, on the injunction to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ show its 
turbulent underside and prevent it from being a guarantor of ethical action. In this 
chapter, the question of the relationship to the neighbour undergoes further torsion. 
Claud Daly and Berkeley Hill’s writing presents a scenario where ‘civilisation’ was 
the prerogative of only a few people amongst many, and the injunction to love the 
neighbour was seemingly suspended. These psychoanalytic accounts of British India 
therefore refract the difficulties Freud faced in finding a stable ethical ground for 
civilisation, through the prism of a colonial history in which they themselves were 
entangled. 
Today, the psychoanalytic articles that Berkley Hill and Claud Daly wrote 
would be called racist. But if we look at their autobiographical writing, we find that 
this ‘racism’ was not a unitary thing. I think it is important to pay attention to the 
ways in which they were divided inside themselves, at war with their own opinions. 
These contradictions help us see how fragile a position of colonial mastery may be, 
while at the same time acknowledging that this very fragility and contradiction was 
resolved through epistemic and physical violence towards an other. In a colonial 
setting, claims to superior knowledge were often the justification for domination, just 
as sexuality was a site for both the consolidation and the undoing of a position of 
mastery. As we will see, the colonial situation, as it is negotiated in these analysts’ 
writing, knots the problem of the relationship to an other with questions of sexuality 
and knowledge. 
 
‘A Room Suitable for Psychoanalytic Treatment’ 
In 1918, amidst much discussion as to who or what was meant by 'European', 
inmates of the Lunatic asylums at Behrampore were transferred to the newly 
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constructed Ranchi Central Lunatic Asylum for Europeans.210 A year later, Owen 
A.R. Berkeley Hill of the Indian Medical Service was appointed as the 
Superintendent of the Hospital, a post that he occupied till his retirement in 1934. 
This is how Berkeley Hill described the asylum: 
 
Vast sums of money had been expended in erecting this fantastic asylum, but 
nowhere more wastefully than in constructing a wall sixteen feet high around 
the whole area, that is, around eighteen acres! One result of this useless 
expenditure was that when the time came to realise that lunatics wear clothes, 
eat and drink and like to sleep on beds, and that beds connote bedding, there 
was hardly any money left to provide even the barest necessities.211 
 
His opinion was shared by J.V. Jameson, who wrote a letter to The Statesman 
in 1920, condemning the state of the asylum: “[i]s it to be wondered at that a man 
accustomed to the ordinary amenities and comforts of life, whose brain has been 
affected by illness or accident, should imagine that he has been put into jail for some 
unknown offence, when he finds himself confined to a small grey prison cell? For a 
prison cell it is in all but name, its door with a barred opening covered by a wooden 
slide to enable the keepers to see in.”212 In his letter, he held the Government of India 
responsible for this dismal state of affairs, and not the asylum authorities, which in 
                                                
210. It was reported that: 
The outstanding event of the triennium is the opening of the Ranchi Central Lunatic Asylum 
for Europeans and the transfer to it of European and Anglo-Indian inmates of the Bhawanipur 
and Berhampore Lunatic Asylums towards the latter part of the year 1918. […] Although the 
matter of selection of transferees was carefully gone into in communication with Government 
before their actual transfer, the Bihar and Orissa Government, shortly after the arrival of the 
lunatics at Ranchi, protested against the action of this Government in having sent patients who, 
it was alleged, were Indian Christians, and not Europeans, for whom alone the Ranchi Asylum 
was intended. This protest was accompanied by a proposal to re-transfer 31 patients to Bengal, 
on the ground that they were not strictly Europeans. Subsequently, in October 1919, the 
Government of India laid down a clear definition of the class of patients who should be 
considered to be eligible for admission into the Ranchi European Lunatic Asylum. They ruled 
that Europeans and Americans would be eligible, including persons of mixed blood whose 
habits are those of Europeans, and that the term European should be held to include persons 
born in the British Colonies and dominions and their descendants being either purely white or 
of mixed blood, subject to the same proviso as to European habits. In consequence of this 
ruling only 3, out of the 31 patients proposed to be re-transferred, were found to be taken back 
to Behrampore. They have, however, not yet arrived.  
Lieutenant Colonel F. O’Kinealy, Triennial Report on the Lunatic Asylums in Bengal for the  
years 1918,1919 and 1920. Printed document, File no. 96/3, Home Department, Jails 1921-1922, 
National Archives of India [NAI], New Delhi. 
211. Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill, All too Human (London: Peter Davies, 1939), 244. 




his opinion were doing whatever they could given the meagre resources that were 
sanctioned them, or, in Jameson's words, “the usual official lethargy and inertia, and, 
above all, by that official outlook in financial matters which cannot get beyond the 
comparison of this year’s figures with last year’s.”213 
Reading Berkeley Hill's annual reports on the asylum (the institution was 
renamed a mental hospital in 1922), one gets the sense that every new tile that was 
installed in the building had to be prised from a stone wall of bureaucratic neglect 
and miserliness.214 The funds that were sanctioned seemed to have been determined 
by a toss-up between the imperative to spend as little money as possible and the 
desire to preserve some sort of benign public reputation which had been 
compromised by letters such as the one Jameson wrote. An administrator such as 
Berkeley Hill was a bit of a nuisance, and the annual reports on him by his superiors 
attest to this: “[h]is keeness for the improvement of his hospital and the advancement 
of psychiatry often led him into opposition with authority of which he is not very 
tolerant” and, “[i]t is always difficult to report with fairness on this officer. His 
abilities have frequently been referred to. [...] It is his impulsiveness which makes 
trouble and he should sleep on some of his problems before committing his views to 
paper.”215 
                                                
213. J.V. Jameson, “THE RANCHI ASYLUM: To the Editor of ‘The Statesman’”, The Statesman, 19 
September, 1920. 
214. See for example, this extract from a report on the Ranchi European Mental Asylum by the 
European Association:  
The various blocks for patients appear to be sufficiently large but it is unfortunate that the	
walls and floors should have all been finished in natural grey cement. This cement colour is 
peculiarly depressing and even the band of red paint at the top edge of the cement does not 
serve to break the monotony of the large area of drab grey. This is a matter of some importance 
as it will certainly in some cases retard the recovery of the patients. We suggest that certain 
rooms such as the mess rooms might have the dado painted with some good washable enamel 
of suitable colour; but the cells are more difficult to improve as many patients scribble on the 
walls and as the cement was not coloured at the time of construction it would be expensive to 
remove it all now and replace it with coloured. However a few single rooms primarily intended 
for paying patients, should certainly have the cement on the walls replaced by plain or better 
still decorated tiles. Even then the rooms would not compare favourably with those now being 
constructed at Bhowanipore Calcutta, where the rooms for paying patients are being provided 
with polished marble floors, glazed tile wall and low windows. 
A.C. Atkinson and W.W. Kennedy, Report to the Committee of the Calcutta Branch of the European 
Association Calcutta the 20th July 1920. Printed document, File no. 88, Home Department, Jails 
1921- 1922 NAI. 
215. L/MIL/14/5, India Office Records and Private Papers [IORPP], London. For Hill's account of his 
confrontations with the administration, see All Too Human. 
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This situation of an overcrowded, understaffed and ill-maintained asylum 
was fairly common in Indian asylums and in other colonised countries.216 What 
attracts our attention  is that this is the place out of which Berkeley Hill conducted 
his psychoanalytic work and produced his psychoanalytic writings. Some of the 
articles compiled in his Collected Papers are mentioned in the asylum report for 
1921-23. In this report on the asylum, Berkeley Hill writes that “the psychological 
laboratory has been finished and a room suitable for psychoanalytic treatment is at 
last at our disposal.”217 Despite this room having materialised (at last!), infrastructure 
remained lacking: “the only available place in this hospital for pathological and 
microscopical work is a disused lavatory measuring 7’-9”— 8’-0’.” Still, Berkeley 
Hill remained hopeful, suggesting that if research facilities at the asylum were 
improved, a trained alienist from one of the European countries impoverished after 
the Versailles treaty may be invited to work in Ranchi. 
The stressful and straitened circumstances that Berkeley Hill and his patients 
found themselves in sound most unlike the room described by H.D. in her memoir of 
Freud, her words suffused with the warmth of the old porcelain stove. 
Psychoanalytic treatment often presumes a room, or is assumed to take place in a 
room. We can perhaps ask, thinking of this absent/present room, about what might 
hang upon the space in which psychoanalytic treatment is practiced. We can turn 
again to H.D.'s analysis for a clue –she mentions her slight sense of unease when the 
analysis shifted to the country house where she met Freud during the summer and 
how the analysis never felt quite in earnest when it was carried out there. It is not 
surprising that patients may come to see their analyst's room as both a shelter and 
refuge, to use its continuity as a sort of transitional object, an object or space that 
allows the patient to learn that things continue to exist even when the patient is not 
there to see them, and yet which can be acted upon and transformed.218 
  The objects in Freud's room were placed there as much through his interest in 
them as through a historical colonial encounter, which led to some places being the 
                                                
216. Sanjeev Jain and James Mills “The History of modern psychiatry in India 1858-1947” History of 
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217. Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill Report of the European Mental Hospital at Ranchi for the Triennium 
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sites where artefacts came from, and other places where collectors lived. However, 
these objects in the analytic room also played a part in analysis, if we are to think 
about how the patient being analysed may not be a contained self, but as much a 
composition of floating desires and associations. The continuity of the objects, as 
well as their unique forms offered an opportunity for containment to patients 
undergoing the fragmentation and diffusion of an analysis. 
It would not have been easy to carry out psychoanalysis in a place like the 
Ranchi European Mental Hospital, which was so pressed for resources. The analyst 
in question, Berkeley Hill, was overworked, the patients lived in inhospitable 
conditions. Added to that was the widespread practice of trying to get psychiatric 
institutions to 'pay' – by getting the inmates to take part in the labour required to 
sustain the institution, and by manufacturing saleable products. Not only did 
Berkeley Hill find it difficult to get funds sanctioned for the hospital, he also found it 
difficult to find staff which would recognise the therapeutic purpose of the 
institution.219 Yet he persisted, and his asylum reports included a section titled 
'Psychotherapy by psychoanalysis'. He also submitted, to the Psychoanalytic Review, 
an account of his ongoing treatment of a patient at the hospital.220 And yet, we find 
that instead of exploring the questions of the material obstacles faced by 
psychoanalysis in an ill-funded institute in a colonial country, Berkeley Hill’s 
psychoanalytical writing seems to use psychoanalysis to diagnose and stigmatise 
native populations. In fact, both Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly published, in various 
psychoanalytic journals, articles drawing upon their experience as colonial 
administrators. These examined racism, attempted to illuminate some aspect of the 
‘native’ psyche, or discussed aspects of the colonizer-colonized relationship. On a 
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While not wishing to depreciate the work done by Mrs. McEnnnis (Work-Mistress) and Mr. 
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first reading, the reader may be struck by the stereotyping and often casual use of 
psychoanalytic concepts. These works have not survived the test of time, either as 
psychoanalytical or anthropological inquiries. But it is precisely the contradictory, 
divided, or plain confused positions they take up in their writing that are of interest 
to us.  
 
‘Unhappy relations between English people and Indians’: Berkeley Hill and 
Claud Daly on the Colonial Condition. 
An investigation into racial prejudice, Berkeley Hill’s article “The ‘Color 
Question’ from a Psychoanalytic Standpoint”, tries to explain this phenomenon 
through two arguments—that there is a universal and ancient link between blackness 
and evil; and that sexual jealousy plays a part in the white man’s hatred and 
suspicion of the black man. To illustrate his point about blackness and evil, Berkeley 
Hill gives several anthropological examples, from Australia, Asia, and Africa. While 
the psychoanalytic literature is referenced, the anthropological examples are not, 
making it difficult for the reader to investigate them in greater detail. This epistemic 
disregard for the details of the lives of non-white people is accompanied by an 
understanding of darker skinned people as “racially more primitive”.221 Then, 
touching upon an argument that Frantz Fanon would develop more than two decades 
later in Black Skins, White Masks, Berkeley Hill links colour prejudice to the sexual 
fantasies and anxieties of the white man.222 Writing about lynch mobs who target 
black men accused of raping white women, he writes: “sexual jealousy of the negro’s 
potency drives the white man temporarily mad, to the end that he inflicts the most 
horrible retributions on his unfortunate rival.”223 Yet Berkeley Hill does not question 
this fantasy, nor does he elaborate upon his own claim that “women, of a racially 
superior type are liable to become the subjects of the strongest attraction for 
individuals belonging to a racially more primitive type”.224 
                                                
221. Owen A.R. Berkeley-Hill, “The ‘Color Question’ From a Psychoanalytic Standpoint,” 
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The article is an uneasy combination of analyses of ‘colour prejudice’ 
combined with Berkeley Hill’s own opinions about which group of people was more 
‘primitive’ than the other. Berkeley Hill took a stand against ‘colour prejudice’ and 
condemned the Ku Klux Klan.225 In his autobiography, written nine years after this 
article was published, he also wrote indignantly against the colour prejudice that led 
to his Hindu, Indian wife being treated unkindly: “[o]ur hostess reminded me of the 
type of English-woman which has done so much to bring about and maintain 
unhappy relations between English people and Indians. […] to think that this vulgar, 
ignorant and arrogant woman could presume that the non-pigmentation of her skin 
entitled her to treat with an all-too-obvious contumely a woman like my wife, filled 
me with loathing.”226 And yet, to the International Journal of Psychoanalysis he sent 
articles such as “The Anal-Erotic Factor in the Religion, Philosophy and Character 
of the Hindus” in which he reads a variety of Hindu texts and practices as arising 
from the inadequate resolution of anal-erotic impulses and comes to the conclusion 
that the Hindus are incapable of adjusting to reality.227  
The institution of caste is central to his analysis, as practices shaped by ideas 
of purity and pollution provide Berkeley Hill with evidence for his arguments: “it is 
the idea of ‘pollution’ with its concomitant [sic] creation of a section of the body 
politic into ‘Outcastes’, “shut out in their filth and poverty”, that makes the Hindus 
unique among the other races of mankind.”228 Just as his point about the white man’s 
sexual jealousy links him to Fanon, the discussion of caste in this essay shares with 
B.R. Ambedkar’s The Annihilation of Caste its recognition of caste prejudice as the 
defining characteristic of Hinduism.229 But in both articles, Berkeley Hill’s writing 
lacks the insight and urgency of Fanon’s and Ambedkar’s work, their commitment to 
addressing injustices felt and observed. Unlike Fanon and Ambedkar, these articles 
by Berkeley Hill sustain assumptions of racial superiority, and an allegiance to the 
colonial enterprise, except in the ways in which they rebound on his own domestic 
life.  
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In Rudyard Kipling’s From Sea to Sea, Berkeley Hill found an illustration for 
“two notable characteristics of the Hindu, namely, his avariciousness and his instinct 
to hoard.”230 In the extract that he quotes from Kipling, the narrator, in his travels 
through the native-administered state of Rajputana, has encountered ‘an intelligent 
loafer’ who is convinced that the colonial ‘Guv’ment’ could make more money in 
India: “there’s enough money in India to pave hell with.”231 This ‘intelligent loafer’ 
is convinced that if the ‘Guv’ment’ set itself to collect more taxes, it certainly could, 
because all ‘Injians’ had money stored away: “Do you ever know a native that didn’t 
say Garib Admi (I’m a poor man’)? They’ve been sayin’ Garib Admi so long that the 
Guv’ment learns to believe ’em, and now they’re all bein’ treated as though they was 
paupers. I’m a pauper, an’ you’re a pauper—we’ aven’t got any thing hid in the 
ground—an’ so’s every white man in this forsaken country. But the Injian he’s a rich 
man.”232 In this account of things, white men in India are all poor, and natives—be 
they servants or peasants, are wealthy because of their perpetual hoarding: “[d]oes 
any black man who had been in Guv’ment service go away without hundreds an’ 
hundreds put by, and never touched?”233 
The reader finds that this ‘intelligent loafer’ is of the opinion that “a hundred 
and fifty million pounds you could raise as easy paint if you just made these ’ere 
Injians understand that they had to pay and make no bones about it.”234  It was only a 
question of employing the right means: “if you send half a dozen swords at him and 
shift the thatch off of his roof, he’ll pay.” Both the narrator and the ‘intelligent 
loafer’ are of the opinion that native administrations are far more oppressive than the 
colonial government. The narrator gestures towards the distance between his views 
and those of the ‘loafer’ saying that he “dissented from him and the brutal cruelty 
with which his views were stated.”235 And yet he uses similar arguments to discredit 
those who criticise the colonial administration: “[a] year spent among native States 
ought to send a man back to the Decencies and the Law Courts and the Rights of the 
Subject with a supreme contempt for those who rave about the oppressions of our 
brutal bureaucracy.”236 The reader, however, cannot be sure whether the attitude 
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towards the native administrations is one of condemnation, or envy. Is the colonial 
government being praised, or chastised, for not being as exploitative as native 
States? It is difficult to tell. Comparing the two administrations, Kipling writes: 
“[a]cross the Border one feels that the country is being used, exploited, ‘made to sit 
up,’ so to speak. In our territories the feeling is equally strong of wealth ‘just round 
the corner,’ as the loafer said, of a people wrapped up in cotton-wool and 
ungettable.”237  
   Berkeley Hill chose, as an illustration of the avariciousness of the subject 
race, an extract from a text that presents to the reader an account of the duplicitous, 
greedy nature of the native. Yet it is also a text that highlights, through the voices of 
the ‘loafer’ and the narrator, the covetousness of the white man in India. Thus, 
perhaps unwittingly, Kipling creates a proximity between the Englishman and the 
Hindu. I find that that Berkeley Hill, in his account of anal eroticism, similarly blurs 
the lines between English and Hindu, a distinction that he is otherwise committed to 
maintaining in his article. In psychoanalytic writing, the description of a neurosis, or 
a tendency like anal eroticism, is not a judgement. Yet Berkeley Hill sought to make 
it into one. He concluded his article by writing that the English had managed their 
anal eroticism in a manner that made them develop positive traits, such as 
“individualism, determination and persistence, love of order and power of 
organisation, competency, reliability and thoroughness, generosity, the bent towards 
art and good taste, the capacity for unusual tenderness, and the general ability to deal 
with concrete objects of the material world.”238  
 It will come as no surprise that Berkeley Hill finds that the Hindus have only 
developed negative character traits in their response to their anal eroticism. Yet as 
Leo Bersani has pointed out in his discussion of anal eroticism, not only does the 
“plasticity of the anal drive—its nearly promiscuous availability to a variety of 
character traits and activities” call into question its “identification as an anal drive”, 
it also “ruins definitional stability” of both the drive and the characteristics 
associated with it.239 What I find remarkable about this article by Berkeley Hill are 
not its colonialist positions, but the way in which, despite its own reasoning, at this 
moment it blurs its own distinction between the English and Hindus, when this 
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distinction is ostensibly the whole point of the article. This, I think, is an indication 
that rather than being obvious or self-explanatory, there is something awry about 
Berkeley Hill’s position of racial superiority and colonial allegiance. 
Claud Daly also dealt with the question of colonization in his article “The 
Psychology of Revolutionary Tendencies”, published in 1930 in the International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis. The article is divided into two sections: “The Rebellious 
Tendencies of the Bengalis” and “Andromeda and Perseus, The Classical Myth of 
Rebellion”.240 In the first section of his essay, Daly attempts to analyse the 
motivations of Indian ‘revolutionaries’, using psychoanalytical terminology to make 
a case for extended British rule in India. According to Daly, the Hindus, exemplified 
in this respect by M.K. Gandhi, believe that they can achieve their aims by “the 
practice of renunciation and austerities.”241 In this, writes Daly, they are like the Irish 
people and English suffragettes “in their attempt to break down authority and 
overcome rules and regulations which are in opposition to their primitive desires.”242  
If the Hindus did not already “suffer from some fixation in their 
development”, he writes, then the Christian Europeans would not have been able to 
rule them.243 Daly was confident that the Hindus would never achieve their ideals of 
getting rid of “age long subjection”, unless there was a change in Hindu character.244 
This change, he argued, was to be brought about through psychologically informed 
education with a focus on the early childhood years. Any change that such measures 
could achieve, though, “must of necessity be an extremely gradual one, for it 
involves the revaluation of the ideas and principles of a race to meet their changing 
libidinal cathexis.”245 In the time that the Hindu people took to grow out of their 
‘infantile’ and ‘feminine’ tendencies, the British government was to “act like wise 
parents”, guiding their children to an independent existence.246 Again, this was likely 
to be a very slow and drawn out process: “psycho-analysis has taught us that 
inhibited children, who have suffered severe traumatic experiences, need especially 
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careful handling, while the overcoming of age-long social fixations is a matter of 
generations, not years.”247 Daly mentions a ‘trauma’ but does not specify what 
trauma it was that necessitated such kindly parental care, leaving the reader free to 
identify it as the very experience of being colonised. While Daly certainly seems 
blind to the conceptual privileging of the ‘infantile’ in Freud’s work, using it in his 
article as a term of condemnation, in his alignment of parental care with state 
authority he also seems to forget that a murderous ambivalence characterises the 
relationship to authority in Freud’s writing. And yet his diaries suggest that Daly 
himself experienced this ambivalence in relation to the figure of Freud.  
As we can observe in their writing, both Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly 
attempt to use a psychoanalytic vocabulary to arrive at a description or diagnosis of 
the psyche of their subject population. Yet the economic injustices of colonialism, 
and acknowledgements of the oppressiveness of the colonialist make their way back 
in, for example, when Daly turns his attention to the Perseus and Andromeda myth. 
Trying to draw an analogy between the myth and the situation in India, Daly writes: 
“[l]et us then substitute the British Government, the machine which grinds the life 
out of Mother India, for the monster.”248 Up till this point the article has steadfastly 
refused to admit political policies into its analysis, attempting to explain everything 
in terms of a psychology insulated from any smear of the social. Now it suddenly 
confronts the reader with an image that destabilises what Daly has said thus far. The 
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British government is compared to a monster. By analogy, the Indian revolutionaries 
are Perseus. Even the ambivalence about authority that Daly seemed to forget when 
describing the colonial government as a kindly parent has returned to this account of 
politics. We find then that both Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly are led, in their 
writing, to images and analogies that unsettle the colonialist argument that they try to 
make.  
This eruption of an unpleasant knowledge (about colonialism) often takes 
place when the psychoanalytic discussion is most in the service of a colonial 
position. Daly interprets Perseus’ slaying of the monster in terms of castration: “the 
son, jealous of the father’s relations with the females of the family, is about to cut of 
the father’s head (=penis)”.249 While arguing that revolutionary tendencies arise from 
the son’s jealousy of the father, he evades the possibility that the father may indeed 
be a tyrant. Yet it is in the course of this discussion, while writing about how a group 
needs to be based on libidinal ties in order to survive, that Daly writes: “[i]n India 
one serious trouble is that the personality of the ruler does not reach the greater 
number of the population, but only the disabilities emanating from the ruler in the 
form of a government which disturbs them by collecting taxes, etc.; even when these 
in themselves are justifiable they are often exploited by ruthless people”.250 Daly’s 
words are telling, they suggest that the government has ‘ruthless’ people in its 
service, that taxes are a disturbance, and are in themselves not justified, only 
‘justifiable’—but Daly himself doesn’t provide any arguments in favour of them. 
Claud Daly argued that Indian revolutionaries were distinct in their 
deployment of masochism – exemplary amongst them Gandhi. Let us set aside, for 
the moment, this inclusion of Gandhi amongst revolutionary terrorists, and consider 
what Daly says: “[w]e can hardly pass by such an outstanding character as M. K. 
Gandhi, for his methods are a good example of one peculiar attribute of the Hindu 
character; we refer to the employment of suffering and renunciation as weapons.”251 
This evaluation was influenced by Lord Ronaldshay’s study of terrorism in The 
Heart of Aryavarta, which diagnosed the Indian nationalist movement as perverse: 
“in the sphere of politics the resurgent spirit of India has at times been perverted 
along channels which have led to rebellious movements against the existing 
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order.”252 In my discussion of Freud’s theories of sexuality in the previous Chapter, I 
suggest that psychoanalytic categories, especially ‘perversion’ do not lend 
themselves to use as terms of approbation. Though Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly 
explicitly position themselves in a psychoanalytic tradition, their discussions of ‘anal 
tendencies’ and ‘masochism’ is only tenuously in conversation with Freud’s writing 
on these questions.  
In fact, in this instance, the conversation with psychoanalysis can be said to 
be taking place elsewhere. The historian Faisal Devji has written that Gandhi’s use 
of suffering as a political strategy was an attempt to reclaim sovereignty in a colonial 
situation: “if we define as sovereign any authority that can ask people to kill and die 
in its name, then we must recognize that what Gandhi did was to split the concept of 
sovereignty down the middle.”253 Though they were not in conversation with each 
other, the experience of WW1 for Freud, and the colonial situation for Gandhi, 
seems to have led them to a common interpretation of sovereign state authority as 
grounded in the exercise of violence—recall here our discussion of Freud’s 
“Thoughts for the Times on War and Death”, in Chapter One. “By separating dying 
from killing and prizing the former as a nobler deed,” Devji writes that Gandhi was 
“doing nothing more than retrieving sovereignty from the state and generalizing it as 
a quality vested in individuals. For while such individuals may be unequal in their 
ability to kill they were all equally capable of dying, demonstrating therefore the 
universality of suffering and sacrifice over violence of all kinds.”254 This was 
political practice formulated around an interpretation of the psychic life of power—
an interpretation independent of the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, yet not only 
conceptually and historically more powerful than those offered by Daly and 
Berkeley Hill, but closer in spirit to Freud’s more radical moments. As we will find, 
at many points in the course of this thesis, the meetings between psychoanalysis and 
India can seem like missed encounters, opportunities for insight lost or jettisoned. 
Yet alongside these missed encounters, political and cultural production in colonial 
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India provides a refreshing, challenging light in which to read Freud’s work. It is this 
productive contradiction that sustains my account of psychoanalysis in India. 
To return then to Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly, who, in their articles 
discussing Indian politics and native ‘character’, positioned themselves as observers 
taking an unbiased, fair and balanced view of events, unlike the natives who were 
too emotional and partisan. In their writing, both Berkeley Hill and Daly dissociate 
themselves from the ‘Hindus’ who are the subject of their research. Writing that “[i]n 
the Hindu, however, we have a psychology which differs considerably from the 
European, its equivalent with us being found only in pathological cases”, Daly 
ascribes chronic derangement to an entire collectivity.255 Berkeley Hill also 
dismissed all Hindus as having nothing worthwhile to recommend them, concluding 
his article with: “[w]hether the Hindu mind is capable of any further approximation 
to reality is a matter which the future alone can show.”256 This insistence is odd, 
given the many Indian employees whom Berkeley Hill praised warmly in his 
Asylum reports – in a manner which was not in keeping with contemporary Asylum 
reports from other provinces.257 It is even more strange, given that Berkeley Hill 
dedicated his autobiography to his wife, a practicing Hindu.  
The distant objects of critique in his psychoanalytical articles were actually 
the intimates of his life. When it was debated who exactly were the 'Europeans' who 
could have access to the Ranchi European Mental Asylum, then even Berkeley Hill's 
children get caught up in this contradictory theorising. The product of a mixed race 
marriage, their claim to the category of ‘European’ would not have been considered 
unambiguous. Indeed, writing about his children in his autobiography, Berkeley Hill 
says: “I have felt it essential to their peace of mind, as well as to their making a 
success of their lives, to warn them not against Indians but against Europeans, 
particularly Englishwomen, who are, in my opinion, a fecund source of several sorts 
of trouble in India.”258  This attempt, on the part of both Claud Daly and Berkeley 
Hill, to distance themselves from the subject populations is therefore worth 
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interrogating, and their autobiographical writing helps us complicate the positions 
they take in their psychoanalytical articles. Accounts of their lives present a 
relationship to the colonies, the ‘native’ populations, and psychoanalysis itself, that 
is textured and complicated in a manner that these articles barely afford us a glimpse 
of. 
 
 ‘The awful shame of appearing to be thoroughly scared’: Adventure and 
Psychoanalysis 
In 1906, Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill’s application to join the Indian Medical 
Service was accompanied by a letter of recommendation by Arnold Pelham, then 
President of Trinity College, Oxford. Pelham mentions Berkeley Hill’s “great 
energy” and says that he is “keen about his work”.259 However what stands out is the 
following line: “[h]e has also I think, something of a spirit of adventure which would 
help him in work abroad and under new conditions.”260 Reading All Too Human 
suggests that Berkeley Hill tried to live his entire life under this sign of ‘adventure,’ 
or would at least have liked his readers to think that he did. He narrates in his 
autobiography incidents that are indicative of the authority and privileges that 
accrued to an upper class white man in the colony.  
When he was in Calicut, Berkeley Hill found himself annoyed at night by 
Moplah Muslims conducting their prayers in the same building as him. He went and 
got into an altercation with them, and threatened to throw a slipper at the praying 
men. Realising that he hadn’t acted very wisely: “it dawned on me that I was doing 
something very rash in threatening to throw a slipper at a Mohammedan engaged in 
religious exercises”, he went to a police station to get them to stop the ‘noise’.261 
Assuming an air of authority, he woke up the sleeping policemen, ordered them to 
arm themselves with lathis, marched them to his building and asked them to get the 
Moplah Muslims to be quiet. All this without being questioned, or having to explain 
who he was. One gathers that Berkeley Hill was quite amused that he could set a 
police force in action, while still in his pyjamas and with no legal or administrative 
authority over them. This one incident is typical of the many that Berkeley Hill 
narrates. He enjoyed his time in the colonies, which is presented to his readers as a 
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series of escapades. He was proud of what he presents as his unorthodox style of 
living, and does not ask himself how much of this ‘adventure’ was based on his 
living in a social context where there were often no adverse consequences for a white 
man who broke social regulations, or even the law. Later, when he was posted in 
East Africa, Berkeley Hill wrote about the war in the same style of adventure and 
escapade. Accounts of losing men in the fighting are interspersed with accounts of 
hunting and exotic social gatherings. This is quite in keeping with Berkeley Hill’s 
usual topics of description. 
For Berkeley Hill, the colonies seem to have been a place different from 
‘civilisation’. We do not know where exactly this difference was located, but it may 
have been the people, the hunting, or the surfeit of authority allowed upper class 
white men. At the same time, Berkeley Hill’s presence in India was justified through 
the colonial mission, i.e., through the idea that the native population could not 
govern itself and needed the presence of the colonial government and army. Given 
how much he valued the kind of ‘adventure’ the colonies had to offer, the pleasure 
that a man like Berkeley Hill derived from his time in the colony seemed to derive 
from a curious relationship to the colonial project: it relied, as indeed may have been 
true for many colonisers, on its not being successful, both so that the difference 
could continue on in its inferiority and exoticism, and so that the colonisers could 
prolong their presence.  
In 1915, Berkeley Hill was sent to Quetta, where he was assigned to the Field 
Ambulance, and then onward to East Africa. War made intimacy with the various 
native populations quite unavoidable. The writing lets us know that this was the 
intimacy of crouching down together in the bushes and tending to each others’ 
wounds. This is the difference between the writing on India before the war, and 
Africa during it. However, even here Berkeley Hill manages to maintain his 
paternalism, and presents himself as enthusing, cajoling or pacifying the men under 
his command. In reading Berkeley Hill, one finds that in order to maintain his 
command over the men he served with, he would often resort to an understanding of 
non-Europeans as ‘types’ rather than individuals. The non-Europeans we meet in his 
autobiography are usually illustrations, or examples of the larger, quite 
undifferentiated mass they are assigned to. And within these groups with their 
‘typical’ traits, there were of course hierarchies. Berkeley Hill would use these in his 
interaction with the ‘natives’: “[f]or the first time since I had known Muhammad I 
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saw that he was thoroughly frightened. Pointing to the Basutos, who were standing 
around the boat with admirable composure, I said to him: ‘Are you not ashamed of 
yourself? You, an Arab, behaving like a frightened child in front of these brave 
Negros!’ This appeal had a very reassuring effect on him and he calmed down and 
took his place beside me.”262 
These instances are narrated by Berkeley Hill in his autobiography, published 
about two decades after the war. However, the letters he wrote at the time of the war 
tell a very different story, one in which the messiness and terror of war has not yet 
been excised from the narrating self, not yet turned into a joke at the expense at the 
labouring ‘Arab’ or ‘Negro’. His letters to Ernest Jones during the war were 
composed in a state of delirium: “It strikes me that this letter is rather rot but really I 
have been devilish seedy for 3 days, so forgive me.”263 We find him bewildered, 
frightened, that is to say, he sounds like a man who is suffering through a war: “I am 
pretty bonny altogether except for the thunder and lightning phobia, which is worse 
than ever, I think. […] If I am called on to do anything or walk abroad I am done, so 
far I have been pretty lucky and managed to get through today and yesterday - both 
stormy without the awful shame of appearing to be thoroughly scared.”264 
This part of the story does not make it into the account of the war that he 
chose to preserve for future generations—the autobiography was intended for his 
children. Berkeley Hill thought of ‘appearing to be thoroughly scared’ as something 
that was an ‘awful shame’. In the autobiography, fear is split off from him, accruing 
to a man of another race. Something shameful, embarrassing or otherwise 
inadmissible could only be acknowledged  in the writing of the self in Berkeley 
Hill’s autobiography when presented to the reader as an attribute of a socially 
disadvantaged other. Berkeley Hill’s arrogantly expansive ‘knowledge’ about his 
companions—to know ‘typical’ Arab traits was to know all Arabs—was a way of 
not knowing something, it would seem from this moment, that somewhere he also 
knew about himself, his own fear and his own mortality.  
His reports from the Ranchi European Mental Asylum suggest that Berkeley 
Hill’s career after the war, and before he wrote his autobiography, was often a series 
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of struggles against the colonial administration. Yet he held on to this conviction in 
the necessity of colonialism, trying to think of ways in which it could be made more 
efficient, comparing the French and British  models.265 Despite the catalogue of 
colonial horrors detailed in his autobiography—racism, administrative apathy, 
economic exploitation—he still wanted to sustain the colonial project. Berkeley 
Hill’s writings present their reader with many instances in which the inefficiency of 
British imperial practices is obvious, and the British government frequently comes in 
for criticism during his account of the war. This makes it difficult to attribute his 
racism, and the way in which he seems to disown his war-time experiences in the 
writing of his autobiography, to some sort of blind allegiance to the British Empire. 
Rather, I suggest that it was linked to the difficulty of bearing and admitting 
emotional states and experiences that did not fit the construction of a masculine, 
white, colonial officer. In Berkeley Hill’s case, it was the phobia that created, in his 
own body, a resistance to the opinions he held, the values he cherished and the self-
image he wanted to hold on to. It is often these ‘irrational’ moments—dreams, this 
phobia—that undo this colonial narrative of ‘a spirit of adventure’ that Berkeley Hill 
and his compatriots subscribed to.266 We also find this interplay, between the ideal of 
a colonial self and aspects of the psyche that resist it, in Claud Daly’s diaries, to 
which his considerable investment in psychoanalysis adds a quite unusual twist.  
In a long narrow room somewhere in the North Western Frontier, Daly was 
telling the two people with him, the Colonel and ‘V’, about a wonderful miniature 
pistol that he had. Then he was in a room upstairs, and ‘V’ came and said: “[t]he 
Colonel has asked you to assist in the defence with your small weapon.” Daly 
continues: “I go down stairs and fire with deadly results at the Pathans who are 
attacking the four of us from without, sneaking up in large numbers, with deadly 
intent and long knifes.”267 He begins his interpretation of this dream by talking about 
his anxiety about the size of his penis: “yesterday I was thinking of the inferiority 
feeling I had always had, which I connected with what I conceived to be a smaller 
member than other boys had.”268 He thinks that his penis is symbolised by the small 
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pistol in the dream. He then writes that the Colonel may stand for his father. At this 
point, however, there is a shift in the register of the interpretation, and Daly writes 
that he may be “overstepping” in thinking that the Colonel stands for his father. 
Instead he offers this remarkable interpretation, which I shall quote at length: 
 
when the house is attacked by Pathans V says that the Colonel has agreed 
that I shall assist them in fighting the Pathans but have I not overshot the 
mark in calling the Colonel and V my Father and Uncle B - do they not rather 
represent Professor F and Dr. J. who after examining my psychological 
knowledge and inclination, have agreed to allow me to assist them in fighting 
the enemy, Ignorance, which is symbolised by the attacking Pathans - the 
resistance of the masses when faced by the Truth as symbolised in the small 
party of psycho-Analysts bravely facing the world confident that they have 
the foundation of truth behind them, and so F sends Dr. J to tell me that my 
little gun is a good enough weapon and he will accept it to be used in the 
defence of the garrison.269 
 
Daly wrote down this dream in 1921, after his war service in France and the 
North West Frontier of India. The Pathans were one of the tribal groups who were 
the inhabitants of the region, and were classified by the British as a ‘martial race’ – 
i.e., a ‘race’ whose men were suitable for recruitment into the imperial army. 
Increased interest and presence in this region created a strong ethnographical 
imperative for the British. As the historian Gajendra Singh points out, these 
ethnographies often “attempted to close the gap between flights of imagination and 
reality. Officers sought to prove the veracity of colonial fantasies by officially 
recording the ‘characteristics, customs, prejudices, history and religion’ of martial 
classes.”270  
The British perception of the Pathans varied considerably and changed as 
their military and bureaucratic interests in the region changed.271 Indeed it is not 
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uncommon to find entirely contradictory descriptions of ‘Pathan character’ on the 
same page in books by British officials. The volume on ‘Pathans’ in the Handbooks 
for the Indian Army offers a telling example of the extent to which perceptions of 
Pathans were shaped by the situation in which they were encountered, and more 
importantly, the military and political interests that shaped the encounter: “tyranny, 
revenge, blood thirstiness” are amongst the long list of traits by which the author 
says the Pathans have been “stigmatized” by those who encountered them while 
“engaged in expeditions against them”, however, when the same Pathans are 
encountered as recruits in the imperial army they are praised for their “courtesy, 
courage, cheerfulness” making them “excellent companion[s]” and “valuable 
soldier[s]”.272 Given that the political conditions changed quite rapidly, “Pathans’ 
frontier nobility was replaced by frontier degeneracy within a matter of years from 
1910.”273  
The authors of these Handbooks and ethnographies saw themselves as 
offering useful information and advice to other British people who had to serve in 
the region. They present their texts as records of objective and informed observation, 
a claim that, in hindsight, is undercut by the contradictory claims that pile up in 
volumes produced within a few decades of each other. Colonial ethnography created 
a collective fantasy of the Pathans, which while it may have been contradictory and 
divergent on the characteristics it attributed to them, was united in thinking that a 
colonising military and bureaucratic presence could produce some sort of 
unambiguous knowledge about the people who lived in the territories that it tried to 
administer. Colonial ethnographies on the Pathans, like Berkeley Hill in his 
autobiography, emphasize supposedly racial or tribal characteristics, pushing them 
into a collective identity. 
The desire for ‘manliness’ was a key strand in the description of martial 
races, one that had added meaning in relation to the Pathans. The ethnographies 
describe sexual interactions amongst men in Pathan society, because of the socially 
accepted practice of man-boy love. 274 In one of Daly’s dreams, his fellow officers 
and he are offered young ‘native’ boys to take to bed. Daly describes himself in bed 
with the boy, wanting to penetrate him but simultaneously feeling afraid of being 
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found out and fearing contact with the boy’s anus. Here, the sexual and social 
anxiety were welded together. Daly’s records of his dreams offer many instances of 
such merging together of the socio-political and psycho-sexual. In this dream, the 
fear of social disapproval attaches itself to sexual anxiety and manifests itself in the 
dream. In other dreams, there seems to be a transgression of the lines that would 
have been drawn in waking life. Thus Daly records another dream in which he 
receives and performs fellatio on ‘an Indian’. The description of the dream is 
followed by a memory of an incident: “there was the episode with the Indian at ----- 
when I let him suck my penis, but did not suck his I thought it dirty, and really 
would not have liked to because he was a native, but I am sure that I would have 
liked to have done so had he been my father or brother, it is evident from the erection 
that I am getting now that this phase of me is near the surface”.275 
Race was lodged into these distinctions between who could do what in a 
sexual encounter. ‘Native’ and ‘dirty’ go together, and here the distinctions of race 
and status carry more weight than the incest taboo—Daly cannot admit to wanting to 
suck a native’s penis, but he can write about wanting to perform the same act with 
his father or brother. The dream, however, did not maintain these distinctions and 
there the exchange with the Indian was reciprocal. In 1860, the colonial government 
had introduced a penal code that did not name homosexuality, but criminalised 
sexual acts ‘against the order of nature’.276 There was continued commentary on 
homosexuality though, usually in the guise of describing the practices of primitive 
tribes—indicative of what Neville Hoad calls the “endlessly displaceable national 
and racial origins of homosexuality”.277 In the ethnographies such desires on the part 
of British officers were never acknowledged, with the result that the Pathan, or other 
native populations being discussed, were the ones onto whom fantasies were 
projected, along with the condemnation that these practices would have attracted in 
the mainstream of British social life.  
Even though the Pathans participated in the same war as Daly, they only 
figure as representatives of a mysterious and dangerous primitivity for him. While 
psychoanalysis allowed Daly to avoid moral condemnation of homosexuality, it was 
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not sufficient to address the various kinds of anxieties released in the text by 
discussions of homosexual encounters.  Given the lower rungs occupied by both the 
homosexual and primitive on the evolutionary ladder, an admission of 
homosexuality was threatening for someone who identified himself with civilisation. 
In Daly’s writing, the Pathans barely exist outside of the place they occupy in his 
dream landscapes. This relationship was intimate enough, because it was where 
Daly’s fears and fantasies lay, but it was also a relationship that could not accept or 
incorporate the much more banal and commonplace shared histories and interactions 
with the Pathans. One finds that it is despite, and against the backdrop of his shared 
history with the Pathans that they come to figure as representatives of ignorance, 
rather than everyday neighbours, in Daly’s dreams. Though the unconscious pulled 
against such a settlement, psychoanalysis was being pressed into the service of 
‘civilisation’.  
It is worth bearing in mind that British ethnography on the frontier tribes, and 
manuals and advice about appropriate behaviour with the tribal representatives, were 
based on a solid foundation of armed force—regular military expeditions were sent 
out to ‘discipline’ and ‘punish’ recalcitrant populations. In the previous chapter, we 
discussed how Freud describes the superego as an internal garrison. A cruel master, 
it has an insatiable appetite for renunciation and punishment. This violent and 
perverse internal theatre sounds remarkably like accounts of life on the Frontier. The 
supposedly primitive tribes were seen as belonging to an ahistorical time of 
primitivity and ignorance, and the colonial authorities related to them in the manner 
in which Freud describes the superego’s relationship to the rest of the psyche. 
Jacqueline Rose, in her book States of Fantasy alerts us to the proximity in form of 
the superego and the modern state.278 I would like to suggest that the superego’s 
place in the psyche evokes the colonial state, or the colonial aspect of modern states. 
Like the superego, colonial authorities tried to tame and punish the recalcitrant 
inhabitants of the landscape. 
 What Freud’s discussion of the superego also alerts us to is the aggressive 
component of any moral injunction. It is this aspect that is magnified in the frontier 
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practices of the colonial army. Daly’s dream shows the sheer military force that is 
required to sustain a supposedly ‘moral’ mission. After all, the justifications for 
colonisation tended to be moral, as much economic or militaristic. In fact the 1858 
Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India, 
after the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown, 
frames colonisation as an entirely benevolent act: “We hold ourselves bound to the 
Natives of Our Indian Territories by the same Obligations of Duty which bind Us to 
all Our other Subjects; and those Obligations, by the Blessing of ALMIGHTY GOD, 
We shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil” all the while relying on the “truth of 
Christianity”.279 
So what is it that must be protected in Daly’s ‘defence of the garrison’? Daly, 
who could not question the basis of existence of his society—colonialism and its 
moral justification as the civilising mission—also tried to replicate this 
unquestioning attitude in psychoanalysis, wanting to be led by Colonel Freud and 
Ernest Jones. Daly’s wish was for a psychoanalysis that could be aligned to an idea 
of confident certain knowledge, itself seen as an attribute or virtue of the colonisers 
in the imperial context. This was psychoanalysis roped into an imperial 
understanding of frontier expeditions. Daly’s interpretation sounds strikingly similar 
to the words of Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India 1874-1878, who said that 
Frontier wars “are but the surf that marks the edge and advance of the wave of 
civilization”.280 In the dream discussed above, a part of the native population of 
Balochistan stands for ignorance, and the colonising British army stands for 
psychoanalysis, and this is psychoanalysis understood as truth, as certainty and as 
certain access to truth.281 
 
‘Curious Beasts’: Shikar, Masculinity, and Sexual Anxiety 
An ideal of masculinity was central to the imperial self that Claud Daly and 
Berkeley Hill attempted to portray in their writing. Fantasies of sexual mastery were 
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involved in the desire to fashion this colonial masculinity, yet in Berkley Hill and 
Claud Daly’s writing we find that the vicissitudes of sexuality were in fact the 
greatest threat to such a self-image.  In the last chapter of his autobiography, which 
Berkeley Hill titled “My Horses”, the reader is presented with an account of a boar 
hunt. Berkeley Hill had gone hunting with one of the “fine officers” of 2nd Lancers, 
Gardiner’s Horse, Major Frank Maxwell. During the course of the hunt, Major 
Maxwell’s horse fell because the boar ran under it. The fall broke Major Maxwell’s 
right wrist. He refused medical attention, shouting to Berkeley Hill: “‘Go on, you 
bloody little fool’”.282 The encounter with the boar also frightened Berkeley Hill’s 
horse Bucephalus, who refused to charge at it. Major Maxwell then suggested that 
the boar be attacked on foot, and approached the animal with his spear tucked under 
his left shoulder. The boar was speared, and then Berkeley Hill went up to the Major 
and tried to remonstrate with him. The injury should have been tended to, he said, 
but the Major responded: “‘[y]ou are here to learn pig sticking, not doctoring.’”283  
The hunt was an important site where ideals of colonial masculinity were 
staged. The ritual of the hunt allowed the participants to perform “the peculiar 
notions of sportsmanship, masculinity and gentlemanliness important to Victorian 
England.”284 In this incident, we are presented with a sketch of a “fine officer”, who 
in the pursuit of his goal, is both impervious to his own pain and fearless in the face 
of real danger to his person. Of course the fact that it was a mere boar that called 
forth this extravagant performance and narrative of bravado could be seen as 
somewhat pathetic—but Berkeley Hill was drawing upon a whole tradition of 
representing ‘shikar’.285 The colonialist as shikari was a gentleman, but also a 
protector, especially when the animal being hunted was ‘dangerous’. In both 
Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly’s writing, shikar is tied to questions of sexuality. To 
explore this entanglement of the pursuit of sex and the tracking of game and the 
questions it raises about sexual exchanges in a colonial context, I will turn to the 
writing of feminist and psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin. Her work, I suggest, casts 
light on some of the structures that seem to be legible in the manner in which 
Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly portray their sexual experiences. 
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In her influential psychoanalytic study of the problem of domination, The 
Bonds of Love, Benjamin turns her attention to the question of recognition. Drawing 
from Hegel, she writes that the “condition of our own independent existence is 
recognizing the other.”286 Recognition is a process in which both parties move 
between moments of recognition and negation. Offering an account of relationships 
of submission and domination, Benjamin argues that in such arrangements, the two 
elements of the process of recognition are split, with one subject embodying only 
one of the two moments. While it seems that the subject to whom domination 
accrues has all the power and agency, the failure of recognition is mutual. When the 
subjectivity of the submissive subject, the ‘slave’, is erased, there is no one left to 
recognize the dominating subject, or, as Benjamin puts it: “the master’s denial of the 
other’s subjectivity leaves him faced with isolation as the only alternative to being 
engulfed by the dehumanized other.”287 
In addition to her reflections on the problem of recognition, Benjamin’s 
thinking about sexual difference and parental authority is also pertinent to this 
discussion. Commenting on how the mother and father’s roles are imagined in 
psychoanalytic theorising and wider social attitudes, Jessica Benjamin writes that 
“every idealization defends against something: the idealization of the father masks 
the child’s fear of his power.”288 She argues that “the myth of good paternal 
authority that is rational and prevents regression purges the father of all terror and, 
[…] displaces it on to the mother, so that she bears the badness for both of them.”289 
As we shall see, in the colonial context such a splitting had implications not only for 
gender relations but also the equation between coloniser and colonised. Jessica 
Benjamin has pointed out that feminists have interrogated and complicated Freud’s 
account of ‘penis envy’ as central to femininity, but the boy’s “disidentification with 
his mother is still considered a necessary step in the formation of masculine identity” 
and remains widely uninterrogated.290 Benjamin argues that the repudiation of 
femininity creates a stance towards women that is constituted “of fear, of mastery, of 
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distance” and that such a position “by no means recognizes her as a different but like 
subject.”291  
As a colonial officer in India and East Africa, Berkeley Hill did not confine 
his exploits to hunting. His autobiographies also present women as trophies, 
collected across continents. Berkeley Hill styled himself as a sexual libertarian, and 
this combined with his affinity for identifying ‘tribal’ characteristics, led to 
descriptions like the following: “I knew enough of East Africa to know that Lamu 
was famous for the beauty of its women as well as for their want of virtue”.292 
Another incident from India details how during a hot summer night Berkeley Hill 
propositioned the woman pulling his punkah: “[w]ith a display of the obscene 
bashfulness that characterises Indian women of this type, she accompanied me to my 
bedroom”.293 The conquest of women, like the hunting of animals, were crucial sites 
for establishing the potency of the colonial officer. Berkeley Hill’s writing on shikar 
shows how fantasies of masculinity and memories of shikar accompanied each other. 
Throughout his autobiography, women across three continents implore 
Berkeley Hill to have sex with them, or confer their immediate consent to 
propositions by him. Berkeley Hill’s sexual libertarianism was based on a narrow 
understanding of sex as sexual intercourse, with no attention to the conditions in 
which such encounters took place, and the particular circumstances in which consent 
is given or withheld. In the two examples cited above, the women’s participation was 
seen as deriving from their group characteristics – Lamu ‘want of virtue’ and Indian 
‘obscene bashfulness’. This interpretation of sex is quite different from the 
psychoanalytical understanding. As we had the opportunity to note in Chapter 1, 
Freud’s writing stresses that not all that is sexual can be expressed through sexual 
intercourse, in fact what matters is the psychic experience of human sexuality. 
Moreover, Berkeley Hill bypasses questions of the material conditions in which 
sexual transactions take place, especially in times of war, and between servants and 
masters. In Berkeley Hill’s descriptions of his sexual conquests, the women 
disappear into an undifferentiated collective, they are barely subjects. 
One might therefore suggest, at risk of wild analysis, that the repetitiveness 
with which Berkeley Hill writes of his sexual conquests in his autobiography, 
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indicates that such a position of potency could never successfully be established, 
rather that it was something that had to be rehearsed repeatedly to sustain a sense of 
mastery. The injustice and brutality of the colonial situation also lay in the fact that it 
buttressed such an attempt at, amongst other things, erotic mastery. The failure of 
recognition—the ‘isolation’, ‘being engulfed by the dehumanized other’—that such 
an attempt may have met with in another situation could be avoided, because the 
drama itself could be restaged, with another partner who had to submit. The 
autobiography that he wrote implies that Berkeley Hill’s colonial authority provided 
the conditions for the repeated restaging, across continents, of this drama of 
domination and submission, by providing women who, through war or poverty, had 
to render themselves available and willing.   
Yet even under these colonial conditions, and in their service, there was 
something about the sexual that still resisted mastery. Once again, Claud Daly’s 
diaries take us under the surface of the life of a colonial officer, to the realms of 
desire and fantasy. In 1910 Claud Daly’s Commanding Officer wrote that he was 
“very keen on shikar” and a “good rider”, and in the decade that his diaries span, 
Claud Daly dreamt of hunting grouse, sparrows, tigers, boar and bears.294 At about 
the time when he’d put in an application for privilege leave in 1921, and was 
awaiting its approval, Claud Daly dreamt of a holiday—and woke up with a 
headache. He dreamt that he had been granted four months’ leave, and someone had 
suggested that he go shooting in the mountains, to shoot a creature that he couldn’t 
identify. These strange creatures had “fine large horns but practically no head, just 
the horns at the end of the neck”.295 There was a sort of face at the junction of these 
horns. In his dream, Daly looks at them as though from below, these forms “sort of 
sticking out of the side of the mountain”.  
When he writes the associations to his dream, Daly thinks immediately of a 
“black vagina”, or rather the childhood experience or memory of having seen one: 
“the black vagina of my childhood.” He attributed his headache to this part of the 
dream. His associations flow on and he says “the long horns are the legs and the 
black sort of face the vagina at first they appeared to have no head but when I looked 
again I saw there was a sort of face–eyes and a mouth, also made of black horn.” He 
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interpreted the angle from which he saw the horns sticking out of the mountains as 
him looking up between a pair of thighs. Writing and interpreting his dream made 
him remember more of it, and he recalled how his friend R had told him about a 
place where there were some duck in a pond—easy to shoot, but “private”, which 
made it inappropriate to shoot them: “[w]hen I got there, there were several black 
ponds I seem to think five of them, some black duck seemed to fly away – then I saw 
that they were all fat tame duck, and a lot of white ones and although they would be 
very good to eat, it would be unsporting to shoot them”. Daly interpreted the ponds 
as signifying black vaginas, and the ducks as women. He thought that black ducks 
that flew away, which he felt inclined to shoot, represented female children, and that 
they then turned into “fat old English, tame ducks – ie my grandmother. No doubt R 
is myself and at first I would like to shoot them, practice incest with them, but then I 
learn that one cannot do so with one’s own women folk, so they become tame duck 
that one must not touch”.  
Further associations to Daly’s childhood and family come up. He wonders 
whether looking up into the cleft in the mountain may have meant looking up at 
either sex, his father or his grandmother. Daly writes: “[i]n the dream I felt that I 
knew the animal that I had seen the curious beasts but that I had never possessed 
one”. Something seemed very strange about them, as though their heads had been cut 
off: “[i]t was as though their penis had been cut off and left them only with the rough 
scar between their legs”. Relating to the number five that appeared in the dream, 
Daly thought that it signified the five vaccination spots he had on his arm. He then 
reconstructed from that: “it was about the same time that I had both experiences, the 
seeing the vagina and being vaccinated, and my fainting fits started about then – 
perhaps I feared that the man who vaccinated me would also castrate me, like the 
women had been castrated”. The fear of being castrated became attached to another 
terrifying image—that of the stumps of amputated legs being stuck in boiling pitch. 
Daly writes that he was afraid that the same would be done to the wound of 
castration: “which was why women were black between the legs”. 
In the chiaroscuro of Daly’s dream, black accrues to the strange horned 
creatures, to liquids—ponds and boiling pitch, and to the wound between women’s 
legs. The image of a “black vagina” is also a recurring one. Daly’s anxiety around 
castration condenses into this image, leading him to associate vaginas with death: 
“how often in dreams is the vagina now symbolised by a ‘black’ hole, and it is not 
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sufficient to suppose that this is just because the mons veneris is often covered in 
dark hair – black is universally a symbol of death, and we cannot take it as mean 
[sic] anything else but that the vagina once the symbol of life the urge to impregnate 
came to have the signification of death for man”. These operations of fantasy in 
Daly’s writing could be said to highlight, albeit unintendedly, the non-essential 
nature of race—amongst other things, a racialised other was constructed out of 
anxiety. Black, while representing something anxious in the dream, cannot be 
understood simply as race. The record of the dream shows that the way in which 
meaning is commonly ordered breaks down in the unconscious.296 The manner in 
which different elements of the dream meld into each other is in contrast to the 
stricter separations that were imposed in the waking and watchful day. This 
breakdown of cherished distinctions created an anxiety that relentlessly sought forms 
in which to manifest itself. It imbued both the feminine and the racialized body, as 
well as sticking to an entire landscape.   
In many of Daly’s dream interpretations, it is the sight of the female genitals 
that brings about the knowledge of the possibility of castration for the boy. The fact 
that the vagina bleeds reinforces this gruesome threat of castration, and, according to 
Daly, establishes the awful authority of the father. Castration was the rubric through 
which Daly interpreted most of his dreams. Let us recall Daly’s article on the 
psychology of revolutionary tendencies. There, while arguing for the necessity of 
parental authority in the colonies—a role to be performed by the colonial 
government—Daly did not conceive of the father as a terrifying figure. Yet we find 
that Daly’s writing, in his diaries, pulls against that construction of benevolent 
colonial paternal authority. The attitudes towards the father were split: terror and 
anxiety in the private writing, idealization and allegiance in public positions. Despite 
this split, the psychical motivations which Daly attributes to the revolutionary in his 
article, such the desire to castrate the father, is remarkably like what he identifies in 
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himself and describes at length in his diaries. At times, when he is writing about 
castration in the article, even his phrasing is akin to his style in his diaries, especially 
the use of equal ‘=’ signs : “slays (=castrates)”; “daughter ( = sister)”; “his hated 
rival (=brother in the normal family); “Gorgon’s head (=bloody vagina = 
menstruating woman).”297 The equations are hardly self-explanatory and don’t 
always make sense but they are close to Daly’s interpretations of his dream symbols.  
These imaginings of primal scenes were not limited to Daly’s individual 
history, he also tried to develop phylogenetic theories around the idea of a menstrual 
trauma. By reconstructing primal scenes, Daly attempted to theorise castration, 
combining questions about evolution with accounts of castration. In his diaries, a 
discussion of castration anxiety is typically followed by an attempt to construct a 
primal evolutionary narrative. Daly’s article, “The Role of Menstruation in Human 
Phylogenesis and Ontogenesis” brings together these concerns with castration and 
evolution.298 Daly’s attempt is to find an explanation of the transition to civilisation 
by studying the “influence which man’s reactions to female sexuality have had upon 
human psychic evolution”.299 Daly traces the transition that takes place in men’s 
response to women’s menstrual blood, from attraction to repulsion, with repulsion 
indicating that a more advanced civilisational state has been reached. He speculates 
about the human animal distinction, and psychic evolution to construct a labyrinthine 
theory of men’s response to women’s menstrual blood which, he argues, is 
characterised by a profound ambivalence. His article is often disjointed, much like 
his diary entries, and many of the concerns are similar. Daly himself acknowledges 
the article’s proximity to his psyche by writing that he began his research “under the 
influence of deep material which had erupted from my unconscious after prolonged 
self analysis”.300 Yet in the article, by contrast, Daly’s concerns from the past 
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decades, his personal ambivalence, have been distanced from himself and presented 
as theory.301  
Daly’s article links the repudiation of femininity to a civilisational teleology. 
Greater ‘repulsion’ towards women’s menstrual blood indicates a higher civilised 
state. Even though in the article on menstruation Claud Daly is not particularly 
concerned with India, he discusses a novel set there. It is a story of a missionary 
seduced by a forest dwelling female spirit to whom goats are sacrificed, and whose 
dwelling smells of blood and flowers. Both the author of the novel, and Daly, 
highlight the simultaneous attraction and repulsion that runs through the story. Once 
again, like in his shikar dream, ambivalence about femininity and images of a 
foreign landscape accompany each other. Let us recall the geography of 
Balochistan—it was the mountains and ravines of the region that made it so difficult 
to conquer, as well economically unrewarding for the British administration. The 
Pathans were also renowned (or notorious, depending on the commentator) for their 
guerrilla warfare tactics, and their ability to use this landscape to their best 
advantage. In the dream, this landscape is inhabited by strange and threatening 
animals, born out of Daly’s most deeply entrenched anxieties. What was strange and 
threatening about a foreign land, the mountains and ravines, as well as the encounter 
with racial difference became glued, in Daly’s imagination, to something frightening 
about sexual difference. I suggest that Claud Daly and Berkeley Hill were unable to 
acknowledge either women or ‘native’ populations as ‘different but like subjects’.302 
Instead, they created fantastic, fear imbued geographies and constructed narratives of 
conquest. 
 
 A ‘black sort of face’ of the Other: Ethics and the Problem of Disavowal 
Octave Mannoni’s book, Prospero and Caliban offers brilliant insights into the 
damage wreaked by the colonial relationship on the psyches of both coloniser and 
colonised. A colonial administrator posted in the French colony of Madagascar, 
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Mannoni later trained to be an analyst and was part of the École Freudienne de Paris. 
This first book by Mannoni acknowledges the economic and psychic destruction 
caused by colonisation, yet also frequently justifies the colonial presence. Certain 
aspects of his thinking on colonisation echo positions Claud Daly and Berkeley Hill 
took. In a manner reminiscent of Daly’s argument about why Indians/Hindus had 
been colonised, Mannoni wrote: “to my mind there is no doubting the fact that 
colonization has always required the existence of the need for dependence. Not all 
peoples can be colonised: only those who experience this need.”303 In his response to 
Mannoni, Frantz Fanon wrote: “The arrival of the white man in Madagascar inflicted 
an unmistakeable wound. The consequences of this European irruption in 
Madagascar are not only psychological, since, as everyone has said, there are inner 
relationships between consciousness and social context.What about the economic 
consequences? It’s colonization that needs to be put on trial!”304 
Mannoni, like Daly and Berkeley Hill, sometimes resolves his ambivalence 
about the colonial project into a romantic ideal of what such an enterprise involved: 
“European colonizers have battled successfully against hunger, sickness, slavery, 
ignorance—for all these evils have recoiled somewhat before their attack—but in 
spite of their good work have failed to achieve friendly relations with the ‘colonized’ 
and we are now inclined to think that theirs was the wrong way to go about it.”305 
Yet unlike Daly and Berkeley Hill, Mannoni expressly engaged with his own 
ambivalence about the colonial situation. His time in the colonies led him to 
recognize that he was in need of greater self-understanding: “it is as difficult to see 
something of one’s self in all men as it is to accept oneself completely as one is. For 
this reason I became preoccupied with my search for an understanding of my own 
self, as being an essential preliminary for all research in the sphere of colonial 
affairs.”306 While Mannoni did not himself eschew a diagnostic analysis of Malagasy 
psychology (one of the most controversial aspects of his book is his thesis about the 
‘dependency complex’ of the natives of Madagascar), he also recognized that in 
discussions of the colonised by the coloniser, the fantasies and fears of the latter 
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were prominent: “the presence of a man whom our unconscious takes to be a 
‘savage’ can cause confused and disquieting feelings to be roused in us.”307  
It is this ability to contemplate the involvement of fantasy in the kind of 
knowledge that is produced about the colonised, that makes Mannoni an original and 
incisive thinker about the question of the other in a colonial situation. In fact he 
offers an account of the relationship between self and other in which neither has a 
proper place, neither is the property of itself. He writes that “every human face 
appears enigmatic to us at first” and that when an infant looks at a face “it seems 
probably that the face becomes meaningful to him just then and that he makes it 
either friendly or unfriendly, so to speak, from inside himself.”308 Where is the infant 
located in this exchange? It would seem that it is there both in its own body, and in 
the enigmatic face it contemplates. When Mannoni describes the reactions of 
colonisers to the unrest amongst the Malagasies, he says that they see them as “the 
stirrings of a half-tamed barbarism of the instincts, while at the same time, the 
contradiction notwithstanding, they like to consider them the product of some 
deliberate and evil plan, hypocritically worked out behind the screen of an 
inscrutable ‘face’.”309 While the fantasies and internal psychic life are involved in 
both accounts of an encounter with another ‘face’, for the colonial observer the face 
has turned into a ‘screen’—or if we borrow Daly’s expression, ‘a sort of face’. 
Much of recent thinking on ethics has drawn upon Emmanuel Levinas’ 
account of an ethical encounter with the face of the other. A “destitution without any 
cultural ornament”, the naked face, according to Levinas, is a “visitation” and 
“supplication” that makes an ethical demand on the subject: “a face is imposed on 
me without my being able to be deaf to its call or to forget it, that is, without my 
being able to cease to be held responsible for its distress.” 310In her book Parting 
Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Judith Butler discusses how, for 
Levinas, the commandment not to kill came from a face, which didn’t have to be a 
face as such—“any sign of injurability counts as the face.”311 Christopher Lane, in 
his important revaluation of Mannoni’s contribution to the analysis of racism, argues 
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that Mannoni’s work develops “an understanding of racial conflict that is free of 
essentialism”.312 And indeed, like the abstract quality of ‘injurability’ that Butler 
draws attention to, for Mannoni too, the effect of an encounter with the other did not 
require this other to be corporeally present. In an article published a decade after 
Prospero and Caliban, titled “The Decolonisation of Myself”, Mannoni considers 
the effects of an impersonal, yet vital other: “the ghost of the former colonial subject 
haunts (without their being aware of it) relationships amongst whites who have never 
left Europe”.313 
But even for Levinas, Butler points out, there were some faces that did not 
count as faces, significant amongst these, the Palestinians. This prompts us to ask: 
what are the conditions in which the face of the other turns into nothing but ‘a sort of 
face’? Mannoni’s essay titled “I Know Well, But All the Same…” discusses how it 
is quite possible to go on believing in something while very well knowing it to be 
false.314 Disavowal, the idea that Mannoni explores in this essay, is a state in which 
the mind is capable of believing two contradictory things simultaneously. The 
contradiction is not one between conscious and unconscious knowledge here, rather, 
it is a contradiction within consciousness itself. This suggests that belief may not 
find its mooring in fact, but in something else. The very concept of disavowal is a 
challenge to the idea of the consistent, self-knowing subject. In this chapter, I’ve 
argued that in a colonial context, sexuality and knowledge were two crucial sites for 
the navigation of a relation to an other. The idea of disavowal brings these concerns 
together. 
Disavowal was discussed by Freud in relation to fetishism. He writes that the 
boy disavows the knowledge that women are castrated “for if a woman had been 
castrated, then his own possession of a penis was in danger”.315 Fetishism is a means 
of both hiding the knowledge of this lack, while at the same time compensating for 
it, as a response to the panic that arises when the subject must take on the knowledge 
of his lack, come to terms with difference.  Previously we discussed Jessica 
Benjamin’s argument that the repudiation of femininity, of dependence, seems to be 
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the route to a masculine position, rather than an acceptance of difference, and noted 
how ‘dependence’ and ‘femininity’ were associated with colonised populations. 
Particularly interesting in Freud’s essay is the link he draws between the panic that 
first arises in this childhood encounter with lack, and “a similar panic when the cry 
goes up that Throne and Altar are in danger” which the adult man may experience, 
and from which “similar illogical consequences will ensue”.316 I read this as a 
warning, by Freud, of the kinds of identifications with authority (‘Throne and Altar’) 
that may accompany the inability to cope with difference, and, by extension, the 
denial of dependence. Mannoni wrote his essay on disavowal many years after 
publishing Prospero and Caliban. It is fitting that this study of disavowal came from 
a former colonial administrator interested in psychoanalysis, because our discussion 
of the autobiographical writings of colonial officers in India repeatedly confronts us 
with the intertwining of a masculine position of mastery, and a recalcitrant 
identification with the colonial enterprise.  
The colonial situation of the analysts discussed in this chapter allows us to 
witness, how the price of disavowal is often paid by a neighbour. In Daly and 
Berkeley Hill’s cases, their familiarity with psychoanalysis, and what it brought into 
language may even have contributed to the energy with which they shored up their 
place in the colonial project. Since psychoanalysis made available to them 
discussions about the incomplete, mortal and strange self, and tried to forge a 
language in which to understand this self, it also made its disturbing aspects closer 
and more real. If a belief in self-knowing masculinity, and a colonial civilising 
mission had to be upheld, then the all too real lacking self had to be excised with 
even more fervour. 
Thus psychoanalysis itself seems to offer no guarantee against disavowal. In 
fact, one of the main arguments of Mannoni’s essay turns on an incident when he, in 
a psychoanalytic session, found himself unhearing and ignoring part of what his 
patient had said. Recognising the futility of guarantees, psychoanalysis goes a step 
further to describe the kind of violence that is sanctioned when knowledge and moral 
positions are held up to be absolute, when contradictions and ambivalence are 
ejected. To pay attention to the contradictions and ambivalences, even the 
vulnerability of colonialists like Berkeley Hill and Daly is not to justify their actions 
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or position. Rather this is important because they sought to rid themselves of this 
very fragility and contradictions in epistemic and sexual activity. Dependence and 
ambivalence in themselves may be an unpleasant, even ugly psychic states, but the 
lives of these men show that if they cannot be borne, they return in a violent form, 





Learning from Experience 
He and his wife and child were in the cabin next to mine, and I became painfully 
aware that the small girl wetted her bed and that Captain L. and his wife thought 
that the right way to cure her was to beat her. I had not at that time read A Child is 
Being Beaten or any of the other works of Sigmund Freud, but the hysterical shrieks 
and sobs which came from the next cabin convinced me that beating was not the 
right way to cure bed-wetting. 
Leonard Woolf, Growing: An Autobiography of the Years 1904 to 1911 
 
My contribution is to ask for a paradox to be accepted and tolerated and respected, 
and for it not to be resolved. By flight to split-off intellectual functioning it is 
possible to resolve the paradox, but the price of this is the loss of the value of the 
paradox itself. 
This paradox, once accepted and tolerated, has value for every human individual 
who is not only alive and living in this world but is also capable of being infinitely 
enriched by exploitation of the cultural link with the past and with the future. 
D.W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality 
 
 
In an attempt to find a metaphor for the structure of the psyche, Freud turned to 
archaeology. He conjours up a vision of Rome to describe how various histories are 
preserved in the mind: 
 
let us make the fantastic supposition that Rome was not a human dwelling 
place, but a mental entity with just as long and varied a past history: that is, 
in which nothing once constructed had perished, and all the earlier stages of 
development had survived alongside the latest. […] where the Palazzo 
Caffarelli now stands there would also be, without its being removed, the 
Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, not merely in its latest form, moreover, as the 
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Romans of the Caesars saw it, but also in its earliest shape when it still wore 
an Etruscan design and was adorned with terra-cotta ante fixae.317 
 
After this elaborate description of civilisational artefacts, Freud abandons the 
comparison, finding that it leads him to absurdity, what he wants to say about the 
mind cannot be conveyed through archaeological metaphor. In Chapter 1, I discuss 
Freud’s non-linear account of temporality, his interrogation of civilisation, and 
exploration of group psychology. In this Chapter, I will discuss the autobiographical 
writings and psychoanalytic work of Wilfred Bion which furthers Freud’s attempt to 
think through these questions, and offers powerful insights into colonialism.  A 
British psychoanalyst who spent the first eight years of his childhood in colonial 
India, his writing offers a marked contrast to the work of Daly and Berkeley Hill in 
how it represents the colony. In Bion’s literary writing and psychoanalytic 
theorisation, I find a productive counterpoint to the positions of mastery and superior 
knowledge that Daly and Berkeley Hill tried to take up in their work. The contrast 
that Bion’s work offers is, I think, an important reminder of the possibilities of an 
ethical negotiation of colonial history.  
Commenting on Freud’s analogy between archaeological investigation and 
psychoanalysis, Bion wrote that it “was helpful if it were considered that we were 
exposing evidence not so much of a primitive civilisation as of a primitive disaster. 
The value of the analogy is lessened because in the analysis we are confronted not so 
much with a static situation that permits leisurely study, but with a catastrophe that 
remains at one and the same moment actively vital and yet incapable of resolution 
into quiescence.”318 This is progressive temporality perceived as disaster, and Bion 
eschewed the progressivist account of both the psyche, and politics. His 
understanding of temporality is indicative of a dialectical relationship between 
historical experience and psychoanalytical theorization in his work. Like Freud, Bion 
used history and politics as ways of engaging with the psyche. By allowing the 
concerns of their time to shape their work, Freud and Bion articulated the 
relationship between historical experience and psychoanalytic theory in a way that 
allowed them broach new frontiers in their thinking. Freud’s theorization of the 
death drive followed upon the First World War. This altered, fundamentally, his 
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model of the mind. Previously, he had suggested that the human subject was 
governed by the pleasure principle. The new model of the mind that he would 
develop tried to account for something exceeding, something beyond, the 
motivations of pleasure. As we shall see, experiences of war and colonialism also 
shaped Bion’s psychoanalytic work, and provided urgent impetus for thinking. 
Parthenope Bion Talamo has written that her father’s wartime experiences 
may have allowed him to theorize the psyche in a non-teleological manner. Rather 
than suggesting that there was a past to which the subject could return, Bion, like 
Freud in his archaeological metaphor, conceptualised the psyche as being made up of 
elements from different times that co-existed. The adult never sucessfully 
superceded the child, rather, the psychical functioning of an infant or child was 
present in the adult. In a short note titled ‘Analytic Techinique’, Bion writes: 
“Winnicott says patients need to regress, Melanie Klein says they must not: I say 
they are regressed…”.319 People did not have to go back to an earlier system of 
psychic functioning – these responses were available to the subject, and Bion 
experienced this at first hand during the war. The psyche that the patient brings into 
therapy is, to use Bion’s word, a ‘palimpsest.’320 
Bion’s own writing, especially in his autobiographies, has a palimpsest-like 
quality. Here, British colonialism in India, and the First World War are two historical 
moments that remain ‘actively vital’ and ‘incapable of resolution into quiescence’ 
like the ‘primitive catastrophe’ that Bion described. Like Walter Benjamin’s famous 
angel of history, Bion looks back to see “wreckage upon wreckage”, and we are 
asked to bear witness to the extent of the disaster.321 Bion’s description of a 
catastrophe at the heart of the human subject that remains vital is a response to 
Freud, but it could equally be read in dialogue with Walter Benjamin. Writing about 
Paul Klee’s painting, ‘Angelus Novus’, Benjamin describes how the angel’s face “is 
turned toward the past”.322 The angel sees a catastrophe “which keeps piling 
wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet”. Benjamin writes that the 
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angel “would like to stay” but is propelled forward by a storm: “This storm is what 
we call progress”. This discussion of the Klee painting is part of Benjamin’s “Theses 
on the Philosophy of History”, which were written in the shadow of the Second 
World War. In these dense, compact fragments, Benjamin offers a rousing and 
evocative critique of progress and civilisation, writing that “[t]here is no document 
of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”323 This was a 
view that Bion shared—with Benjamin, he encourages thought at times and in 
situations when such uncompromising contemplation of history and present 
circumstances may have been most unbearable. 
 
‘Mysterious Sweetmeats’: the Enigmas of Childhood 
Towards the end of his life, Wilfred Bion wrote two autobiographies. The 
expansive California landscape surrounding him evoked India, where he had spent 
his childhood years. This is where the story begins. In her Foreword to the 
autobiography, Francesca Bion, the author’s collaborator and wife,  writes that many 
generations of the Bion family had served in India: as missionaries, administrators, 
and in the Indian Police. It is very much a colonial childhood that Bion describes, 
where the cast of characters include not just the author’s parents, but also a retinue of 
‘native’ servants: the ayah, the kitmetgar, the bearer.324  
  The reader is immediately struck by Bion’s language: associative and playful, 
we are in the presence of a narrator who has an idiosyncratic relationship to time, 
and is uncertain about his own feelings and opinions: “[o]ur ayah was a wizened 
little woman who, in so far as I connected age with her at all, was assumed by my 
sister and me to be very old, much older than our father and mother. We were very 
fond of her, perhaps more fond than of our parents. On second thoughts, perhaps not. 
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[…] she was not less than say, two or maybe three hundred years old”.325 Bion’s 
narration of his childhood also conveys a feeling of isolation. This is the inevitable 
isolation of a child in an adult world, someone who is still stumbling into language. 
The implications of this become clear when Bion’s father gets him a train that runs 
on electricity. The child asks “a mass of questions about electric city”.326 The 
exchange leaves both father and child disappointed. The adult is excited about the 
wondrous power of electricity, the child is enthusiastic to find a location for this 
wondrous ‘city’ which he links to the Biblical stories he has been told as a child: 
“Simply City; Electric City; Green hill far away where our dear Lord was 
‘crucerfied’ and died to save us all”.327 They use the same word, but their language 
leads them down separate paths. In the style that Bion employs to reconstruct his 
childhood, language always seems to lead elsewhere – as though it is difficult to 
keep stitched together a word, a sound, with what it is meant to denote. 
If language is tricky, so are social interactions. The narrator can see that 
society, like language, has its laws, but he is not able to get his bearing amidst them. 
Always getting himself into trouble, he cannot quite wrap his head around why 
adults act the way in which they do. Bion runs into trouble for asking one of the men 
at his father’s club for an ice cream: “[t]hat had made my father angry. People got 
angry very quickly and suddenly especially about nice things like ice-cream and 
lying on your tummy and 'wiggling'.”328 Bion’s attempts at masturbation, what he 
calls ‘wiggling’, are met with inexplicable behavior on the part of his parents: “[t]o 
my growing surprise I was seized, stripped by my mother and dumped in the tub! 
[…] What had she wet me for, since I was dry to start with?”.329 The period of his 
childhood that Bion reconstructs is what Christopher Bollas identifies in a child aged 
between four to six as the ‘Freudian Oedipal era’, a time when “ contributions from 
many previously latent sources now impinge upon the child who must consider 
them.”330 Maternal containment is given up for psychic complexity–which, as Bion’s 
autobiography shows, also involves a taking in of myth, politics and unanswered 
questions. 
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I find that Bion, in his memoirs, turns to the figure of the child who doesn’t 
yet comprehend what is going on around him as a strategy of alienation. In The Long 
Week-End, the child is not an innocent pitted against the cruelty of the adult world, 
as Bion allows the child both aggression and deceit. Rather, this is a child who has 
not yet been completely interpellated, who remains yet on the margins of ideology, 
even as he desperately attempts to place himself squarely inside it: “[t]he previous 
Christmas I had been asked what present I would like. I had set my heart on a Union 
Jack. When it came I did not know what to do with it. It seemed silly only to wave 
it.”331 One of the literary strategies for the depiction of this inadequate interpellation 
is the baffled narrator, whose voice throws into relief the absurdity and injustice of 
colonial arrangements because it cannot understand them. In his autobiographical 
writing Bion takes on as a strategy of anti-imperial insight the very childishness that 
Claud Daly identified as the flaw in native character that needed prolonged colonial 
rule. 
When the ‘electric-city’ train, gifted to Bion by his father, stops working, one 
of the servants, a bearer, tries to help by oiling the dysfunctional machine with ghee, 
“the best butter” as Bion calls it.332 The sight of the train, oiled and left out in the sun 
in the hope of a cure, calls forth the ire of Bion’s father. The beating of ‘native’ 
servants was not uncommon in colonial India, and the diaries of memsahibs 
frequently discussed the practice.333 The child, accustomed to his father’s anger and 
its consequences, identifies, in that moment, with the bearer: “I feared. I wanted to 
tell my friend the bearer to run, run for his life”.334 Even though the blows don’t fall, 
as they do earlier in the story when Bion is “given a good beating”335 for being 
naughty, even though the “bearer was miraculously saved”336, someone has to take 
the blame, this happens to be the aged and ageless ayah: “She it was who had told 
him about electric 'terains'. Her head trembled as the storm beat about her, but like a 
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reed shaken by the wind she bowed to its fury and it passed her by.”337 In fact the 
ayah usually took the blame: “[t]he great advantage of the ayah was that although 
grown up she could be dealt with.”338 The childhood that Bion describes is strange – 
strange because the world is as such for a child trying to find a place in it, stranger 
because the relations between the people who surround him are odd, to say the least. 
The ayah is an adult, but she takes the blame, she can be ‘dealt with’. The child is 
confronted with a capable adult who does not seem to have authority. At the same 
time, authority, and the power to punish both children and ‘natives’, accrues to 
seemingly incapable adults like his parents: “[p]erhaps some things were too old 
even for the grown-ups. It did not occur to me till many years later that any of those 
in a position of authority could be called on to solve problems that were too old for 
them.”339  
Bion’s parents tried to raise him insulated from pagan beliefs and practices: 
“my father and mother were afraid I would ‘get ideas’ if I were allowed to have 
contact with any kind of ‘pagan superstition’ at variance with the pure, unsullied 
belief of our puritan and their missionary forbears [sic?]”.340.Yet the narrative 
constantly emphasizes Bion’s failure, as a child, to act like the representative of 
empire he is being raised as. Being walked back from school, he sees two young 
girls engaged in a kind of play where they lick each others’ tongues: “my ayah was 
shocked; she clearly did not think it right for ruling- class white children to behave 
like that.”341 Bion doesn’t ask his parents about what he has seen, having learnt by 
this point that “(t)he Master Race did not behave like that”.342 This failure to inhabit 
his proper position, which I have described as a failure of interpellation, opens up the 
possibilities for the recognition of an other. Interpellation, in the Althusserian sense, 
is a process of subjectification. Our discussion in the previous chapter has showed us 
how, in the colonial situation, certain subjectivities were founded on the erasure of 
others, even as they were haunted by their very excisions. Bion’s autobiography 
suggests that the failure to be a solid, self-identical subject was fortuitous.  The child, 
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in Bion’s narrative, has learnt that there is duplicity involved in holding up the 
shibboleths of empire. Failure becomes the basis for insight.343 Bion allows himself 
to identify with those whom he is meant to despise: his “low caste, untouchable” 
companions, “like my ayah and my friend Dhunia the sweeper” rejected both by the 
British and by upper caste Hindus. These identifications, which psychoanalysts and 
memoirists like Claud Daly and Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill tries to smother, are 
allowed a transformative place in Bion’s literary writing. 
At this point, it would be important to recall that Bion’s narration of his 
childhood is a reconstruction. In the Preface to his autobiography he writes: “I know 
that the most I can claim is to be 'relatively' truthful. Without attempting any 
definition of terms I leave it to be understood that by 'truth' I mean 'aesthetic' truth 
and 'psycho-analytic' truth”.344 I have suggested that the baffled narrator who 
presents to us Bion’s childhood is also a means of presenting to us colonial injustice, 
and that in the narrative we can find a story of the failure of interpellation and the 
possibility of recognition. I would like to add that Bion also offers us some resources 
on how to think about such a transformation might come about.  
Much of this has to do with Bion’s portrayal of a curious creature named ‘Arf 
Arfer’.  In Bion’s playful rendering of the linguistic experience of childhood, ‘Our 
Father’, who resides in heaven, turns into “Arf Arfer Oo Arf in Mphm”, an 
onomatopaeic god-dog responsible for all kinds of trouble. The figure of ‘Arf Arfer’ 
links Christianity, the terrifying aspects of Bion’s father, and aspects of social 
convention that the child in the narrative doesn’t yet understand. When ‘Arf Arfer’ 
shows up, Bion knows that he or someone else is going to be punished. Yet he is not 
entirely sure what makes this figure show up, and lives in terror of it: “[s]ometimes 
in my dreams I thought I heard Arf Arfer arfing. It was a terrible frightening noise. 
Once I saw jackals sitting in a circle while one gave the 'fiaow' call. It was 
bloodcurdling. 'That's Arf Arfer’ I thought.”345 
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‘Arf Arfer’, I would like to suggest, can be read as a possible dramatisation 
of the process of the formation of the superego. In the previous two chapters, I have 
discussed Freud’s critique of the superego. Bion’s writing underscores my argument 
about the superego as an intolerant, colonizing entity: 
 
But I did like asking questions. This made people go arf, arf, arf. Once they 
thought it so funny it made me frightened and angry. I felt hot all over and 
made up my mind to keep my questions to myself.  
"You must learn to keep your mouth shut", said my father harshly.  
I was astonished. "But, Daddy, I always keep my mouth shut! Why must I 
keep it shut?"  
"There you go again! Just when I have told you not to!"  
This defeated me. I was about to ask him another question when I found 
myself crying instead. I thought it time to run away; he did not like it when I 
was a silly little cry-baby.  
 
The superego is the entity that stills dissent. Bion not only shows  the 
negative aspects of authority but also a strategy for eluding its tyrannical rule: an 
ironisation of the ‘superego’. Bion’s writing shows up the terrifying, ‘Our Father’ to 
be ridiculous: an ‘Arf Arfer’. Bion manages to escape the threat of authority  when 
his sister and him are able to laugh at it. In The Long Week-End, the obviousness of 
ideology is made strange, while the commands of the law  are rendered  comedic.  
Added to the confusion of authority that Bion describes, is the enigma of 
exchange. Indians who come with baskets of fruit and sweetmeats are thanked, but 
their gifts are never accepted: “I was used to the never-to-be-broken rule that neither 
my father, nor mother, nor sister, nor I, nor any servant of the household was to 
accept a gift of any kind”.346 Yet one day an Indian man appears with a silver cup as 
a present for the child, and the gift is accepted. The child never sees the cup again, 
despite asking his parents for it, and he never finds out where it came from: “When 
the Indian had gone my questions started. “Why did he want me?” “What is the cup 
for?” “Who was he?” “Where…?” But my parents were uncommunicative.”347 The 
reader shares the experience of inhabiting an unresolved engima with the child-self 
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that Bion creates to narrate his experience of India. These questions, which are about 
inequality and political conditions, remain unanswered in the child’s narrative. They 
form the base from which spring the later critiques in the book. The enigma that 
Bion communicates to the reader is an effective literary strategy for the 
representation of childhood, though it is also possible to see in Bion’s style of 
narration an allusion to the process of an analysis. The analysand can only offer their 
speech piecemeal, making retrospective reconstruction a crucial part of the process. 
As we shall see, it is when he writes of the First World War that Bion’s descriptions 
of India at the beginning of the memoir acquire added gravity as a critique of 
colonialism.  
The mysterious loaded trays of sweetmeats and fruits which were refused by 
Bion’s family, acquire added meaning against the backdrop of the famines that had 
starved large sections of the Indian population in the period that the text describes. 
They are an enigma for the child who sees them being refused, and because the 
narrative is from the point of view of a child, they are also an enigma for the reader. 
One interpretation available to the reader is to see them as symbolic of the excess of 
material comfort (so much, that it could be refused) that certain sections of the 
British could enjoy in India. To allow the reader to inhabit the enigma, Bion uses 
polyvalent and condensed images in his writing– his childhood memory also offers 
an image of plenitude that is in stark contrast to the scarcity of food that Bion 
describes in his war memoirs. 
 
‘A Curzon-like form with leather exoskeletenous sheath’: Imperialism and anti-
knowledge 
In his essay “A Theory of Thinking” [1962], Bion turned his attention to the 
question of how we develop a capacity to think. He argues that thinking is an 
apparatus developed in order to cope with thoughts, which precede thinking, rather 
than being its product. A thought itself is the result of an expectation that meets with 
frustration: “an infant whose expectation of a breast is mated with a realization of no 
breast available for satisfaction.”348 Thought is born out of frustration, and the ability 
to sustain being frustrated. The absence of a satisfactory object is crucial, as it is only 
when something is missing that it can be thought. Yet the capacity to think 
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transforms the experience of frustration: “[a] capacity for tolerating frustration thus 
enables the psyche to develop thought as a means by which the frustration that is 
tolerated is itself made more tolerable.”349 Born out of lack and frustration, thought 
is not opposed to feeling, but is itself an indubitably emotional experience. It is this 
frustrating experience of thought, Bion writes, that allows us to learn from 
experience. When the frustration cannot be tolerated, Bion suggests that thoughts are 
felt to be bad internal objects that must be evacuated. One of the consequences of 
this is that the ability to distinguish the other from the self is compromised, since the 
absence that distinguishes them from one’s own self cannot be held in mind. Another 
strategy to avoid frustration is “the assumption of omniscience”.350 To avoid the 
difficulty posed by the process of thinking and learning from experience,  
“[o]mniscience substitutes for the discrimination between true and false a dictatorial 
affirmation that one thing is morally right and the other wrong.”351 
Bion develops his theory of thinking further in Learning from Experience 
[1962] developing a critique of forms of knowledge that are too certain, that exhibit 
an excess of conviction in themselves. An activity that can only be known as a 
continuing process, thinking does not end with the possession of a thought. 
According to Bion, knowledge can only be the process of getting to know 
something, the moment it turns into the feeling of being in possession of a piece of 
information, then it is no longer knowledge, but its opposite. This state of certainty is 
what Bion refers to as –K (minus K). Here, the painful and frustrating process of 
getting to know something is modified into the resolution of possessing a piece of 
knowledge about something: “a misrepresentation of an emotional experience that 
makes a striving for fulfillment appear as fulfillment.”352 
In Learning from Experience, he writes: ‘If a sense of reality, too great to be 
swamped by emotions, forces the infant to resume feeding, intolerance of envy and 
hate in a situation which stimulates love and gratitude leads to a splitting that differs 
from splitting carried out to prevent depression. It differs from splitting impelled by 
sadistic impulses in that its object and effect is to enable the infant to obtain what 
later in life would be called material comforts without acknowledging the existence 
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of a live object on which these benefits depend.’353 Even in his most dense 
metapsychological texts, Bion therefore is concerned with the question of why 
people act as though material benefits do not rely on the existence (and labour) of 
live objects. Once again, we are returned to the question of a relationship to an other. 
Even though Bion’s immediate concern in this book is not to answer this particular 
question, it accompanies the discussions of thinking and knowledge which the book 
addresses, as though one set of questions calls forth the other. Its unresolved nature 
places it within the category of what Bion, contrary to the common usage of the 
word, would call knowledge. 
In his memoir, the use of the enigma in the description of the childhood in 
India demands that the reader engage in an active process of thinking and making 
links, rather than receiving a story that can be mastered or possessed. At the age of 
eight, Bion was sent away from his parents and his beloved ayah, to school in 
England. He describes a period of ill-adjustment and misery: “I learned to treasure 
that blessed hour when I could get into bed, pull the bedclothes over my head and 
weep.”354 The description of boarding school forms a bridge, in the memoir, between 
the child in India, and the youth on the battlefield in WWI. This also where Bion 
begins to articulate the links between the violence of the First World War, and 
colonialism. He offers an illustration of forms of certainty as defences against 
thinking: “[t]he sonorous and impressive phrases of the headmaster, the mobilization 
of ‘Christian So-ho-ho-holdiers marching on to-hoo war’ was premature, immature 
grasping for certainty where no certainty was. Had I wanted to erect a primitive 
phallic, visual image to worship it would have taken a Curzon-like form with leather 
exo-skeletonous sheath to take the strain imposed by an inadequate spine.”355 
The phallic, visual image of a Curzon like form, the apt idol to represent the 
ideals of British boarding school education, was founded on a denial of lack and 
uncertainty. Bion links this desire, one could say hallucination, of certainty with an 
abdication of ethical responsibility. An exo-skeleton of righteous conviction, made 
up of a jingoistic identification with war and religion, ‘Christian so-ho-ho-holdiers’ 
resolves too soon, and too neatly, the dilemma posed by an enigma. Just as thinking 
is born out of frustration, it also relies on being able to tolerate a paradox, to 
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maintain an enigma and keep it productive.356 The consequences, at an institutional 
level, of not being able to do this, were manifested in the bullying culture of 
boarding school and the devastating effects of colonial policy. The phrase ‘Curzon 
like form’ refers to Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor General of India 1899-1905, 
when Bion was a child there.357 Lord Curzon was infamous for presiding over the 
territorial re-division of the Bengal and Orissa provinces in 1905, despite protests 
which were violently curbed by the British administration. It was also under 
Curzon’s rule that millions died in a famine in British India – two years after Bion 
was born.  
Bion links the so-called moral markers of British civilisation–education and 
Christianity–to a form of cultic idol worship. The ‘primitive phallic’ image that Bion 
presents the reader with is not the idol of some tribe in a far away land. Instead, Bion 
locates ‘primitivity’ in the heart of the British colonial enterprise – a gesture that 
locates at the centre of the civilised subject the primitivity that he would locate 
elsewhere in the world, and himself claim to have transcended. Bion condenses into 
a few sentences about boarding school life both a critique of India’s colonial 
administration, as well as a forewarning of the war to come.  
The claim to moral superiority made by British colonisers can be understood 
as what Bion would call ‘omniscience’. Their moral certainty was a form of 
‘omniscience’, a means of avoiding thinking about their situation, and ever so often, 
a sanction and justification of violence. The self assured morality of omniscience 
was a result of the inability, or refusal, to bear the pain and frustration of thinking 
and learning from experience. This takes us back to previous discussions of the 
super-ego in relation to Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly’s claims to superiority. Their 
sense of superiority relied, to a great extent, on their belief that they were better 
informed than the native populations, that they were representatives of a more 
advanced knowledge system, and in Daly’s case, this superior knowledge was 
psychoanalysis itself. To think of knowledge and thinking as emotional and 
uncertain is to give to these categories very different meanings and implications to 
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those attributed them by  colonial psychoanalysts like Claud Daly and Owen A. R. 
Berkeley Hill.358  
 
‘Justice and Glory and So Forth’ : War Memoirs 
After the First World War, Bion wrote a set of diaries recounting his 
experiences with the Royal Tank Regiment in France from 1917-1919. He joined the 
army at the age of eighteen, soon after leaving school. In The Long Week-End he 
describes how the decision to join up was made all the more urgent by the constant 
mockery that a boy of his height and build faced in the streets of London when seen 
in civilian clothes. In these diaries he tries to come to terms with what he had 
witnessed in over two years of active fighting. Not written with the aim of 
publication, these diaries were intended as an offering to Bion’s parents, to whom he 
had found it impossible to write letters during his time as a soldier. His 
autobiography tells us that the war was a matter of honour for his parents, especially 
his father, who said “our war is just”; “we should fight with clean hands”.359  
Bion was to learn otherwise. His daughter, Parthenope Bion Talamo, writes 
that “Bion continued to buy books on warfare, histories of war, memoirs of partisan 
warfare and so on right on up till his death, as though the subject was never far from 
the suface of his mind, perhaps constituting, in its social and individual components, 
a great unsolved puzzle.”360 Incidents recounted in the War Memoirs, the title under 
which these diaries were published, late in Bion’s life, also find their way into 
Bion’s autobiography. It is as though he had to work through them, over and over 
again, because they presented new questions each time. Once again, Bion does not 
settle for any easy answer to the questions that these memories pose. 
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After time spent in England training, and learning about tanks, Bion was sent 
into active fighting. Though proud, at the time, to go overseas as part of a battalion, 
Bion describes “reminiscences of night time fears when I was small in India” when 
waiting at La Havre to be sent to the front.361 He describes the nightmare of the 
Third Battle of Ypres, stumbling in rain through a desolate landscape, treading 
through men who may have been dead or alive for all he could tell. With increasing 
time spent on the front, by 1918 Bion describes himself in a state where it was 
difficult to keep a bearing on reality: “[i]t was a weird business – the heat, and the 
nightmares out of which one started up suddenly in a kind of horror to find the sweat 
pouring down one’s face. It was almost impossible to distinguish dream from reality. 
The tat-tat-tat of the German machine-guns would chime in with your dream with 
uncanny effect, so that when you awoke you wondered whether you were dreaming. 
The machine-gun made you think everything was genuine, and only by degrees you 
recovered yourself to fall into uneasy sleep again.”362 Bion found himself “looking 
forward to getting killed” feeling that dying was the only way in which he could 
have some agency amidst the “unknown powers” who persecuted him: “[a]fter all, a 
mouse must feel that it is one up on the playful cat when it dies without making any 
sport for its captor.”363 
Though he was a decorated, and, one might say, successful officer, Bion 
writes in his diaries about a conversation, on the battlefield, with one of the soldiers 
under his command: “[w]e both found we were by no means keen on the war and its 
justice and glory and so forth–which is obvious a good distance away, but not quite 
so obvious close to the real thing.”364 Glory, then, was a too quick resolution to the 
question of war, the suffering it caused. Bion watched a fellow soldier die and wrote 
in his diary: “I didn’t see then, and I don’t see now, why that fellow and many like 
him should have been taken from their English homes (and their German homes) to 
die for a squabble they didn’t understand and couldn’t realize. […]The sooner people 
realise the criminal folly of their leaders the better.”365 Bion’s writing used the 
visceral, gory brutality of the war to question jingoistic patriotism.  
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The ‘criminal folly’ of leaders that Bion castigates indicates his awareness of 
how upper class Englishmen had offered up the lives of young men to their ideals of 
patriotism and empire. In The Long Week-End, memories of the First World War are 
placed within the first section on India, which is narrated from the point of view of a 
child. This creates a dissonance in the text, because the narrating self seems split 
between the child existing in the present moment in India and a voice that is able to 
remember the propaganda of the First World War even before it has happened. In the 
following extract, for example, the past continuous and present tense are used to 
narrate events that would have been concluded by the time Bion was writing:  
 
Soon I would be in England which was full of little boys, brave boys like 
Havelock and Outram – not like me. “Shsh…”, my mother was saying. “It’s 
only a dream. Go to sleep dear […] I don’t suppose it made much scar on my 
mind because I do not remember a time when I wasn’t a sissy. Even Outram 
and Havelock, and the girl who heard the bagpipes in Lucknow, and 
Nicholson with his beard and stern eyes scared me stiff. Your King and 
Country Need You, thundered Kitchener from the hoardings – but that was 
years and years later.366 
 
This layering of elements from different times links the First World War to 
colonial experience, by pointing out the nationalism that bound the two. The 
supposed heroes of the revolt of 1857, James Outram and Henry Havelock were 
meant to be ideals for the young English boy growing up in India. Bion draws a 
straight line from them to jingoistic British nationalism at the time of WW1. To 
understand the significance of Bion’s formula, we can turn to a literary example. The 
link between Havelock and the First World War is made with very different intention 
by Peter Walsh in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway [1925]. Watching young boys in 
uniform march up Whitehall, he thinks of the “great renunciation” that unites him 
with the boys, and which unites the boys with the “exalted statues” of Nelson, 
Gordon and Havelock.367 Not just role models for the English boy in India, these 
imperial ‘heroes’ were part of the physical landscape of London. Amidst Peter 
Walsh’s sentimental admiration, Woolf conveys her opinion of the boys in uniform: 
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“drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by discipline.”368 Bion would use similar 
descriptions for the army in his memoirs, calling it a “primitive brute”369, a “strange 
religion” around the “sinister idol” of the Lewis gun.370 What Bion shows us, in this 
image of a frightened English child being consoled by his mother in British India, is 
the future as it was shaping itself in the present. And the future, the war, as we have 
seen, is the most dense, bitter part of Bion’s autobiography. 
Just as he makes a link between the First World War and colonialism, Bion 
also connects the everyday, normalized violence of ‘peacetime’ to the dramatic loss 
of life in war. When Bion’s diaries were published, they were accompanied by a 
commentary written in 1972, in the form of a dialogue between Bion and his 
younger self. The two voices, called ‘Myself’ and ‘Bion’, go over the diaries and 
interpret them in light of what has happened since.  
 
BION: We held Ypres 
 
MYSELF: No. Peace broke out with its customary virulence. With heavy 
industry idle, workers rotting for lack of work, we ‘prepared’ to fight another 
war without arms, without training, without spirit. We did NOT “keep on” 
holding Ypres. And now we slither to our Niagara. This time it is not a 
dream.371 
 
Bion’s voice echoes critics of the war like Bertolt Brecht and Rosa 
Luxemburg, who, on the other side of the war, had articulated the connections 
between imperial expansion, war, and class oppression. The lyrics of the famous 
‘Kannonensong’ in Brecht’s Die Dreigroschenoper put forward this critique: 
 
Soldaten wohnen 
auf dem Kannonen 
Vom Cape bis Couch Behar 
Wenn es mal regnete 
Und es begegnete 
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Ihnen ‘ne neue Rasse 
’ne braune oder blasse 
Da machen sie vielleicht daraus ihr 
Beefsteak tartar372  
 
Yet these very men, brutalised by their war experiences, are abandoned by 
the army: “John ist gestorben und Jimmy ist tot und George ist vermisst und 
verdorben /Aber Blut ist immer noch rot, für die Armee wird jetzt wieder 
geworben!”373 In the commentary that follows the diary entries in War Memoirs, 
Bion’s present day persona (‘Myself’) disagrees with the share of blame Bion 
apportions to his immediate senior officers, preferring instead to lay responsibility at 
the door of what he calls the ‘Establishment’. The translator and psychoanalyst Paulo 
Sandler has commented that in his discussions of the ‘Establishment’, Bion 
developed Freud’s account, in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego”, of 
the Church and Army. This ‘Establishment’ was not just a sociological description, 
rather, it could be introjected, and “instil habits of mind, established forms of 
thinking and non thinking” that were repetitive and addictive.374  
In Bion’s memoirs, in the institutions that surround him—the family, 
boarding school and the army—the assumption of a masculine position is wound up 
with the taking on of imperial ideals. The reader can see Bion chafe against these 
ideals–from his childhood, through boarding school and in the army. Towards the 
end of his unfinished second memoir, All My Sins Remembered, this ideal explodes. 
Bion describes himself on holiday in Alfriston. Taking a walk by the shore he sees 
his former fiancée with a new lover. He fantasises about having a gun and shooting 
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the man, and maiming the woman. He then writes: “[o]f course, in England you are 
not supposed to support your claims to masculine superiority by force – not unless 
you have a platoon of troops and an unarmed crowd on which to test your machine 
guns.”375 A few pages before describing this incident, Bion mentions the massacre at 
Jallianwallah Bagh in 1919, when General Dyer “‘saved India by timely order to 
fire’ at Amritsar. Of course some Indians got killed, but India was ‘saved’”.376 The 
incident Bion refers to was the infamous killing, by the British Indian army, under 
the orders of General Reginald Dyer, of over a thousand unarmed people gathered in 
a public park in Amritsar in 1919. Fearing an uprising, the British administration had 
put the state of Punjab under martial law, which curbed the right to assembly. 
Information about the imposition of martial law was not widely disseminated so 
those gathered at the park included both political protesters and pilgrims celebrating 
the holy day of Baisakhi. In his description of the incident,  Bion shows the 
underside of ‘civilised sexual morality’–the restrained chivalrous masculinity of the 
suitor in England is accompanied by the permission to shore up this masculinity by 
firing at unarmed women and children in the colony, gathered at a peaceful 
demonstration in a walled park, with armed soldiers closing off the only exit.377  
The psychoanalyst and feminist scholar Juliet Mitchell has argued that the 
‘legitimate’ violence of war–the killing of other combatants on the battlefield, within 
the framework of certain rules and prohibitions, is always accompanied by 
illegitimate violence. This she defines as attacks on non-combatants, as well as 
sexual assaults on women. As war lifts the prohibition on killing–otherwise 
forbidden (or strictly regulated) in human societies, Mitchell argues that it also 
releases other forms of violence that are otherwise prohibited.378 In his descriptions 
of the war, in both War Memoirs and The Long Week-End,  Bion mentions an 
incident at the village of Bohain, where he sees a young French girl who has been 
raped by German soldiers. She gives birth to a baby soon after the British forces 
arrive in the village: “I had never seen, and never want to see again, such misery and 
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horror disfigure any face.”379 He adds that he had “seen terrible things before, but 
there had always been some relieving feature – fearful mutilations at least meant 
escape from war, and death was no hardship. But from her misery there seemed to be 
no release.”380 The girl continued to haunt his dreams all his life. 
Having situated Bion amongst critics of the war, I would like to reiterate that 
amongst those who survived the war, it was also possible to assimilate the war 
experiences to a narrative of progress and civilisational superiority. Claud Daly is a 
case in point, as is Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill, whose memoirs, as we have seen, 
present a very different account of the war from Bion’s. Unlike Berkeley Hill and 
Claud Daly, Bion owned up to the shameful, inglorious aspects of war, and chose to 
preserve them for future generations. The question here is of what the coming 
generations would find available to them as a means of interpreting the past. Or, like 
the title of one of his psychoanalytic books, the task was one of learning from 
experience. 
 
The Psychosis of Everyday Life 
When Wilfred Bion was a child in India, he went on a tiger hunt with his 
parents. After the tiger was killed, its mate circled the camp for days and “roared her 
requiem”.381 The child Bion asked his mother “if she thought Jesus loved the tigress” 
and when his mother, after some hesitation, said yes, he was relieved, because “he 
did not want the tigress to be lonely”.382 At this point in the narrative, Bion mentions 
a painting that his family owned, which depicted some animals and a child. He 
compares this painting to Picasso’s ‘Family of Saltimbanques’–the figures in both 
paintings ‘stood about doing nothing’.383 ‘Saltimbanques’ is an image into which we 
can read the questions that shape Bion’s writing. In the painting, not only do the 
figures stand about doing nothing in particular, they also seem disconnected from 
each other, no two gazes meet. Moreover, each figure is accompanied by an odd 
selection of objects. The little girl has a basket of flowers and pretty pink dress but 
no shoe. Another unshod boy carries a black drum. He casts no shadow on the 
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ground. A woman sits with a vase that seems to fade into the air–as if suspended 
between the realm of ideas and tactile objects. 
Bion’s psychoanalytic writing concerned itself extensively with questions 
raised by psychosis. As a psychoanalyst, Bion was interested in the ways in which 
people, like the figures in the painting, look past each other, without noticing the 
other’s existence or recognizing a shared reality and common ground. In his clinical 
work Bion encountered the capacity of the mind to populate the world with bizarre 
objects which seemed to occupy a space between the inner psychic world and 
external shared reality–calling into question, by their very existence, this distinction 
between inner and outer. These experiences in clinical work led him to theorize the 
process of thinking and the apparatus of consciousness in a manner that could take 
on board the questions posed to psychoanalytic theory and practice by psychosis. In 
his study of fetishism, Freud had found that the withdrawal of reality seen in 
psychosis was more widespread than it had, at first, seemed to be–it was manifested 
across a broad spectrum in forms of disavowal and fetishism. Like we saw with 
Mannoni, Berkeley Hill and Claud Daly, questions of disavowal and fetishism are 
particulary foregrounded in a colonial context, which was the setting for Bion’s 
childhood experiences. 
Bion was amongst the first analysts to extend the practice of the talking cure 
to patients diagnosed with psychosis, and this is one of the reasons Bion’s 
psychoanalytic work is considered truly ground-breaking.384 This was a departure 
from Freud’s work as a clinician, as Freud thought that psychoanalysis could only be 
practiced with patients suffering from neurotic disorders.385 Bion argued that all 
subjects have a capacity for psychosis, that there is a psychotic and non-psychotic 
part of the personality. He attributes ‘omniscience’, discussed previously as a 
response against the pain and frustration entailed by thinking, to the psychotic part of 
the personality. Bion argued that the analyst could address herself to that part of the 
patient’s personality that was not psychotic, however absent this part of the psyche 
may seem to the observer. 
The distinction between neurosis and psychosis hinges on the question of the 
contact with reality sustained by the suffering person. The common account of 
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psychosis suggests that it involves a schism from what is accepted as reality. Bion’s 
account of psychosis challenges this. In his theory, sense perceptions (called beta ‘ß’ 
elements) are transformed by the psyche through a process called the alpha function. 
The alpha function is a kind of constant process of dreaming, which the subject is 
engaged in, whether awake or asleep. It transforms perceptions into a form of 
unreality, and creates a distance from immediate sense perceptions, allowing them to 
be used by the psyche. In psychosis, Bion argues, this function is almost missing or 
very underdeveloped. For the psychotic, there is no transformation of, no escape 
from sense perceptions. In the experience of psychosis, reality is all too real. 
The person who is not psychotic does not have a better grasp of reality– 
rather, she has greater doubts about reality, and is able to grasp that she will never be 
able to apprehend the thing-in-itself. A psychotic relation to reality is characterised 
by absolute conviction in the truth of one’s perceptions. The capacities for reverie, 
for daydreaming, for being absent-yet-present to oneself are lost. In the individual 
suffering from psychosis, the pressure created by sense perceptions that cannot be 
avoided, that cannot be transformed, is immense and a cause of great distress.386Bion 
argued that everyone has a capacity for psychosis, which may not seem apparent, but 
can manifest itself in group relations, or in institutional cultures.  
 His experience of groups and institutions characterised by omniscience, by an 
unshakeable conviction in their worldview, such as the British in India, and the 
army, may have allowed him to see psychosis not just in the seemingly ‘mad’ 
person, but also in so called ‘normal’ people and organisations. This universalisation 
of the capacity for psychosis allowed him to conduct therapeutic work with 
individuals suffering from psychosis, and it was also used by him to develop a 
critique of institutions that functioned in a psychotic manner. 
 Bion placed considerable emphasis on collective mental life: “for a man to 
lead a full life the group is essential”.387 His investigations into group psychology 
first took the form of group work with soldiers during the Second World War, and 
Bion carried on this work after the war at the Tavistock Clinic. He wrote that no 
“individual, however isolated in time and space, should be regarded as outside a 
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group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology.”388 The very use of 
language required a passage through the political. Writing about the problem of 
‘publication’, that is, the process by which something private is made public, Bion 
identified two dimensions to it—the emotional and technical. He wrote that the 
“[t]he emotional problems are associated with the fact that the human individual is a 
political animal and cannot find fulfilment outside a group and cannot satisfy any 
emotional drive without expression of its social component” and that this need for 
the social comes into conflict with narcissistic impulses, creating a conflict between 
“narcissism and social-ism”.389 The technical aspect of the problem of publication is 
“concerned with expression of thought or conception in language, or its counterpart 
in signs”.390 This suggests that at the heart of language is a political conflict, one 
between narcissism and social-ism. The content of these terms, ‘narcissism’ and 
‘social-ism’ is not provided, neither is the nature of the conflict described. However, 
what remains with the reader is Bion’s awareness that language, and speech, always 
carries traces of discontent in the spheres of political and social life, and that entering 
into social identifications is as difficult as it is necessary. 
In the group, like in the individual, Bion noticed psychotic tendencies. He 
described these as the ‘basic assumption’ phenomena in a group, which were 
characterized by split off mental functioning, an absence of the sense of time, and a 
reluctance to learn from experience. He identified three forms of basic assumption 
phenomens: ‘dependence’, which manifested itself in the group’s belief that it was 
gathered to rely on, and derive sustenance from a leader; ‘pairing’ which was the 
feeling of messianic hope for an unborn leader or unrealized ideal, which required 
that this leader or ideal never arrive; and ‘fight or flight’ a state in which immediate 
release and satisfaction was sought, whether as flight from the situation or the release 
of uncontrolled aggression. A group organized around a basic assumption was bound 
together by ‘valency’: “a capacity for instantaneous involuntary combination of one 
individual with another for sharing and acting on a basic assumption”.391 
 While Freud focused attention on the group centred around the figure of a 
leader based upon the figure of a primal father, Bion did not have one single 
template for the leader of a group. Drawing upon the idea of ‘valency’, he suggested 
                                                
388. Bion, Groups, 132.	
389. Bion “Thinking,” 221. 
390. Bion “Thinking,” 221. 
391. Bion, Groups, 153. 
134	
	
that the leader of a basic assumption group may in himself be nothing much more 
than a screen of empty place: “an individual whose personality renders him 
peculiarly susceptible to the obliteration of individuality by the basic-assumption 
group’s leadership requirements.”392 Or, instead of a leader, a group organized 
around the basic assumption of dependence could turn to the history of the group, 
what Bion terms “Bible making” instead of a personified leader.393 The purpose of 
the basic assumption group was to avoid learning from experience, as this was felt to 
be painful and disruptive of the status quo. Dependence and messianic hope were 
both ways of avoid this painful process of growth. Flight and fight were also in the 
service of this end, and Bion pointed out that they were not two distinct responses 
but the same: “[f]light offers an immediately available opportunity for expression of 
the emotion in the fight-flight group and therefore meets the demand for 
instantaneous satisfaction—therefore the group will fly. Alternatively, attack offers a 
similarly immediate outlet—then the group will fight.”394 Rather than Freud’s group, 
which comes together around the leader, Bion saw the leader of the group as 
someone who sanctioned emotional states already existing in the group: “[t]he fight-
flight group will follow any leader (and, contrary to views hitherto expressed, retains 
its coherence in doing so) who will give such orders as license instantaneous flight 
or instantaneous attack.”395  
 This has implications for how we view historical or collective responsibility, 
and Bion suggested that when group members stayed silent in response to feelings or 
suggestions articulated only by a few members of a group, they were in effect, giving 
their consent to what was being articulated. He thought of group mentality “as the 
pool to which the anonymous contributions are made, and through which the 
impulses and desires implicit in these contributions are gratified.”396  
 Bion was interested in helping both the group and the individual to find 
expanded possibilities of thought and learning. In addition to his powerful account of 
psychosis in groups and individuals, Bion’s work concerns itself with the ability to 
make links. Psychosis, Bion argues, is characterised by attacks on links–elements 
                                                
392. Bion, Groups, 177. 
393. Curzon, whom Bion saw as the epitome of anti-knowledge, had a strong sense of history and was 
known for his identification with previous Viceroys of India: “he described some of his predecessors 
in terms that might almost have been autobiographical”. Gilmour, Curzon, 165. 
394. Bion, Groups, 180. 
395. Bion, Groups, 180. 
396. Bion, Groups, 50.	
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that join associations, and allow for feelings to be linked to each other. The 
consequence of an avoidance of lack is an inability to think, as discussed earlier, and 
this leads to the splitting of perception and experience into tiny components, all in 
the service of avoidance. The task of the analyst is to allow for these splits to be 
reintegrated, and to help the patient undergo the consequent pain of this linking, 
which would make the fact of absence and lack more prominent. As we have seen, 
Bion’s memoirs are also a process of linking, of making connections between 
histories of war, colonialism and class exploitation which are all too often split off 
from each other in the service of a self idealising establishment. 
In his work on alpha and beta elements, and links, Bion is concerned with the 
process of transformation. He is not a reparative or optimistic thinker, and his work 
offers no easy way out of psychic and political dilemmas, but he theorises, not just 
psychosis, but also ways of learning from experience, of understanding and 
inhabiting complex histories. I have argued that his own memoirs were such a 
reckoning, but as a warning against idealization, it is important to remember that 
Bion’s political critique was something that developed over the course of his life. 
Even though this critique structures the memoirs, so that the childhood and war are 
seen through its frame, this was not the case in the chronology of Bion’s writing. 
Bion’s experience of the First World War led to a critique of colonialism in his war 
diaries, but after some years this awareness had been buried. Writing in 1940, when 
he was an army psychiatrist, Bion uses a very different set of images to describe 
colonialism:  
 
In this country, mother of a colonial empire, most of us have been 
familiarized with stories of pioneering in distant lands, of caravans trekking 
great distances and being attacked by Red Indians and other foes. Cannot this 
heritage be capitalized? Most of us remember how, when the alarm sounds, 
the men folk rushed to their weapons, a circle of carts was formed as a 
palisade, and the women fell to their allotted tasks of ammunition carriers, 
nurses and even warriors. The fight over, the attack beaten off, the march was 
resumed.397  
 
                                                
397. Wilfred Bion, “The War of Nerves: Civilian Reaction, Morale and Prophylaxis” in the Complete 
Work of Wilfred Bion 4 (London: Karnac 2014), 11-12. 
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 This is a much more romantic and naïve understanding of colonialism, and 
this kind of romanticised colonial imagery is used to evoke some rather 
conservatively gendered ideal of menfolk rushing to their weapons. There is a world 
of difference between this set of images and the memoirs. This article serves as a 
reminder that experience in itself does not lead directly to political awareness, or the 
critique of unfair institutions, rather, the work of critique and transformation has to 
be ongoing. Bion began his intensive psychoanalytic work after the Second World 
War, and there was a dialectic between Bion’s psychoanalytical work and his 
interpretation of historical events, a process that was alive to the possibilities of 
change. In the work of analysts like Claud Daly we have witnessed psychoanalysis 
put into the service of colonial ideals. Bion’s work shows how psychoanalysis, 
despite the subject’s capacity for self-delusion and self- idealization, can help create 
the conditions for an ethical position towards an individual and collective history. 
I find in Bion’s work not only a profound critique of British imperialism, but 
also a way of interpreting the work produced by psychoanalysts who identify with  
the project of colonisation. Histories of colonialism frequently discuss it as a project 
of gathering and producing knowledge–and the vast colonial archive certainly bears 
witness to this. Thinking psychoanalytically can allow us  to complicate this concept 
of knowledge. The idea of the unconscious challenges the assumption that 
knowledge equals mastery, and shows that attempts to align the two together are 
bound to produce their own forms of suffering and failure. Bion’s work allows us to 
think of the process of knowing not as an exercise in administration or governance, 






Heads and Dreams 
Until that hot afternoon when I toiled up the steps, I had never seen the house or 
garden, yet as I walked the lawn it was as if something at least was persistently 
familiar. That night I looked again at the illustrations in the Assam monographs— 
The Sema Nagas, The Ao Nagas, The Angami Nagas. Then at last I knew. It was the 
neat darunta [sic] hedge rimming the compound like a line of privet, squat, cosy and 
suburban. Of all the natural beauties in the Naga Hills, it is the hedge which has 
been most lovingly and regularly photographed. Sometimes it provides the romantic 
background for a set of witchcraft figures. Sometimes its well-clipped outlines 
provide a decorous setting to a warrior’s glory. Sometimes it looms dim but visible 
beneath the compound clothes-line while Naga cloths dangle their differences in the 
glum light. Even when Sema boys wrestle and a chief stands proudly to attention, the 
hedge remains neat and gentle, a pointer to another land where the Nagas are 
huddled in museums and the head-taker is only a specimen. 
Mildred Archer, Journal deposited in the European Manuscripts division of the India 
Office Library 
 
& if they ask you about life on the reservation  
                if they say they want to hear about stilt houses 
                and the dry clack of rain on bamboo 
                and the preservation of tribal ways 
                         give them a slaughter. 
Mona Zote, ‘Rez’ 
 
He had known what tortures the savages had prepared 
For him there, as he calmly pushed open the gate 
And entered the wood near the placard: ‘TAKE NOTICE 
MEN-TRAPS AND SPRING-GUNS ARE SET ON THESE PREMISES.’ 
For his father had protected his good estate 




In Totem and Taboo [1913], Freud describes the treatment of a head gathered by the 
Sea Dyaks of Sarawak in a successful head hunting expedition: “for months after its 
arrival it is treated with the greatest consideration and addressed with all the names 
of endearment of which their language is capable. The most dainty morsels of food 
are thrust into its mouth, delicacies of all kinds and even cigars.”398 A connoisseur of 
cigars himself, Freud is quick to warn his reader against imputing to these 
observances, “which strike us as so horrible”, any desire on part of the victors to 
ridicule the severed head.399 Indeed this example is adduced to Freud’s argument that 
even amongst “savage and half savage races” [den wilden und halbwilden Völkern] 
the killing of an enemy is accompanied by observations and taboos. 400 The reader is 
expected to receive this with surprise, as Freud thinks that “we may be inclined to 
suppose that savage and half-savage races are guilty of uninhibited and ruthless 
cruelty towards their enemies.”401 Freud drew his example of the head hunting 
savage from Frazer’s book, The Golden Bough.  
This chapter takes us to the North Eastern frontiers of colonial India, where 
certain administrators, readers of Freud and Frazer, were engaged not only in 
describing, but also in governing the practice of head hunting. While I draw 
examples from the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, later designated the Chief 
Commissioner’s Province of Assam, my primary focus is on the region known as the 
Naga Hills. 402 Home to the Nagas—a name with uncertain etymology used to group 
together tribes that often spoke distinct languages, this territory attracted 
considerable anthropological interest over the years.403 The ethnic groups living in 
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402. “India under Crown rule, after the revolt of 1857-8, began to implement a policy of separate 
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403. Lt. Colonel R.G. Woodthorpe wrote: 
Various derivations have been given for the name Naga, some supposing it to come from the 
Bengali word Nangta, in Hindustani ‘Nanga’ = ‘naked’. Others think that the Kachari word 
Naga = a young man= a warrior, supplies the name; while others again derive it from 
‘Nag’= ‘a snake.’ Not one of these derivations is satisfactory, nor does it really concern us 
much to know more about it, seeing that the name is quite foreign to and unrecognized by the 
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the hills in this region were considered reservoirs of uncorrupted primitivity: “among 
these primitive hillmen some have still retained ‘their customs of primeval 
antiquity’, and present to the modern observer a picture of what man was in the 
childhood of human civilisation. To the modern student each of the tribes of Assam 
present opportunities for lifelong research and investigation.”404  
This shift in location allows us to take questions relating to civilisation and 
temporality further, by exploring historical and theoretical conjunctions of 
psychoanalysis and anthropology in colonial India. Due to the fascination the region 
and its people held for anthropologists, we find that many of the conversations 
between psychoanalysis and anthropology in India, which we will be examining later 
in this chapter, also involve the Nagahills. While John Henry Hutton (1885-1968), 
James Mills (1890-1960) and William Archer (1907-1979) all held administrative 
positions in the North East, other anthropologists like Cristoph von Fürer 
Haimendorf (1909-1995) and Verrier Elwin (1902-1964) visited the region and 
wrote about it. Their sense of excitement, of an encounter with something 
extraordinary is palpable in their writing. Describing a visit he made with Cristoph 
von Fürer Haimendorf, the ‘Baron’, to the village of Chongtore in 1936, James Mills 
wrote in a letter: “[y]ou can imagine how thrilled the Baron was at achieving the 
anthropologist’s ideal, and visiting villages no white man had been to before. […] 
the children will have lots to say later—people of an entirely strange colour wearing 
                                                                                                                                     
Nagas themselves. They have no generic term for the whole race, not even for each of the 
various tribes constituting this race.  
in The Nagas in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Verrier Elwin (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
47. W. Robinson wrote:  
The origin of the word Naga is unknown; but it has been supposed by some to have been 
derived from the Sanskrit word nagn and applied in derision to the people, from the paucity 
of their clothing; but there seems little foundation for this etymological derivation, as the 
term has never been known to be applied by the Bengalees to either the Khassias or Garos, 
with whom they were far better acquainted than with the Nagas; and besides, the Garos 
especially are habitually accustomed to a greater degree of nudity than any of the Naga tribes 
with whom we are acquainted. Whatever the origin of the word Naga, it appears that the 
appellation is entirely unknown to the hill tribes themselves. The inhabitants of these hills 
are divided into numerous communities or races; and they know themselves by the 
designations of their respective tribes only, and not by any name common to all the races.  
Nagas in the Nineteenth Century, 84. 
404. SK Bhuyyan, Speech made by Prof.  S.K. Bhuyyan in proposing Dr. J.H. Hutton to the chair, on 
the 13th anniversary of the Kamrupa Anusandhana Samiti (Assam Research Society) held at Gauhati 
on October 27, 1925. Typescript. Box 3, Hutton Papers, Pitt Rivers Museum Collection [PRMC]. For 
more on the Kamarupa Anusandhana Society and SK Bhuyyan see Bodhisattva Kar, “The Tragedy of 
Suryya Bhuyan”, Biblio May-June 2008, pp 26-27. 
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entirely strange clothes, must be too much to take in all at once.”405 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, in Freud’s writing, mentions of the primitive are found alongside 
discussions of ambivalence and ethics, notably in Totem and Taboo. I find that there 
is a fundamental difference between Freud’s use of anthropology, and the use of 
Freud by anthropologists working in the province of Assam in colonial India, not 
least because the men I write about in this chapter were also colonial officers leading 
punitive expeditions against the very people who were the subjects of their 
ethnographies, or landowners demanding labour and taxes from their ‘primitive’ 
tenants. An ideal of progress frequently sanctioned the violence that was unleashed 
in the region, taking us back to discussions of the superego, and aggression 
sanctioned by morality. 
Assam, a meeting place for such a concentration of anthropological notables, 
also foregrounded, in its politics, questions about primitivity. Always a cause of 
some anxiety in the colony, the maintenance of the division between primitive and 
civilised became the cause of particular concern in India in 1905, eight years before 
the publication of Freud’s Totem and Taboo, which as I have argued, offers a new 
mode of thought in relation to the category of the ‘primitive’. The beginning of the 
twentieth century witnessed the creation of the new province of Eastern Bengal and 
Assam in British India, under the supervision of Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor 
General of India. In the Introduction, I suggested that this historical moment can help 
us situate Girindrasekhar Bose amongst Bengali intellectuals invested in ideas of 
‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’ and understand his invocation of the savage who “goes 
out head hunting merely for the pleasure of it.”406 In the protests and petitions by 
Bengali activists against the territorial re-division there was noticeable unwillingness 
to being assigned to the province of Assam, which was considered, as Bodhisattva 
Kar has pointed out, a ‘primitive’ region populated by ‘savage’ tribes: “it is no light 
matter for 11 millions of people to be driven to a strange land (…) and to be forced 
to form an alliance with a strange people with whom we have nothing in 
common”.407 This territorial re-division brought to the surface anxieties about 
primitivity and civilisation, which congealed around the creation of the new 
                                                
405. James Mills, The Pangsha Letters: An Expedition to Rescue Slaves in the Naga Hills (Oxford: 
Pitt Rivers Museum, 1995),10-11.    
406. Girindrasekhar Bose, Everyday Psycho-Analysis, (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1945), 27. 
407. Sitanath Raybahadur, quoted in Kar “Deprovincialising Assam,” 47. 
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province.408 The colonial government, architect of this division, itself had worries 
about this poorly mapped province—its boundaries not clearly demarcated, its 
inhabitants not fully incorporated as subjects of the colonial administration.409  
After Curzon’s territorial re-division scheme was implemented in 1905, the 
Lt. Governor of the newly created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, E.J. 
Bampflyde Fuller, commissioned a project to undertake ethnographies in this 
“museum of nationalities”.410 Colonial administrators, and occasionally Christian 
missionaries, were called upon to produce accounts of the people they were 
governing, or trying to bring under governance. John Hutton and James Mills 
published monographs in this series, and in his “Foreword” to Hutton’s monograph 
The Sema Nagas, Henry Balfour commends this scheme initiated by the Government 
of Assam: “[e]ncouragement of ethnographical and ethnological research is one of 
our most crying needs. The material is abundant, since we are responsible for the 
welfare and progress of peoples whose very varied culture-status ranges from that of 
the Stone-age savage to the highest civilisation.”411 Ethnographies published in the 
Government of Assam scheme were ordered according to a scheme prescribed by the 
government, the ‘Contents’ page of all the ethnographies used the same divisions, 
part of an attempt to produce a more efficient catalogue of knowledge on the 
‘primitive’, who was seen as data to be filled into pre-existing concerns and 
categories. Amongst these, we find questions of knowledge, civilisation and 
governance, three themes that were knotted together in the previous chapters, 
particularly in relation to Claud Daly and Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill. 
 
                                                
408. See Kar “Deprovincialising Assam” for a discussion of these. 
409. See Ishita Dube, A History of Modern India, (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 223-
224. 
410. E.J. Bampflyde Fuller, “Introduction” in The Garos by Alan Playfair (London: David Nutt, 
1909), xiii. A similar opinion was expressed by S.K. Bhuyyan:  
We are fortunate, gentlemen, that we live in the province of Assam, which some call 
‘benighted’, inhabited as it is by a diversity of races, speaking diverse languages, and 
professing diverse religions and customs, from the most enlightened and intellectual Aryan 
population of the plains down to the most primitive and unsophisticated denizens of the hills, 
some of whom have not as yet been brought under the humanising influence of modern 
civilisation, and are supposed to be still living in their aboriginal ferocity as head hunters and 
snake worshippers.  
Speech made by Prof.  S.K. Bhuyyan in proposing Dr. J.H. Hutton to the chair, on the 13th 
anniversary of the Kamrupa Anusandhana Samiti (Assam Research Society) held at Gauhati on 
October 27, 1925. Typescript. Box 3, Hutton Papers, PRMC. 
411. Henry Balfour, “Foreword” to The Sema Nagas (London: Macmillan and Co, 1921), xv-xvi. 
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‘Huddled in Museums’ 
In addition to compiling information about indigenous populations into 
ethnographies, the administrators also collected objects that were sent to museums. 
The first epigraph to this chapter is taken from the diary of Mildred Archer, wife of 
W.G. Archer, who was posted in the Nagahills in the last year of British rule in 
India. It attests to how both the ethnographies, and the colonial framing of 
indigenous objects, packaged the Nagas for consumption in “another land where the 
Nagas are huddled in museums.”412 Significant amongst these museums was the Pitt 
Rivers in Oxford, which was involved in procuring various Naga artefacts that are 
still on display to its visitors.413 Today, the museum also serves as the repository of 
the papers of some of the anthropologists I discuss here. When Augustus Henry Lane 
Fox Pitt Rivers gave his collection of ethnological and archaeological objects to the 
University of Oxford, it was on the condition that they would be housed in a 
museum arranged according to a scheme approved by Pitt Rivers. The museum’s 
collection is arranged according to levels of material culture. The lower floors 
display the earlier and ‘simpler’ examples of material culture and the upper floors 
display artefacts belonging to a more complex level, a scheme that shares with the 
Government of Assam ethnographies a belief in a hierarchy of cultures. According to 
Pitt Rivers, the “one great thing” to be emphasized in a museum displaying artefacts 
of this kind was evolution, and he saw this collection as an educational aid to further 
a belief in this process: “to impress upon the mind the continuity and historical 
sequence of the arts of life, is, without doubt, one of the most important lessons to be 
inculcated.”414 Or, as the poet James Fenton puts it in the poem from which the third 
epigraph to this chapter is taken, ‘The Pitt Rivers Museum, Oxford’: “the thesis is 
salutary/ And simple, a hierarchy of progress culminating in the Entrance Hall.”415 
Amongst the many objects sent from the Nagahills to the Pitt Rivers are some 
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16, (April 1984), 37. 
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head trophies, these are displayed on the ground floor, under an exhibit titled “The 
Treatment of Dead Enemies”. On the highest level of the museum, which according 
to Pitt Rivers’ scheme for the museum, also corresponds to objects from the most 
sophisticated level of material culture, is an extensive display of guns. Unsurprising, 
as Pitt Rivers was a military man, and a keen collector of weapons. The heads in the 
museum arrived after a transcontinental journey, but in a curious and important link 
to the history of psychoanalysis in India, the dreams that lived inside the heads of 
people in the Naga and Garo hills, insofar as dreams can be said to live anywhere, 
also made journeys themselves, by becoming collectibles, part of the data of 
colonisation. The colonial investment in the idea of civilisation, as well as a 
relationship to knowledge that was accumulative and classificatory had a part to play 
in shaping this history. And yet in such an historical situation where discourses of 
progress, evolution and civilisation seem most entrenched, writing produced by 
colonial administrators suggests that there was a drag, something less easily 
subordinated to such a narrative because of its more complex psychic content, which 
pulled against the epistemological and administrative certainties.  
As we shall see, the presence of psychoanalysis, once again a concrete part 
of, and reference point for this history, can also serve to alert us to its more uncanny 
components, the bizarre and often self-divided nature of the projects undertaken by 
these anthropologist administrators. But it is in literary writing, by James Mills and 
the Naga writer Temsula Ao, that the civilised self finds itself undone, and the 
‘savage’ writes back. Like the speaker in Fenton’s poem suggests, if the visitors to 
the Pitt Rivers were to turn to their own past, “like a child entering the/ Woods of his 
lonely playtime”,416 they would find that the ‘savage’ is far more heimlich than they 
had perhaps expected. Surely it is no accident that the memory that surfaces in the 
concluding stanza of Fenton’s poem, leads us from the exhibits in the Pitt Rivers to a 
country estate in England.  
In the previous chapter, I discussed Wilfred Bion’s distinction between minus 
K (a form of knowing complacency which functions as a defence) and positive K (a 
destabilizing and painful experience of learning). Bion used these categories to 
articulate a critique of colonialism, which he represented as being characterized by 
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minus K, identifying Lord Curzon as the epitome of anti-knowledge, a form with a 
“leather exo-skeletonous sheath to take the strain imposed by an inadequate 
spine.”417 Bampflyde Fuller, the Lieutanant Governor of Assam, who had described 
the province as a “museum of nationalities” wrote that “this museum has, till 
recently, remained un-catalogued - has, at least, been undescribed in a systematic 
catalogue […] five years ago the Government of Assam decided to bring together all 
that had been collected by previous investigators, to correct it, complete it and bring 
it up to date in a series of monographs”.418 Bampflyde Fuller’s words: ‘museum’, 
‘catalogue’, ‘collected’, suggest inanimate and static objects, rather than living 
beings with their passions and history.  In the ethnologies produced by the 
Government of Assam and in the exchange of dreams tables between scattered 
anthropologists we encounter a form of minus K that was institutionalised and made 
policy. This form of anthropological writing, with its stamp of institutional approval, 
served the same purpose as the glass on a museum cabinet: to separate the observer 
from the observed, to prevent a dangerous touching. 
 
‘Recording Dreams of Non-European Races’ 
Amongst John Henry Hutton’s papers at the Pitt Rivers Museum archive are 
some pages, divided into five columns each, with the titles “dream symbol”; 
“interpretation”; “informant”; “tribe”, and; “remarks”. A “symbol”, such as 
“wedding”, or “death of a man” is listed, an equally cryptic ‘interpretation’ 
follows—in these examples, “death”, and “the successful pursuit of game”.419 The 
following columns record the name of the informant and their tribe. The final 
column, ‘Remarks’ compares, in a few sentences, this symbol and its interpretation 
with those of other Naga groups, and notes when a similar belief prevails in another 
place, Ireland being the most frequent comparison. Hutton lists forty six symbols, 
from four Naga groups. In most cases, he writes, the interpretation noted is collective 
and future oriented, meant to foretell something. When a ‘personal’ interpretation is 
recorded, it is because the ‘dream symbol’ is of significance in foretelling the 
personal future of the informant.  
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This curious, somewhat puzzling document takes us into the history of the 
interaction between psychoanalysis and anthropology in England, to an instance 
where dreams became a site of examining and establishing racial difference. 
Hutton’s tables were compiled in response to a letter by Charles G. Seligman, a 
noted anthropologist at the London School of Economics.420 Seligman had worked 
as a doctor during the First World War and wrote that most of his “knowledge of 
dreams was gained in this country while doing ‘shell shock’ work”.421 He wanted 
data from around the world about the dreams of ‘primitive’ people, an endeavour 
that required assistance of other anthropologists. This was sought through an advert 
published in Man and by contacting various acquaintances; amongst these Henry 
Balfour, of the Pitt Rivers Museum. 422  Balfour put Seligman in touch with James 
Mills and John Henry Hutton, then working in the province of Assam in British 
India. At the time that Seligman contacted them, Hutton was Officiating Deputy 
Commissioner, and Mills the Assistant Commissioner in the Nagahills. They were 
well acquainted with Balfour, to whom they had sent many Naga artefacts such as 
ornaments, weapons, carved stones etc. for inclusion in the Museum’s collection. 
Their monographs on the Nagas, published by the Government of Assam, were 
known to Seligman, who had been intrigued by the brief descriptions of Naga 
dreams included in them.  Seligman wrote to Mills saying that he was concerned 
with “the psychology of non-Europeans” and hoped that records of Naga dreams that 
Mills, or Hutton, could gather and send him would help him in exploring this topic. 
The letter was accompanied by two notes—the first discussing Freud’s 
theory of dreams and titled “Note on Dreams”, and the other meant as a set of 
instructions to dream gatherers, titled “Suggestions as to Method of Recording 
Dreams of Non-European Races”.423 In his “Note on Dreams”, Seligman divides 
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dreams into three categories, those that are “sensible and intelligible, i.e. they tell a 
connected story of the everyday world”; those that tell a connected story, but there is 
something in them that makes them seem ‘unnatural’, and; dreams with “bizarre, 
confused and non-sensical content”.424 Dreams in the first category, Seligman writes, 
“are often obvious and simple wish fulfilments,” of the kind seen amongst children 
“in the white races”. Of the last category, Seligman notes that “[m]uch of the 
strangeness of these dreams is due to the symbolism used to express the dream 
thoughts.” The three categories are indicative of levels of complexity for Seligman. 
Dreams in the latter categories would be the product of greater repression: “the 
unnatural and bizarre elements are considered to represent a symbolic rendering of a 
desire or emotion which we cannot bring ourselves to admit during our waking 
hours”. 
Seligman was interested in finding out “whether the dreams of natives belong 
in the main to class (1) or to the other two classes, and if the latter whether they can 
in a general way be regarded as disguised wishes or fears.”425In the course of his 
anthropological work he had noted that “natives not infrequently have dreams of 
class (1).” Interested in recording more dreams from the second and third category, 
“to find out whether any special meaning is attributed to them, i.e. is the fact of 
symbolism in dreams recognised”, Seligman was concerned with the question of 
whether there are “general conventional meanings attached to particular symbols and 
even personal meanings”. Further, he wanted to investigate whether “in the latter 
event does the individual consider that certain objects or animals or people dreamt of 
have a particular significance for him, and if so upon what experiences or fantasies 
does he base his belief.” 
Freud does indeed write that children’s dreams are often constructed around a 
simple wish fulfilment, which Seligman lists as the first ‘category’ of dreams in his 
note. Dreams with a similar structure are also observed amongst adults, Freud writes, 
yet he offers a caveat to this formulation—in adults, the wish that is represented as 
fulfilled is rarely as simple as that of a child. In his note, Seligman suggests that the 
dreams of natives are like the ‘simple wish fulfilment’ dreams of children, while 
Freud cautions that even when dreams seem like an obvious wish fulfilment, when 
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the material presented seems facile, this should not be taken for granted in the 
interpretation.  The interpretation of dreams is a fragile exercise that can only take 
place with some integrity if the encounter can work with both the patient’s resistance 
and transference. 
This alerts us to how Seligman’s study presupposed racial difference. The 
assumption behind his categorisation of dreams, and interest in the dreams of the 
‘natives’ was that the primitives would have ‘simpler’ dreams because in their 
psyches less was repressed. Dreams and dream interpretation became the ground 
upon which the distance between the savage and civilised was to be marked out. This 
was Freud’s theory of dream interpretation appropriated for a theory of racial 
difference. For colonial administrators to carry out Seligman’s project, Freud’s 
theory had to be translated and reworked. In a note titled “Suggestions as to Method 
of Recording Dreams of Non-European Races”, which accompanied his letters to 
Hutton and Mills, Seligman divides the process of recording dreams into four 
steps.426 This modular refashioning of Freud was supposed to enable far away men 
to collect some dreams in their spare time, when they could excuse themselves from 
the cares of administration. Seligman did not seem to expect his informants to 
interpret the dreams of the ‘natives’ they interacted with at any great length. The 
exercise was not meant to produce transformative meaning in a dialogic encounter. 
The study was ostensibly interested in both the form and content of the native 
unconscious—both the shape of native dreams (the way they were structured) as well 
as their content (the kind of images and symbols that appeared in them). Yet there is 
little discussion of how the form of the recording exercise would in itself have 
produced a certain kind of information. As I discussed in Chapter 1, this question of 
why any ‘native’ would have wanted to share their personal associations with an 
anthropologist, is a question that Freud poses in Totem and Taboo, and leaves 
unresolved. It is left unaddressed in Seligman’s method of recording dreams, and in 
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the transcontinental exercise where dreams were dissociated from their dreamers, 
and sent to another person who would interpret them to his own end.  
In an essay titled “Some Additional Notes on Dream Interpretation as a 
Whole” published in 1924, the same year in which Seligman would present the 
results of this study in a Presidential Address to the Royal Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland, Freud stressed the difficulties of dream interpretation. 
According to Freud, while there are a set of psychoanalytic theories as to how 
dreams may be interpreted, in practice there is no one, predetermined route to follow. 
Arguing that dream interpretation can only be undertaken with some integrity within 
the framework of an analysis, as it is the analysand’s resistance that endows the 
process with energy and meaning, Freud maintained that dreams interpreted, as in 
the case of Seligman, “without reference to the dreamer's associations, would in the 
most favourable case remain a piece of unscientific virtuosity of very doubtful 
value.”427 The unconscious, in Freud’s version, is not just something to be decoded, 
but is endowed with significance. It is in the process of being heard, as part of 
interpretative activity, that it both makes and resists meaning.  
In January 1924, when Seligman presented the results of his study to the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, he thanked Hutton and Mills for their contribution 
to his research, for “their invaluable records of the dreams of the native peoples they 
know so well.”428 The study was “a purposive investigation of the unconscious 
amongst non-European races.”429 As Seligman discussed dreams from around the 
world, he ranked those who had dreamt them in order of increasing primitivity. He 
first discussed the dreams of Arabs, saying that it was unsurprising that these dreams 
seem similar to European dreams. He then gave examples from dreams of more 
‘primitive’ African groups.   Within this scale, the Nagas were classed as the “more 
primitive members” of the “Mongolian peoples”.430 Seligman was interested in 
symbols and type dreams, unlike Freud. These offered him an opportunity for 
“exploring the unconscious of white and other races”: 
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If it can be shown that identical symbolism (i.e. identical symbols with the 
same meaning attached to them) is to be found in the dreams of unrelated 
races differing profoundly in their civilisation and social organisation, then 
we shall have to admit that the unconscious of the most diverse races is 
qualitatively so alike that it actually constitutes a proved common store on 
which fantasy may draw […].431 
 
The shared unconscious that Seligman ‘discovered’ was seen as ‘store’ rather 
than as a shared structure. Instead of the unconscious requiring potentially infinite 
interpretation, an idea that troubles the mastery of the analyst and renders complex 
the patient’s relationship to the only partly knowable contents of her or his mind, 
Seligman posited the unconscious as a ‘common store’ with identifiable contents. He 
wrote that this shared unconscious has to be acknowledged in discussions of “the 
origins of myths, beliefs and even, perhaps, the simpler implements and technical 
processes.”432 Inferred through dream symbols abstracted and detached from a wider 
network of associations, this shared unconscious could still be made anterior, since 
as Seligman suggests in a telling phrase, its significance would at most be seen in the 
study of ‘simpler implements and technical processes.’ Likewise, as discussed 
previously, he writes that ‘natives’ may have “even personal meanings” for their 
dreams, as if the personal could not be assumed to exist in the ‘primitive’.433 
Suggesting that a distinction at the level of simplicity is being maintained, Seligman 
also wrote that the unconscious may influence “even, perhaps, the simpler 
implements and technical processes.”434  
Behind all the frenetic collecting set in motion by Seligman’s letter, there 
lurked the idea that if the ‘native’ had a simpler form of dreams, or dreams that were 
subject to collective interpretation, then somehow the native may be less of a 
‘person’, or that there may be something less ‘personal’ about the native. Even 
though Seligman concludes his investigation by saying that the unconscious is 
indeed the same in Europeans and Non-Europeans, nonetheless via this idea of 
simplicity, psychoanalysis is also being appropriated for a theory of racial difference. 
We have arrived at the opposite of Freud’s theory of the unconscious. When Freud 
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said the unconscious was an aboriginal population in the mind, that modern man is 
still in touch, at the core or deepest level, with what he most wishes to differentiate 
himself from, he opened up the possibility of an ethical relationship to the past and 
to the ‘primitive’ other, as I suggest in Chapter 1. In contrast, the question that 
preoccupied Seligman was whether there was a distinct aboriginal unconscious. 
As Seligman’s reading of Freud reduced the method of dream interpretation 
to a bureaucratic exercise, it is no surprise that the conclusions drawn from such a 
study compromised the very conception of the unconscious. Another crucial question 
in the practice of psychoanalytic dream interpretation, that of the aims of 
interpretation, was also inadmissible in the Seligman study. Colonial anthropologists 
saw knowledge about the ‘natives’ as something that had to be collected and 
categorized, so dreams, like other artefacts, became something that the colonial 
officer could traffic in. This attitude towards knowledge reduced the possibility of an 
ethical encounter with the ‘native’ other, and introduced an incommensurability 
between psychoanalysis, and the colonial anthropological exercises, as knowledge 
was seen not as transformative truth, a new recognition of self and other.  
Decoding the unconscious may lead to knowledge on the register of 
information, but psychoanalysis emphasizes an encounter with the unconscious 
which has the potential to lead to knowledge with the capacity to be a transformative 
truth. Moustapha Safouan illustrates this distinction by differentiating the ‘meaning’ 
from what he calls the ‘message’ of a dream.435 Sometimes the ‘meaning’ of the 
dream, if presented to the analysand as a decoding of her dream, may even block 
access to the message, which is something that the analysand may take a long time to 
hear and accept. This distinction that Safouan makes between these two registers of 
knowledge is not only relevant to the clinical practice of psychoanalysis which he 
emphasises, but, as we see here, also to its use as a method of cultural interpretation. 
Yet these fragments of dreams also tell another history, that of being created 
as subjects of Empire. Collection fever was not limited to British and European 
anthropologists. Tarun Chandra Sinha, Secretary and later President of the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society, made his first appearance in the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis in 1937, where he was listed as a member of the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society (IPS). Sinha was a collector of all things ‘Garo’: “I have in 
                                                




my collection 850 songs of different types, 502 actual dreams, 201 stories, 230 
names of deities, records of 500 cases of colour and form preference and 162 
photographs taken from different aspects of Garo life.”436 His anthropological 
fieldwork in the 1930s was conducted in the Garo Hills district amidst the Garo 
tribes.437 In 1948, Sinha published an article titled “Dreams of the Garos”, an attempt 
at “Freudian interpretation of Garo dreams showing fulfilment of repressed 
wishes.”438  
In his monograph, The Psyche of the Garos, Sinha describes Major Alan 
Playfair’s work, The Garos, as “the only book of some importance in the field.”439 
Published in 1909, under the auspices of the same Government of Assam scheme 
that had commissioned the ethnologies of the Nagas, Playfair’s book collected some 
‘typical’ dreams of the Garos.440 Between 1909 and 1937 there was a shift in the 
status of dreams, from ‘religion’ to ‘science’. Playfair describes the dreams of the 
Garos under a section on ‘Religion.’ By the time Sinha made his own collection, 
dreams were a topic fit for a paper that he read at the Indian Science Congress. As 
discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation, The Indian Psychoanalytical 
Society was committed to promoting psychoanalysis as a scientific endeavor, and its 
members were closely associated with the scientific community in Calcutta. The 
anthropological work done by Hutton and Mills would also have served to validate 
dreams as a matter of scientific interest. Though the dreams of the ‘primitive’ 
transitioned from ‘religion’ to ‘science’, on our key issues of knowledge, meaning, 
and the ‘primitive’, the place of the dream in the colonial imagination does not seem 
to shift. 
Sinha’s essay “Dreams of the Garos” included tables with material arranged 
under the titles ‘Dream Material’, ‘Current Bengali Interpretation’, ‘Garo 
Interpretation’, ‘Remarks/Garo Interpretation Association Link’ and ‘Probable 
Freudian Interpretation.’ The first column in the table, ‘Dream Material’ carried a 
three or four-word description, for example, ‘snake or snake bite’, followed by a few 
lines under the next two heads giving the Bengali and Garo interpretations. The 
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‘Remarks/Garo Interpretive Association Link’ were comments by Sinha, and in the 
example mentioned, the ‘Probable Freudian Interpretation’ was ‘Penis, 
Homosexuality.’ The ‘Probable Freudian Interpretations’ are just a list of phrases 
like homosexuality, castration, mother as wife, coitus with mother, female body, 
child birth, homosexuality with father, female genital, death of mother. These 
phrases may seem baffling because the word ‘Freudian’ places them under the sign 
of an entire system of interpretation and invites comparison with Freudian 
psychoanalysis. As accounts of the psyches of Garo subjects, these tables where the 
‘associations’ are barely a line or two of speculation written by Sinha, do not seem 
‘probable’, with no further commentary, no chain of associations, no potentially 
competing meanings. 
The link with Hutton’s tables is unmistakeable, though it is difficult to 
establish whether Sinha saw the tables that Hutton made. Also, unlike Hutton, Sinha 
was much more intimate—personally and professionally, with psychoanalysis. When 
this article was published, he was a training and control analyst with the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society, their librarian, and had been a member for over a decade 
and a half. According to his own account in written in 1966, when discussions took 
place between 1922 to 1938 about the training of psychoanalysts, it was decided that 
a prospective analyst must undertake at least 200 sessions of personal analysis and 
two cases of at least 100 sessions each as control work under a senior analyst. Sinha 
mentions his own insistence on a minimum of at least 500 sessions of personal 
analysis.441 Yet his work suggests that despite his prominent position in the Indian 
Psychoanalytical Society, Sinha was much closer to Seligman, Hutton and Mills in 
the way he approached psychoanalysis when it dealt with ‘primitives’. It would not 
be incorrect to say that Sinha’s ‘Probable Freudian Interpretations’ in his essay were 
a case of wild analysis. However this leaves unanswered the question of how an 
analyst so insistent on a long analysis could offer interpretations of dreams where the 
associations of the dreamer are absent. What were dreams made of, that they could 
be arranged in tables? In Sinha’s article, dreams were divided into ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’, 
with sub-classifications for each category. In the tables, there were dreams of 
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litigations, of laskars, and of men coming in boats.442 The dreams could be read as 
listing a history of being created as subjects of taxation and administration, marking 
out the creation of the Garos as specific historical subjects, at once bureaucratically 
and as the focus of a psychoanalytical investigation. 
In the studies by Seligman and Sinha, the value of the Garos and the Nagas 
came from their ‘primitivity’. The very conditions of the possibility of this work, 
though, relied on the participation of these ‘primitives’ in the contemporary economy 
as porters and translators. Enlisting populations for labour, porterage and military 
duty was a part of colonial administrative practice in the North Eastern Frontier, and 
as we saw in our discussion of Claud Daly, in the Balochistan and the North West 
Frontier Province as well. Sinha, not a colonial officer, also mentions in his texts the 
many porters who accompanied him on fieldwork.443 In fact the ‘primitive’ subject 
of psychoanalysis and anthropology, and the subjects of contemporary taxation 
sometimes got mixed up for Sinha. Describing the resistance he faced in getting the 
Garos to share their dreams with him, Sinha wrote: “I have some Garos as my 
tenants. Though otherwise very obedient and docile they refused to tell me their 
dreams”.444 The very circumstances that made it possible for Sinha to know what 
were ‘docile’ and ‘obedient’ tenants caused trouble from another quarter. Sinha 
mentions his initial difficulty in getting permission from the Government of Assam 
to conduct his work: “[b]esides Garo Hills being a partially excluded area, the then 
British Government were possibly more strict in my case. Here I should mention that 
the major portion of the Garo Hills was included in our estate, before the British 
Government took it away from my grandfather in the year 1872 by a piece of 
arbitrary legislation known as the Garo Hills Act. Since then the Government did not 
like our access in Garo Hills.”445 
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The grandfather whom Sinha mention was the Raja of Susung, Mymensingh 
district. Around 1860, the extent of the Susung estate had become a disputed matter, 
particularly the question of whether the Raja could continue to levy taxes on those 
Garos he claimed as his tenants in what had come to be designated as the Interior 
Garo Hills region. The matter was taken to the High Court, which ruled in the Raja’s 
favour. In 1869, the Government enacted fresh legislation that placed the disputed 
tracts under the direct governance of the Deputy Commissioner of the Garohills 
District. Litigation, then, was something shared by Sinha and the Garos whose 
dreams he collected. Sinha’s reader will never know whether the dreams of litigation 
really indicated ‘hostile father,’ ‘child birth,’ ‘sexual desire’ or ‘impregnated womb’ 
but the dream tables do tell the reader that the long and brutal history of border 
demarcation in the region was part of the context of psychoanalysis there and 
appears in the dreams of the ‘natives’. This alerts us to the already fraught 
relationship between upper class landowning Indians, and laboring ‘primitive’ 
tenants, upon which colonial antagonisms were mapped. Girindrasekhar Bose used 
the example of the head-hunting ‘savage’, so that he could set up a distinction 
between the primitive and civilised populations of India. In Sinha’s case, and as 
indicated in the Introduction, the lines of division do not only pass between the 
British colonialists and the ‘native’ or ‘primitive’ other, but also appear internally in 
how Indian writers, in relation to caste and class, imagine themselves. If these texts 
on ‘primitive’ dreams have an unconscious, then it is at least as much this history of 
labour and appropriation, as the ‘psyche’ of the Garos, Nagas, or other ‘non western 
races’ that they supposedly reveal. 
 
‘Fine Specimens’: Headhunting 
Writing on the Nagas, in English, from the mid 19th century to the early 20th 
century often had a tone of despair. One of the first English language commentators 
hoped that his writing would “lead to an improvement in the moral, as well as 
temporal condition of the people”.446 Much of this despair had to do with the practice 
of ‘head-hunting’, though the fierce opposition that the Naga tribes put up to British 
attempts to take over their land only served to strengthen the accusations and 
fantasies of the unchecked savagery that surrounded the hill tribes. The Nagas were 
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excellent fighters and skilled at negotiating a terrain that the British found 
threatening and inhospitable. The colonial victory owed much to the use of superior 
firepower, but the introduction of guns into the Naga Hills region by the British 
changed the nature of head hunting expeditions. The raids were now deadlier, with 
the number of people killed increasing exponentially. The presence of guns put more 
heads in circulation than had been previously imaginable. Paradoxically, this led to a 
situation which the British administrators had to manage, with the use of even more 
guns, resulting in a further increase in casualties. 
With Hutton and Mills, there was a transformation in the way in which the 
practice of head hunting was perceived by colonial authorities. Previously, in the 
nineteenth century, Naga head hunting had been seen as a mark of the Naga’s 
exteriority to civilisation, as a bloodthirsty and incomprehensible act.447 From the 
early twentieth century on, the administrator-anthropologists tried to understand and 
explain this practice, locating it within a dense system of meaning. A “significant 
break in the official discourse”, they explained it as a way of securing the social 
body, as a form of ‘sport’ and as a means to an end (whether this end be clothes, rank 
etc). 448 In The Angami Nagas, Hutton relates the practice of head hunting to the 
pleasure in sport and chase, and links it to the Britisher’s enjoyment of shikar. The 
noted anthropologist Verrier Elwin commented that “head hunting was not really 
understood until Hutton and Mills published their books which go deep into what we 
may call the philosophy of the custom.”449 Yet the new, knowledge driven approach 
to head hunting did not completely displace the previous view of the head hunters as 
barbaric, and the two co-existed somewhat uneasily. 
Their commitment to understanding how the act of taking a head was not 
simply a moment of primitive excess but a practice connected to economic, social 
and sacred life, governed by rules and subject to regulations, was accompanied by a 
change in the way in which the actual objects of hunted heads were treated. Earlier, 
head trophies were destroyed, but with the involvement of the anthropologists they 
became coveted objects. Bodhisattva Kar has carefully tracked the ways in which the 
anthropologists pursued and collected head trophies from Naga villages (more than 
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99 heads were sent by them to the Pitt Rivers Museum). In his account of the 
Pangsha expedition in 1936, Mills wrote: “[t]he Baron and I went into the village 
and had a look round. Not very interesting, they told me that Pawsey made them 
burn all their old heads taken when head hunting, when they were taken into the 
administered area. I wouldn’t have believed him guilty of such an act of 
vandalism.”450 In fact the letters that Mills wrote during this expedition are as much 
an extended shopping list for the Pitt Rivers (“I got a lot of stuff for Balfour. I know 
exactly what he wants, just simple things that cost nothing but which fit into 
series”451) as they are an account of a military-administrative exercise. 
In his lecture “Anthropology as an Imperial Study”, Hutton makes a case for 
an anthropologically informed administration, which would be able to understand the 
indigenous systems of life and meaning and therefore change them in a way that 
would not have the same deleterious consequences as seen in past colonial 
interventions. This would require a specific kind of anthropological vision, capable 
of suspending its judgements, values and morals when apprehending a cultural 
system different from its own: 
 
For to the anthropologist all customs are natural, and even head hunting, 
human sacrifice and cannibalism, however necessary it may be to supress 
them, are not revolting and atrocious crimes but reasonable and inevitable 
acts resulting from beliefs and ideas logically applied to circumstances and 
environment. Primitive communities though often observing intricate and 
difficult customary rules frequently have entirely different standards from 
ours and base their codes on a very different corpus of information.452 
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Here, we witness how the previously unknowable savage, of pre-Huttonian 
administration, who could only shock and horrify the colonial traveller or 
administrator with his barbaric and violent practices becomes completely knowable, 
even logical – head hunting has been transformed from an act radically 
incomprehensible and repulsive to the western observer, to something ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘inevitable’—the result of ideas ‘logically applied to circumstances’. All that 
needed to be done was to figure out the ‘different standards’ of the natives and 
gather and acquaint oneself with the ‘different corpus of information’ upon which 
the codes and prohibitions of the ‘primitive’ native were based. The cataloguing and 
codifying that the administration was relentlessly engaged in served this end. But the 
emphasis on logic and reason emptied head hunting, and no less significantly, its 
colonial observers, of any hint of the unconscious. Neither account of the head 
hunting ‘primitive’ acknowledges in the ‘primitive’ an interplay of unconscious 
processes and conscious decisions. The ‘primitive’ is either seen as pure 
unconscious, or not allowed to have one. The latter interpretation allowed the 
practices of the ‘primitive’ to be introduced into a system of commensurability, in 
which they could be exchanged for practices thought of as better, modern, or more 
efficient. 
Anthropology offered the opportunity to understand the role and significance 
of an act within the culture to which it was attributed. Once the function and 
significance of an act found to be offensive was understood, it could be replaced by a 
less offensive act that was still endowed with the same significance. Hutton gives the 
example of a tribe where marriages stopped because a marriage proposal had to be 
accompanied by a man acquiring the status of someone who had taken a head, but 
this was not possible as head hunting had been outlawed. The administrators, Hutton 
notes with approval, worked to get the tribe to accept that boars’ heads were a 
suitable substitute for human heads. Once this substitution was accepted by the tribe, 
social life returned to its course. Such displacements relied on the administrators’ 
belief that they understood head hunting. In the districts that Hutton and Mills 
administered, the attempts to substitute heads with other objects, or what Kar calls 
“working along the grain” began to inform administrative policy not just in relation 
to head hunting, but also in enlisting labour and allegiance during the two world 
158	
	
wars.453 Curbing the practice of head hunting had been a means of bringing more 
villages under colonial administration. The successful substitution of human heads 
with animal heads or other human body parts was a means of securing allegiance to 
this administration. During the First World War, Hutton’s immensely effective 
recruitment drives were attributed to his skilled manipulation of the desires 
associated with head hunting into enthusiasm for participation in a global war. 
During the Second World War, successful recruitment drives worked by replacing 
the head as trophy with another part of the body—a finger or ear, for example. If the 
Nagas recruited for wartime fighting acquired these other trophies then they would 
qualify as warriors and have access to all the pomp and circumstance that this 
entailed. The administration would entice them with the opportunities that wartime 
afforded for such activities, and turn a blind eye to their trophies. 
What then emerges is that this high risk endeavour leads straight back to the 
question of civilisation, as a concept fraught with ambiguities as we saw in our 
discussion of Freud in Chapter 1. For such an appeal to be effective, Europe was 
represented as a theatre of the very desires that the primitive had previously been 
tainted by and which modern day ‘civilisation’ was meant to have surpassed. This 
was not without risk, as the civilisation that the primitives were being inculcated into 
stood in danger of exposure as something relentlessly cruel. As Henry Balfour wrote 
in his Foreword to Hutton’s book, The Sema Nagas:  
 
One wonders what impressions remain with them from their sudden contact 
with higher civilisations at war. Possibly, they are reflecting that, after what 
they have seen, the White Man’s condemnation of the relatively innocuous 
head-hunting of the Nagas savours of hypocrisy. Or does their sang-froid 
save them from being critical and endeavouring to analyse the seemingly 
inconsequent habits of the leading peoples of culturedom?454  
 
The fighting that took place in a far-away land during the First World War, 
came to Naga territory in the Second, with the most violent fighting in the region 
taking place during the Battle of Kohima. For all the descriptions of the Nagas as 
bloodthirty and violent, their lands had never seen death or fighting on such a scale.  
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It is possible to read the two colonial positions on head hunting as both 
structured so as to allow the colonial observer an escape from an encounter with his 
own unconscious. Early commentators thought of headhunting as pure excess, and 
closed off the possibility of any similarity between the head hunters and the colonial 
observer. The head hunter carried all the irrational aggressiveness that the colonial 
observer excised from himself. In the second position, the administrator-
anthropologists gave head hunting the dignity of meaning, but within a framework 
that could only account for conscious motivation. Made explicable within an 
explanatory system that saw it as a means to an end within a logical system of 
beliefs—a way of acquiring women, status, good fortune—head hunting was made 
to mirror the utilitarian logic of the colonial administrators, who then set about to 
replace this with a more efficiently utilitarian system. The second system was 
somewhat like Hutton’s dream tables—even when explicitly concerned with desire 
and fantasy, both the administrator and the savage were presented as having no 
unconscious—only a set of collective beliefs each.  
Furthermore, excising the unconscious can also be seen as a way of not 
taking up an ethical position in relation to the aggressiveness and violence of not 
only the coloniser but also the colonised. Psychoanalysis understands aggressiveness 
as fundamental to the human subject. Psychoanalysis and colonial responses to Naga 
head hunting bring to the fore the fact of the neighbour’s aggressiveness. Without 
taking away from the injustice of the colonial situation, the encounter between the 
colonial administrators and Naga head hunters requires us to remember that a 
position of ethics needs to be taken up not just next to a neighbour who is passive 
and abused but also one who may be violent and vengeful—as colonised populations 
could be, not just in response to colonial oppression but also towards each other. It is 
difficult to imagine what shape such an ethical encounter may have taken within the 
frame of colonisation. And yet the question remains, of how to respond when 
confronted with a neighbour perceived to be violent. Is the only response one that 
unleashes more violence, which refuses to recognise its own enjoyment in forbidden 




Progress and Nostalgia 
Administrator-anthropologists in Assam were disoriented, not just by the 
practice of head hunting, but also by the lack of a ‘head’ in Naga political systems. 
Their work required that there be local leaders who could be held accountable and 
used as intermediaries in interactions with the local populations. Troubled by a form 
of social organisation where authority did not seem to be clearly organised around 
leaders, part of the work the administration did in the region was to create these posts 
and figures of central authority. Hutton’s tour diaries record many instances of his 
dissatisfaction with the people he appointed to fill the many posts that had been 
created. He could never be sure where someone’s loyalties lay, and it was never 
entirely certain that the officials appointed by the British would be accepted as 
figures of authority by the people. To further complicate matters, the administrators 
were often confused by Naga villages, which were made up not just of one clan, but 
many, and this prevented them from being entirely sure which village was ‘friendly’ 
and which ‘hostile’. Colonial administrators were convinced that head hunting had to 
be abolished, because ‘primitive’ societies had to be remade in the image of 
‘advanced’ ones. Their interventions also reshaped structures of authority as they 
tried to remake indigenous society in the image of the kind of group arrangements 
they were familiar with, and part of. Establishing civilisation also meant establishing 
a structure of leadership.  
This history resonates with our discussion of  Freud’s theorisation of group 
psychology in Chapter 1. In his essay Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego, Freud discusses the formula for the “libidinal constitution of groups”: a set of 
individuals who have identified with each other in their ego, because they have put 
the same object in the place of their ego ideal. 455 Within Freud’s scheme, it is 
possible for the place of this external object to be occupied, not just by the leader in 
the form of a person, but by a concept, an idea. I think it is possible to suggest that 
this leading idea, for these administrators and anthropologists, was ‘progress’. In 
Chapter 1, we discussed how the relationship of a group to its leader is marked by 
ambivalence, which has to be periodically excised and directed outside in order to 
maintain the group. When an idea occupies the place of the leader instead of a 
person, the group would have to deal with its ambivalence about this orienting idea. 
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If we understand the administrator-anthropologists in Assam as a group constituted 
around the ideal of progress, then we can see how they had to repeatedly excise their 
ambivalence about this leading idea. The ‘primitive’ was a suitable site to receive the 
ambivalence that had to be gotten rid of. The ideal of progress, like a vicious 
superego, demanded increasing sacrifice. Progress supposedly creates change, but 
we find that in the work of these administrator-anthropologists, it also created a 
profound nostalgia for what had been left behind. 
Hutton’s inaugural lecture at the University of Cambridge in 1938 began with 
a joke about how an inaugural lecture was like the ‘ordeals’ encountered in primitive 
societies when someone had to take up a higher rank or shoulder new 
responsibilities. Towards the end of his time in India, Hutton had begun to express 
concern about the impact of colonial administration on tribal people. This was at its 
starkest in the approaching extinction of the Andamanese, and Hutton wrote a 
damning critique of colonial policy which was censored by the colonial government. 
In this lecture, Hutton described the process of incorporating primitive societies into 
the British empire: “a process which may invest people of lowly and undeveloped 
culture with duties, responsibilities and  privileges for which their past experience all 
but inadequately prepared them”.456 This practice had proved to be quite an ordeal, 
often “so severe that the novice has succumbed to the hardships involved, and, 
instead of attaining a fuller life in a new society of peoples, has disappeared from 
among the nations of the earth.”  
Hutton’s lecture was very conscious of the time in which it was written, 
aware of the challenges faced in sustaining the British empire. The lecture is heavy 
with the knowledge of the damage wreaked by colonialism on indigenous peoples: 
“vast majorities of such people have been incorporated in their systems by western 
powers and have been, or are being destroyed in consequence.” Also, the attitude to 
those whose lands had been colonised seemed to have shifted: “the feeling is 
fortunately growing in this country at any rate that dependencies inhabited by people 
of primitive culture are held in trust primarily for their inhabitants, and secondarily 
for the world in general.” For Hutton, anthropology provided one of the ways of 
dealing with these challenges. He found that taxation, missionary work and colonial 
modes of administration had destroyed the fabric of indigenous life, and in doing so, 
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destroyed the will of the people. Colonial administration had torn down the very 
systems by which indigenous people made meaning in their world, and subsequently 
left them in a state of “apathy, depression and degeneracy”.457 
Reading Hutton’s lecture with the knowledge of British administrative policy 
in the Nagahills, it is difficult not to think that the ‘primitive’ only became an object 
of interest in the process of its destruction. Colonial anthropologists lamented “the 
remarkable rapidity with which they [the Naga tribes] are changing and indeed 
already have changed”.458 After destroying and reshaping the lives of the people they 
administered, the anthropologists described, with maudlin nostalgia, what they had 
ended:  
there are still across the frontier happy tribes, which have not yet touched 
pitch and become civilised like their administered brothers; which pay no 
house- tax, and do no reluctant coolie work; which know not the seed of 
conversion and the sword of dissension which missionaries bring, nor have 
yet been made to eat of that forbidden fruit which drove our first parents into 
fig-leaves and banishment. The diseases which follow like the jackals in the 
wake of invasion have not yet touched them, and they go clothed on with 
their modesty rather than with “dhutis.” No paternal Government forbids 
them the taking of heads or [sic?] their fittest to survive and no profane hand 
is raised against the customs of primeaval antiquity.459 
In this account of things—administration, taxation, coolie work, conversion, 
disease—are all happenstance, no responsibility is taken for them. The ‘paternal 
Government’ mentioned above was hardly a passive entity as regards the frontier, in 
fact it was actively engaged in expanding its boundaries. The transformations in 
administrative strategy, discussed in the previous section, did not mean a more 
‘humane’ government. Not much changed in the way in which the villages were 
treated. The number of anti Naga expeditions and the accompanying activities of 
“[b]urning settlements, fining villages, jailing individuals, blockading communities” 
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only increased.460 As Mills wrote in a letter to Balfour: “[i]n August or early 
September I expect to visit Yungya again. With any luck I ought to be able to 
surprise it and loot it properly, to the advantage of the P.R. I should like to fire on it, 
but there is the risk of hitting women and children if they have no chance of getting 
them away. The men deserve bullets...” 461 The representatives of civilisation, its 
administrators and self-identified pacifiers come to sound, and act, as violent as the 
‘primitive’ practices they wanted to control, if not abolish. If there is ambivalence, 
nostalgia, a recognition of colonial destruction, it only goes so far. 
There are echoes here of Leo Bersani’s account of Freud’s theories of the 
superego: “[t]he regulator of aggressiveness is identical to the very problem of 
aggressiveness”, which I have suggested has profound links to the colonial world.462 
In leading raids against villages that were suspected of practicing head hunting, the 
administrator-anthropologists could both present their actions as reasonable and 
necessary, while enjoying the pleasures of looting villages of their possessions 
(particularly the prized heads), burning settlements and killing scores of people. 
Indeed offering an account of the aggression released by civilisation, Freud might 
have been describing the actions of the anthropologists who were reading his work in 
Assam. As the dealings of the administrators with the Nagas show, the demand to 
end head hunting was presented as a self-explanatory, reasonable demand. If a 
people were to be incorporated into a more ‘civilised’ state, then the ‘ordeal’ that 
Hutton joked about would involve giving up practices such as head hunting, even 
though the sympathetic anthropologist may provide suitably anodyne substitutes. But 
in the actions of the people who were sanctioned to ensure that this happened, the 
command to sacrifice pleasure to the state coexisted with the incitement to 
untrammelled aggressive enjoyment.  
The encounter between psychoanalysis and anthropology in the Nagahills 
was therefore once more a missed encounter, insofar as nothing about 
psychoanalysis that would challenge the way in which the administration conducted 
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its affairs was taken on board. In 1947, when the Indian nation came into being, the 
Nagas were categorical in the refusal to join the newly formed state, petitioning both 
the British and the Indian nationalists for their own nation. Their demand was heeded 
neither by the departing British, nor by the leaders of the Indian anti-colonial 
movement. In its endeavours to ‘pacify’ the Nagas, the Indian government turned to 
none other than the former colonial advisors, including Hutton and his successor 
Charles Pawsey. Their policies and mode of thinking returned, this time through the 
newly decolonized Indian nation. The manner in which the army was deployed 
against the Nagas, the re-grouping of villages, the destruction of granaries was a 
ghastly return of the colonial practices of the British. On the academic side of things, 
the binary between primitive and civilized continued to be propagated. The 
Anthropological Division of the Government of West Bengal not only published 
Tarun Sinha’s work, but also the memoirs of his uncle. 
 
‘A Certain Uncanny Lilt’: Writing the Nagahills 
Classification, like civilisation, created its own discontents. The writings of 
Hutton et al once again bear witness to the ‘other’ scene of what they are describing, 
and trying to stabilize and enforce in their work. In his tour diaries, after concise 
descriptions of agricultural practices, litigants and petitioners, and villages collapsing 
under increased taxation and penalties, Hutton would report on the state of the 
Inspection Bungalows he stayed in. In one instance, the hat pegs had been tacked 
into the walls, rather than screwed on. Hutton left instructions for this to be 
remedied. Another time, the bathtub wasn’t installed properly. At least the gardenias 
looked pretty during one of his visits.463 In 1915, Hutton ordered the construction of 
an inspection bungalow at a site that the villagers warned him against. They had 
“said it was ‘bad place’. They could give no very good reason, but said they were 
accustomed to make small sacrifices there to the spirit of a man who had been 
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drowned in the near-by Tizu river”.464 It was in this bungalow that Hutton spent a 
troubled night: “spoiled by a horrifying nightmare in the course of which I saw a 
creature like a human child with a monstrous big head creeping across the floor; the 
principal feature of the dream was the quite unreasonable fear which I experienced 
and which caused me to perspire so freely (the weather was quite cool) that my 
pyjamas and sheets had to be dried in the sun next day.” 
Later, Hutton was to find out that his close associate James Mills had a 
similar experience at the same bungalow: “[t]he only difference in our accounts 
seemed to be that whereas the creature with the big head that I had seen had unkempt 
hair, he had seen it bald, or it may have been the other way round.” Hutton and Mills 
later sent two other people to stay at the Bungalow, to check if they had “any sort of 
uncomfortable psychic experience” there. One of the two men was so distressed by 
something that happened when he was asleep there that he chose to leave 
immediately and walked twelve miles to the next inspection bungalow. During later 
visits Hutton always felt uncomfortable in the bedroom where he had first dreamt of 
the creature, and Mills avoided it altogether. 
Hutton recorded these experiences in a note that was never published, written 
after his return to England and Mills’ death. The experiences he describes—the 
‘quite irrational fear’ and the repetition of the dream, refuse to be assimilated to 
rational meaning. The colonial officers who experienced these hauntings would not 
have described themselves as ‘primitive’, their setting was an inspection bungalow 
built to modern standards, not a remote Naga village of the kind described by Hutton 
and Mills in their anti head hunting expeditions—surrounded by spiked panjis 
(sharpened bamboo sticks) with a head tree decorated with trophies inside. Rather it 
is amongst hat pegs, bath tubs and gardenias—the heimlich comforts of an 
inspection bungalow (albeit one built on a marked spot, a place of sacrifice) – that 
there was a return of the uncanny as that which is inassimilable to meaning – 
something that should have stayed hidden but has come to light. It is in the dreams of 
those who were engaged in sorting, classifying and distilling dreams that something 
surfaces and transmits itself, and holds the dreamer in the grip of an uncanny horror. 
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Amongst the papers of W.G. Archer is a typescript draft of an unpublished 
story by J.P. Mills, titled, “Shakchi, Killer and Artist.”465 It tells the story of Shakchi, 
born to a family of warriors in the village of Hukching, as he proceeds from being a 
youthful warrior to a gentle middle-aged man. Written in the third person, the story 
begins with a sympathetic and intimate description of Shakchi’s parents. Yet within 
the very first sentences of the story, there seems to be a division in the narrating 
voice. While on the one hand, the voice seeks to demonstrate its familiarity with the 
characters and their milieu, commenting on their dietary practices—the importance 
of chilies, the prohibition on pregnant women eating meat from kills—it also 
describes these as ‘Naga custom’, which suggests that the voice is outside the scene 
being described.  
As the reader discovers, it never is made clear who the narrator is, and where 
he stands. Yet the description of British activity in the region as “imposing peace” 
makes the voice sound distant from the characters at the very moment when it seeks 
to speak most intimately from their point of view. In a curious moment that is left 
unaccounted for in the narrative universe of the story, the reader is told that Shakchi 
was an artist, innovating on the tribal patterns carved by his village. Then the 
narrator says: “[t]hey are very fine, and some of the best are in England now.”466 We 
do not learn how they made this journey, who procured and transported these 
objects. This, along with the distaste with which head hunting rituals are depicted, 
aligns the story with existing colonial travelogues and ethnographies on the Nagas.  
Indeed, there are moments when the writing begins to sound like colonial 
propaganda and endorsements of British policy. Describing the ceremonial killing of 
a bull bison the narrator comments: “[r]eluctant though the British are to interfere 
with ancient customs they have felt compelled to check the awful cruelty of these 
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sacrifices and enforce more humane methods of killing wherever their rule 
extends.”467 Unsurprisingly, the reader also finds in this story colonial nostalgia and 
desire for the ungoverned tribe away from British civilizing influence—the story is 
set in an unadministered Naga region beyond the Frontier. 
And yet this piece of writing is not travelogue, ethnography or propaganda. 
The very attempt at writing the story pushes the writer into a terrain where he has to 
imagine and occasionally identify with what goes on in a head hunter’s mind, since 
Shakchi the head hunter is the hero of the story. The narrator’s distance from the 
characters shifts through the course of the story, at times appearing to occupy a 
position that allows it access to the point of view of the characters, for example when 
it describes white men: “[s]trange-looking Sahibs, with skins so pale that it seemed 
as if the sun had never ripened their bodies, had imposed peace on the tribes to the 
East and the West”. That the narrator of James Mill’s story seeks to convey the 
perceptions of Naga people when they see a white man is significant, since Mills 
also wrote, in a letter that I quote from at the beginning of this chapter, about the 
thrill of visiting a village where no white man had been before, in strikingly similar 
language: ‘people of an entirely strange colour wearing entirely strange clothes, must 
be too much to take in all at once.’ This involvement in the question of how a native 
population would respond to the white man suggests an interest, on the part of Mills, 
in seeing himself perceived through the eyes of another, to himself occupy the place 
of the ‘strange’, and as we shall see, the encounter between the primitive Naga and 
the white colonial administrator occupies a key place in the story of Shakchi. 
The story wavers between portraying Naga life in a tone of colonial fantasy 
and horror, conveying desire, even envy of the perceived vitality of Naga life. This is 
nowhere more pronounced than in relation to head hunting, descriptions of which 
provide the story with most of its action. We are told of Shakchi’s childhood in the 
village, seeing “raiders welcomed as they returned with their gory trophies” or going 
into guardhouses and looking at “rows of grinning skulls”. Soon after, the death of 
Shakchi’s father, mother and sister at the hands of head hunters from a neighbouring 
village is described in a somewhat maudlin tone: “he died too soon to see his wife 
and daughter cut down” and, “three headless bodies and a raider marked the scene of 
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the tragedy.” Yet quite soon after descrbing this ‘tragedy’ Mills refers to head 
hunting as a “pleasant sport”.  
Later in the story, the reader is invited to witness Shakchi’s exploits as a 
head-taker, and the narrator steps in the mind-space of the hero, describing his quest 
to take a head the avenge the killing of his family, and to impress his sweetheart. 
This head is taken in breach of a truce, but the narrating voice comments: “a head 
was a head […] a head got by treachery was better than none at all.” And yet the 
narrator later goes on to link the customs surrounding this act with cannibalism: 
“[h]e had, of course, heard the story that somewhere in the unknown mountains to 
the east there was a village of men who ate human flesh […] this ceremonial meal 
with blood stained hands was itself a last relic of forgotten cannibalism”. There is a 
tension between representing head-hunting as normal and thus presenting an 
authentic and convincing account of Naga interiority, and expressing revulsion for it. 
In addition to this there is an excitement surrounding head-hunting, not only because 
the plot keeps returning to it, but also in the way in which it is described.  
At one point, describing Shakchi’s married life, the narrator says: “for the 
next year or two only the passion that his young wife returned prevented him from 
finding life monotonous, though for a civilized man, to whom war is something 
abnormal, the constant raids and counter-raids would have provided more than 
enough excitement.” This seems to suggest that Shakchi needed both war and sex—
‘the passion that his young wife returned’—for a sense of excitement while for 
‘civilised’ man, war would have sufficed. In addition to the clichéd portrayal of the 
savage as having excessive appetites, there seems to be the suggestion that Shakchi 
didn’t value war enough, or find in it the kind of excitement ‘civilised’ men may 
have been able to derive from it. Here, a feelings of pleasure, desire, envy seems to 
surface in how head-hunting is written of, after all, the narrator says the head hunting 
raids would have provided enough excitement instead of, say for example, worry. 
This proximity between sex and violence draws attention to the gendered 
thematics in depictions of head hunting. In the story, as in colonial anthropology, 
women were seen as inciting head hunting. In Shakchi, the hero is spurred to take 
revenge when “he had held Aminla’s firm young body in his arms and asked her if 
she would be his always, and she had said he could be her lover, but never her 
169	
	
husband till he had avenged his father and proved himself a man.” Or as Mills put it 
in his ethnography of The Lhota Nagas: “[a] Lhota who died recently much desired 
when he was young to marry a certain Phrio girl. The minx said she would only 
accept him if he would take the head of a Rengma girl and show it to her as proof of 
his valour.”468 Women are portrayed as the fickle instigators  of head hunting, 
repositories of a sexuality that can only be accessed through a display of violence on 
the part of their suitors. Yet at the same time, they are also presented as the victims 
of head hunting. In Mills’ story, as in the wider ethnographical literature, the horror 
of head hunting is conveyed to the reader by depicting women as its victims. This 
portrayal in the colonial discourse and policy on head hunting suggested that because 
women were the victims of head hunting, the practice was more inhuman that other, 
European, wars, and punitive action against Naga villages was justified. Yet as these 
women were themselves morally degraded in their encouragement of head-hunting, 
it was not troubling to deprive them of life and livelihood by burning their villages. 
The reader of “Shakchi” is not introduced to the punitive practices of the Naga Hills 
administration, as setting the story beyond the frontier allows these incidents to go 
unmentioned. 
Questions of sexuality are also germane to the portrayal of the male head hunter. 
While head hunting is depicted as an act of machismo, it is also associated with a 
desire for ornaments and decoration, in a way that suggests that such desires 
compromise the masculinity of the head hunter. Yet that the observer-
anthropologist’s desire was involved in this depiction is suggested by the way in 
which Shakchi’s encounter with a white man, a colonial administrator, is described 
in a romantic, almost homoerotic vein: 
The contrast with the drab figure in khaki shirt and shorts was striking 
enough, and Shakchi’s appearance is worth a brief description, for there is 
assuredly no finer dress in India than that of a Naga warrior. On his head was 
a tall helmet of the finest plaited scarlet cane, topped by an upstanding crest 
of scarlet goat’s hair. His ears were decorated with the prized shell discs he 
had worn so uncomfortably that day he took his first head, and round his 
neck was a collar of huge boar’s tushes. His naked torso showed every 
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rippling muscle, and round a waist that a dandy would have envied he wore a 
broad belt of cowries, from which hung his only garment, a little red and dark 
blue apron embroidered with the figure of a man in cowries. On his legs were 
greaves and on his wrists gauntlets of canework like that of the helmet, and 
polished sections of elephant tusk ornamented his upper arms. His spear was 
in his hand and his trusty “dao” sheathed on his back. His face was grave as 
he offered the Sahib a drink of rice beer, but the smile with which it was 
received brought an answering smile of great charm. On that day began a 
friendship which has never been broken, rare though meetings have needs 
been. 
  
 And yet, within the story there seems to exist an awareness that contact with 
the white man could be deadly for the Naga. On a visit to this white administrator in 
his guarded camp, bearing a chicken as a present, Shakchi is almost shot down by an 
armed guard because he does not understand the command, issued in English, to stop 
and identify himself. He is saved only by his squawking chicken, which the guard 
recognises as a sign of friendship. This is indeed a romantic gloss on the chickens, 
grain and other valuable supplies that Naga villages were obliged to supply to 
visiting colonial officers and accompanying porters and soldiers. 
 Both Mills’ story and letter try to imagine how the Naga villagers perceived 
the white man. The nature of the archive is such that we cannot know what the 
residents of that village were thinking. And yet a Naga village visited by Mills found 
a way to write itself in, on its own terms, into the colonial anthropologist’s writing. 
In a letter, Mills describes encountering a “huge powerful village, never before 
visited”.469 The village didn’t want Mills’ company of soldiers near it, so the 
company had to “camp well up on the spur where water is a great difficulty.” The 
village gave to the visiting colonial contingent the usual supplies of food that were 
extracted from each village: “pigs and chickens, but their baskets of rice had a thick 
layer of rice on the top and Job’s tears underneath—this is a very inferior sort of 
grain. All our efforts to get big bamboos for carrying water have been in vain. They 
just sit about, and I don’t want a quarrel.” Mills decided that he would do the usual 
thing: “[t]omorrow I am going into the village (with a strong escort). I have always 
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wanted to see it and I hope to get some things for the Pitt Rivers Museum.” He 
doesn’t mention the outcome of this visit, but his letter suggests that the village had 
its own back: “I’ve never seen such a village as this for ceremonial slowness. An 
enormous procession of men has just brought water and firewood and water-
bamboos. Most people carried nothing, and no one more than one stick of firewood 
or one bamboo! It took an immense time to get this very small result, for the 
procession had to move slowly and chant all the time!”470 Playing at being the 
ceremonious subject of anthropological investigation allowed the residents of this 
Naga village to frustrate colonial attempts at depleting its resources.  
Finally in this chapter I turn to Temsula Ao, one of the most prominent 
writers of present day Nagaland. Born when the Naga Hills were still administered 
by the British, Ao has borne witness, in her life and writing, to the changing political 
and psychic landscape of the region, invoking and decisively reordering many of the 
themes discussed in this chapter. Her first book of short stories, These Hills Called 
Home, published in 2006, offers a way of thinking about the Nagahills that is 
cognizant of historical injustice but also interested in telling another story, in 
remembering differently: “[b]ut what do you do when it comes to someone else’s 
memory and when that memory is of pain and pain alone? Do you brush it aside and 
say, it does not concern me?”.471  
The history of the administration of the Naga Hills, her stories suggest, seems 
marked by an inability to come to terms with the past, or to mourn and recognize an 
other. These themes become central to her work. She tells many of her stories in the 
voice of Naga women, claiming for them a complex interiority and crucial 
relationship to politics. In the colonial anthropology on the Nagas, the women 
occupy an even more shadowy place than the men. As a typical description has it: 
“[a]mong the women however ugliness is the rule. A pretty Sema girl is hardly to be 
found, […] The women generally are very short, squat and horny-handed.”472 
Reduced to ethnological descriptions and photographs in the colonial archive, in 
Ao’s writing, Naga women instead have their own stories to tell. 
Her medium does not confine her to the recording of ‘facts’. In a prefatory 
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note she writes: “[t]hese stories however, are not about historical facts; nor are they 
about condemnation, justice or justification of the events which raged through the 
land like a wildfire half a century ago.” It is by leaving the realm of verifiable fact 
that Ao evokes the truth of historical experience, much as Freud tried to do in his 
constructions in analysis. Her story “The Last Song” tells of Apenyo, a young 
woman with a beautiful voice and lovely hair, who continues to sing even as her 
church is invaded by the Indian army. The story goes on to describe how both 
Apenyo and her mother are raped by soldiers. The daughter is dragged by her 
beautiful hair. This gruesome but small detail in Ao’s story is evocative of the 
massacre at Yengpang, described by the Naga nationalist leader Phizo : 
Among the stories told by survivors is that concerning Sibonglemla, the 
cheerful young woman who was the village schoolmistress. Dragged on the 
ground by her long and beautiful hair, which was four feet long when loose, 
she begged for mercy and wept, but the killers scalped her while she was still 
alive and then cut her head off.473  
In Ao’s story, Apenyo’s voice becomes a means of resistance even as her 
body is being annihilated—she continues singing even as she is raped and then 
killed. Even after death, her voice retains its independence, not abject, not 
assimilated to nationalist claims (‘condemnation, justice or justification’), rather 
returning to keep alive both memory and mourning. It is an old woman who tells 
Apenyo’s story to the younger people in her village, who have heard of the massacre 
but do not have any memory of it: 
as the wind whirls past the house, it increases in volume and for the briefest 
of moments seems to hover above the house […] The young people are 
stunned because the hear the new element in the volume and a certain 
uncanny lilt lingers on in the wake of its departure. The old woman jumps up 
from her seat and looking at each one in turn asks, “You heard it, didn’t you? 
Didn’t I tell you? It was Apenyo’s last song” and she hums a tune softly, 
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almost to herself.474 
As one of the few literary writers who concerns herself with this historical 
moment, Ao also takes another unexpected step. Within the political and literary 
landscape of India, to write about the crimes of the Indian Army and the occupation 
of the Nagahills regions is in itself a radical gesture. It is therefore extraordinary that 
Ao does not limit herself to evoking the violence of this period. The Nagas, in her 
stories, are neither victims nor heroes. Instead, they are allowed to mourn. The men 
and women in her stories suffer, not just because they have been harmed by the 
Indian Army, but also because they have themselves been led into harming and 
taking the lives of others. The characters she creates insist on mourning, even when 
they kill an enemy in self defence. In “An Old Man Remembers”, a man who spent 
his youth with the Naga underground army recounts his experiences to a young boy 
in his village. The man describes having to turn the body of an enemy soldier which 
had fallen on a gun, in order to retrieve the weapon, and seeing the look of pain and 
horror on the young, dead face. Ao writes of the boy listening to this story: “[t]he 
young boy did not understand why he should be crying; after all they were enemy 
soldiers weren’t they?”.475 The story she writes tries to provide an answer to this 
young boy’s question. This recalls Freud’s powerful construction of the primitive 
mourning by the body of the dead enemy. In Ao’s writing, the only reparation that is 
carried out is by remembering and mourning the painful past. Key to this process is 
being able to recognize the injustices of one’s own people, and Ao not only allows 
her characters to mourn their enemies, she also endows them with the ability to 
confront the failings of their own political movement.  
Often, it is the women who are the bearers of insight in Ao’s stories. They 
have the ability to look at themselves – whether it is the wife in “Saoba” who can see 
how the ideals of the Naga political movement have been diluted and compromised – 
or the young nurse in “Three Women” who dares to confront racial prejudice 
amongst the Ao-Nagas by adopting a dark skinned child from the tea tribes who has 
been abandoned by her mother. As a writer Ao tasks herself with remembering at its 
most historically acute and psychically powerful and complex. We could not be 
further from the colonial and anthropological writing discussed in this chapter. In 
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many of her stories, we find her characters in the process of narrating a significant 
incident, a tale or forgotten event, without censoring what surfaces into an idealized 
version of history. Her writing inhabits a difficult space that is both interior and 
exterior, trying to stay in touch with what is painful and what has been disavowed. 
The question with which she begins her book is about the relationship to an other, 
and the negotiation of a difficult past. Ao’s ethical gesture is that of giving this pain 
form and voice. Both in their reckoning with the past, and respect for an other, 
Temsula Ao’s stories are able to develop some of the most creative and ethical 
insights of psychoanalysis. These were hushed in encounters between 
psychoanalysis and anthropology – but return and are kept alive in the literature that 





The Call of the Mother 
mothers who were always a set of equipment and a fragile balance 
mothers who looked over a gulf through the cloud of an act & at times speechlessly 
saw it 
Denise Riley, from ‘Affections Must Not’ 
 
Calcutta, January 12, 1924. Arthur Smith was in a tramcar passing along 
Chowringhee Road towards Esplanade when he heard a shot, and “saw a European 
stagger and fall”.476 Smith then heard several more shots and saw an Indian standing 
over the prostrate body of a man collapsed on the ground. He got out of the tram and 
chased this Indian, who had begun to run away, a taxi driver in close pursuit. The 
driver was also shot, and staggering, pointed Smith in the direction the fugitive had 
taken. People gave chase through some of the most frequented areas of Calcutta, as 
the runaway shot various men while he tried to escape, asking cab drivers, at 
gunpoint, to drive off with him. Three Indian chauffeurs were wounded, two 
critically. After dramatic pursuit, the Indian was caught as he tried to climb on to a 
‘tum tum’ (a two wheeled horse drawn carriage) going north to south on Wellesley 
Street. A European, identified as A.W. Ogg, “noticed a revolver in his hand and 
immediately seized him with most commendable pluck”.477 The injured European 
was identified as Mr. Ernest Day, an employee of the I.G.S.N. Company, “a quiet 
law-abiding citizen”, a “loveable man” who had been “shot down like a dog” while 
looking at the shop window of Hall and Anderson on Chowringhee Road.478 He died 
later that day, after having been taken to the hospital.  His attacker, the ‘Indian’, was 
identified as Gopinath Saha, “a thin, sallow complexioned young man of 21 or 22 
years of age”.479 Dressed in a khaki shirt and white dhoti, with an “expensive wristlet 
watch” on his hand,480 Saha looked like a member of the ‘bhadralok’—the mostly 
upper caste Bengali middle and upper class—an impression reinforced by his 
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speaking English when arrested.481 He had in his possession a Mauser automatic 
pistol and a revolver, as well as many unspent cartridges.  
As it so happened, Ernest Day’s death was the consequence of a case of 
mistaken identity. It emerged from statements made after his arrest that Saha had 
intended to assassinate Charles Tegart, the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta. 
Tegart was notorious for having established the Intelligence Branch of the Calcutta 
Police, which kept tabs on individuals and organisations suspected of revolutionary 
activities. During his long career in Calcutta, he had been involved in the 
suppression of revolutionary activity during the anti-partition protests and the 
Swadeshi movement in Bengal. Known for his daredevil methods of policing, he had 
also been accused of custodial torture and abuse of political prisoners. 482 In 1924, a 
bulletin from the Indian Psychoanalytical Society, published in the Bulletin of the 
International Psychoanalytic Association amidst news of the various international 
societies, mentions that their President, Girindrasekhar Bose, had been called as “a 
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psychological expert witness” in a “sensational political murder case”, but leaves out 
the particulars of the incident.483 It is by turning to contemporary newspapers that 
one learns that Bose was an expert witness in the Saha case, part of a trial where the 
question of politics became indivisible from an account of the psyche. The Saha case 
confronts us with an assassination, a political act, that belies attempts to understand 
it solely within the framework of rationally motivated action. In this, it is a reminder 
of how psychic processes accompany and often give direction to political events, and 
yet how the two are irreducible to each other. This case requires us to hold  the 
immanence of the psyche in political life together with its irreducibility. 
Reconstructing the Gopinath Saha case is an opportunity to understand this 
intersection of nationalist activity and psychoanalytic affiliation in a colonial 
courtroom, and the ends to which psychoanalysis was mobilized. Saha’s dramatic 
courtroom speech, invoking ‘Mother India’, leads us into a domain where it is 
difficult to draw a line between mysticism and patriotism, fantasy and political 
action. In her book The Juridical Unconscious, Shoshana Felman delineates the 
distinct goals of law and literature: “[a] trial is presumed to be a search for truth, but, 
technically, it is a search for a decision, and thus, in essence, it seeks not simply truth 
but a finality: a force of resolution. A literary text is, on the other hand, a search for 
meaning, for expression, for heightened significance, and for symbolic 
understanding.”484 As I hope to establish in the following discussion, the fantasy of 
Mother India confuses these distinctions. It was developed in literature, notably the 
1882 novel Anandamath, influenced  national and anti-colonial political action, and 
played a prominent role in the Saha trial. The courtroom becomes the site where 
symbolic understanding is offered and sought, and Anandamath, a literary text, 
provides political vocabulary, and a template for revolutionary action, thus 
functioning as the mainspring of ‘a force of resolution’. Here law, literature, and 
politics were not mutually exclusive domains but profoundly, sometimes 
unexpectedly linked, directing and giving form to one another. This trial tells the 
story of a nation and identity in formation, and the sexual and religious politics of 
the time returns us to themes that have accompanied my account of psychoanalysis 
in the colony: how to co-exist with a neighbour and find an ethical relationship to 
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otherness. To give a very different account of how to approach these questions from 
those offered by the encounter between psychoanalysis and the courtroom, I offer a 
reading of Rabindranath Tagore’s novel Gora, and Mahasweta Devi’s story “Breast 
Giver”. 
 
‘A Sensational Political Murder’: Insanity in the Courtroom 
Soon after the killing of Ernest Day, widely referred to as ‘The Chowringhee 
Outrage’, Gopinath Saha was produced before a District Magistrate at a Sessions 
Court. Once his identity was established, it was decided that the case would be tried 
at the High Court. The first step of Saha’s defence counsel was to put before the 
Court an insanity plea. The prosecution’s witnesses, two doctors, both said Saha 
appeared sane in his interactions with them after he had been taken into custody. He 
appeared lucid and was able to answer questions put to him. According to W.G. 
Hamilton, I.M.S., the Inspector General of Prisons: “the prisoner spoke like a sane 
person. He always spoke rationally, took his meals, occupied himself most of the day 
in reading and was clean in his habits.”485 Saha himself said to one of the doctors 
that he was not insane. He had tried to escape after shooting Ernest Day, the 
prosecution argued, which showed that he recognised the consequences of his 
actions. His attempt at escape indicated that he could differentiate between right and 
wrong, and that his actions on the day of the crime suggested that he knew what he 
had done was wrong. The prosecution then urged the jury to consider whether Saha 
would have acted in the way he did if policemen had been present on the scene. 
In its cross examination of the doctors, the defence counsel raised three main 
points: an insane person could have lucid intervals; an insane person could think of 
themselves as sane; and there was a history of insanity in Saha’s family. Defence 
witnesses included people from Saha’s childhood: his friends and teachers, and a 
cousin. They all testified to the presence of ‘madness’ in the family. The catalogue of 
suffering was encapsulated in a question posed by the defence counsel to the 
prosecution’s medical witness:  
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Suppose you heard that the prisoner’s uncle was insane and disappeared, that 
an aunt was insane and committed suicide, that a cousin tried to commit 
suicide twice, that another cousin committed suicide, that his parents were 
mentally deranged that the prisoner is one of four brothers one of whom is 
absolutely insane from birth while the other two are not quite mentally 
responsible, would not those be factors in deciding the question of the 
prisoner’s sanity or insanity?486 
 
The prosecution’s arguments had been marked by an either/or form of thinking. Saha 
knew he was committing a crime, thus he couldn’t be insane, as though one 
cancelled out the other. This form of reasoning, unsurprising in a courtroom, does 
not have room for the possibility of unconscious motivations. By contrast, the 
Freudian account of guilt and criminality stresses such motivations and even 
suggests that a confession of a particular crime may well arise from guilt accruing to 
another act.487 In its response to the prosecution’s arguments, the defence had offered 
a deterministic account of heredity, admitting a family history that no doubt shaped 
Saha’s experience of the world, but without any discussion of what this past meant to 
him, and what he’d made of it. In this context, Dr. Girindrasekhar Bose was 
summoned as an expert witness by the defence. He spoke to Saha in Bengali, who 
seemed lucid. The Indian Daily News reported on his meeting with Saha, and Bose’s 
subsequent statement in court: 
  
Insane persons often showed physical abnormalities known as stigmata. He 
examined the accused physically. The accused’s skin was not normal. His 
muscular system was also not normal. His chest was abnormal, one side 
being prominent and the other side sunk. There were glandular swellings in 
his neck. That was a sign of a morbid condition. Witness spoke to the 
accused in Bengali. Asthma was associated with insanity. The accused’s 
intelligence and memory were normal, but he had a delusion, thinking that he 
received calls from the mother country. The accused said that he used to lose 
his appetite and sleep when these calls came and he got very excited. Having 
regard to the history of the accused and his family when both parents were 
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tainted the children must also be tainted. The conduct of the accused in the 
lower court was compatible with insanity. […] If the trial went on the 
accused would be able to follow most of the points, but he would get excited 
when the call of the disembodied spirits came. The accused’s delusion was 
that the mother country calls to him to rescue her and when that call came he 
lost his appetite and sleep. If that call did not come during the course of the 
trial the accused would not get excited.488 
 
Bose’s account of Saha’s ‘delusion’ was an alternative to the understanding of 
‘insanity’ that the prosecution worked with, as the very idea of a ‘delusion’ makes 
room for motivations that the subject may not be aware of. Yet with the exception of 
this acknowledgement of ‘delusion’, this was no more a psychoanalytic diagnosis 
that what was offered by the prosecution. Bose’s investment in a normative ideal—
the words ‘normal’, ‘abnormal’ and derivations of these are used five times in the 
first ten sentences of Bose’s testimony—is at odds with the psychoanalytic 
understanding of normality as an ‘ideal fiction’.489 By turning to some of his writing, 
we can better situate Bose’s statement in court.  
In Bose’s writing there was a belief in the strict separation of disciplines–the 
first portion of his essay “Manuser Mon” argues for the autonomy of psychology 
from physiology, biology and philosophy. The interest in scientificity and 
disciplinarity was a major influence on how Bose theorised matters relating to the 
mind/ psyche.490 Illustrative of this is the theory of ‘pan psychic psycho physical 
parallelism’, developed in Bose's first book, and discussed in most subsequent work. 
The theory posits a radical separation between the domains of the psychic/mental 
and the physical. However, since both the body and the mind seem affected in 
certain instances, such as when alcohol is consumed, all objects are understood to 
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have both a physical and a psychical component to them, and these respective 
components influence their corresponding counterparts in the object that is being 
acted upon–in this case, the person consuming the alcohol.  
Theoretically, this seems to make the body unavailable as an object of 
enquiry for psychoanalysis since, though both can be co-present in the symptom, the 
body has been so rigorously distinguished from the mind. This was certainly not the 
case in Bose's therapeutic practice, where the patient's body was read and 
commented upon. Indeed Bose's theory puts his relation with psychoanalysis in 
question, given the manner in which Freud theorised the instinct / drive (Trieb) as “a 
concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic” and “as a measure of the 
demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the 
body.”491 Freud's words—‘frontier’, ‘demand’—indicate a conversation, a back and 
forth movement central to which is the issue of translation—as though the drive is a 
process of translation of a source text that cannot otherwise be accessed. What could 
the talking cure be, given Bose's utter splitting of the psychic from the material? 
Bose’s theory of the separate spheres of the material and the psychic cannot account 
for speech, especially the psychoanalytic understanding of the body being taken as 
material for speech in the expression of a symptom. 
In his role as expert witness, Bose established Saha’s ‘insanity’ based on 
physiology, the presence of cryptic ‘stigmata’ and a link that he made between 
asthma and insanity. Yet his own theories, especially that of ‘pan psychic psycho 
physical parallelism’, could not accommodate the use of the body as material for the 
expression of a psychic symptom, even though Bose, in his clinical practice, was 
confronted with such symptoms. Similarly, the link between the physical symptoms 
(the stigmata and asthma), the ‘delusion’ and the diagnosis of ‘insanity’ remain 
unclear in Bose’s court testimony. And while an account of the environment and 
family history are important to psychoanalytic interpretation, in that they are taken 
up and transformed in a subject’s psychic history, in Bose’s version we find a view 
of heredity that is both reductive and deterministic: ‘when both parents were tainted 
the children must also be tainted’.492 In such an account, the outcome of history can 
be known in advance, rather than being something fraught and unpredictable. It 
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cannot admit that Saha’s life was a response to his history, and by virtue of this 
contained the possibility of having been something else. While Bose’s testimony was 
the first mention in court of Mother India, he did not comment on this figure who, as 
we shall see, played a key role in the case. 
The prosecution’s account suggested that Saha acted in full awareness and 
control of himself: a version of events that rids the act of psychic significance, 
insofar as admitting the psyche into an account of things is also to admit the 
unknowable. Yet Girindrasekhar Bose for the defence not only subscribed to a 
similar version of psychic determinism, he also omitted to make a link between an 
account of Saha’s psyche and the specifically political form that his actions had 
taken. An essay from Bose’s book Everyday Psychoanalysis, titled “Crime and 
Psychoanalysis”, sheds light on his testimony. Discussing the usefulness of 
psychoanalysis in understanding 'crime' or 'criminality', Bose writes that “a crime is 
the inevitable result of foregoing individual social, hereditary, ethnological, and 
other factors. A criminal, according to my view, therefore, is not responsible for his 
actions [...] You cannot punish a criminal any more than you can punish a diseased 
individual”.493  
Bose emphasized these very hereditary factors in his diagnosis of Saha.494 
Such a position, however, denies entire groups of people the capacity for responsible 
action, on the basis of hereditary and ethnological factors. Bose’s position coincides 
with the colonial administrative practice of classifying ‘criminal tribes’.495 The 
sociologist Meena Radhakrishna writes that the discipline of anthropology 
contributed towards establishing the categories of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ in the 
colony, then used them to criminalize the ‘primitive’: “[i]n the popular ethnographic 
literature of the period, a sketch was drawn of a criminal who possessed not just 
bizarre social customs, but a strange body and psyche as well”.496   The implications 
of such reasoning are most eloquently articulated by Hannah Arendt, writing in the 
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context of anti-Semitism and Nazi totalitarianism: “[i]f crime is understood to be a 
kind of fatality, natural or economic, everybody will finally be suspected of some 
special predestination to it”, and that supposed tolerance or leniency shown to people 
understood to be predisposed to crime could switch to a decision to do away with 
them altogether.497 Not being considered fit to be subject to the law, in this argument, 
is a fate possibly more violent than the punishment inflicted by the law. Bose places 
both the criminal and the diseased person outside of the realm of responsible action. 
The Saha case requires an account of the subject that would jettison neither the 
subject’s unconscious, nor their capacity to take responsibility for themselves. This 
was not to be found in the medical-legal parameters of a colonial courtroom. 
After listening to the testimonies of various witnesses, the jury decided that 
the accused was fit to stand trial and the newspapers ran reports of this the next day 
under the headline ‘Insanity Plea Rejected’. In an unpublished memoir of her 
husband, Kathleen Tegart would recount how the plea failed and say of Bose’s 
arguments: “[p]erhaps he protested too much.”498 In the meantime, the question of 
madness and politics was being taken up in the wider political responses to the Saha 
case. Outside the courtroom, discussions in the press and legislative assemblies 
brought together issues of racism and political repression. These alert us to a political 
landscape in which we can never be certain whether ‘insanity’ is to identified in the 
actions of a man like Saha, or in the measures taken by the colonial administration. 
 
‘Unconscious Terrorists’ 
News of Ernest Day’s killing filled the Empire Theatre in Calcutta, where the 
European Association held a mass meeting to voice their feelings about the matter. A 
colleague of Ernest Day’s read an extract from a letter he had received from an 
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“Punishment is the right of the criminal,” of which he is deprived if (in the words of Proust) 
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Indian friend which expressed “abhorrence at the dastardly outrage against humanity 
and against an innocent soul” which was committed when Mr. Day was murdered. 499 
In the next couple of days, various statements were issued stressing that the murder 
was not a racial matter. This was stressed multiple times in the gathering mentioned 
above, though at one point the meeting noted the difficulty of accepting this opinion: 
“[t]he Chairman observed that it was most horribly hard to get out of one’s mind that 
this was not a racial matter. One of their own community had been shot down in a 
most ruthless manner by an Indian. But the more one thought of what one knew of it 
already the more one was convinced as far as one could see at present, that it was not 
a racial matter at all.”500  
At its meeting, the European Association had passed three resolutions. The 
first two resolutions had expressed sympathy with Mr Day’s relatives, and 
condemned the act, but the third petitioned the government to exercise caution in the 
release of political prisoners, which was an issue of public debate at the time.501 The 
murder of Ernest Day took place at a time when the Bengal legislature was debating 
the release of prisoners interned under Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, III of 
1818. This piece of legislation allowed the government to arrest and detain 
indefinitely, without trial, people suspected of criminal intent. The following 
telegram was sent by the Association to Ramsey Macdonald, the newly elected 
Labour Prime Minister, and Stanley Baldwin, the former Prime Minister, in England: 
“[t]he European Association, as a representative body of the European community in 
India trust you will exert your influence to strengthen the hands of those responsible 
for the maintainence of law and order in this country!”502  
  This political position angered the nationalist press. In the reasoning of the 
European Association, Indians had to chase the assailant, and themselves be injured 
in the process, to prove that the murder was not a ‘racial matter’. The burden of 
proof lay with the Indians, whether in the form of regret expressed—as in the letter 
quoted in the meeting, or in the acts of the injured chauffeurs. Quick to pick up on 
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this attitude and condemn it, the nationalist press pointed out how Europeans 
routinely ill-treated Indians, something that the European Association would not 
acknowledge: “why is it that Europeans in this country never raise a single voice of 
protest when a European kicks or shoots an Indian to death? Is it the Indians who 
spread racial hatred or the Europeans?”503 Another newspaper reminded its readers 
of the most notorious British shooting in recent memory, Jallianwallah Bagh: “when 
thousands of innocent men and children were brutally massacred.”504 The papers also 
pointed out how any attack on an European was a means of strengthening the 
repressive powers of the Government: “[i]f a single white man is murdered by an 
Indian, Europeans set up a tremendous cry for law and order and demand that the 
powers of the police must not be curtailed.”505  
The opinion expressed by the nationalist press, that race determined the 
difference in treatment of Europeans and Indians, seems to have been unwittingly, 
and perhaps unconsciously, accepted by the European Association itself. There is a 
curious double negation in the statement made at the Association’s meeting, ‘it was 
most horribly hard to get out of one’s mind that this was not a racial matter followed 
by ‘the more one thought of what one knew […] it was not a racial matter at all’. The 
first sentence would make more conventional sense if it said ‘this was a racial 
matter’, but the addition of the ‘not’ begs the question of why the thought ‘this was 
not a racial matter’ should be ‘most horribly hard’ to get out of the mind – or why 
indeed, it would need to be evicted from the mind at all. Would it have been more 
comforting to think that it was indeed a racial matter (as the nationalist press 
suggested the Europeans did in any case)? 
Widespread arrests took place after the Day murder, including arrests of 
members of the Congress, a party committed to non-violent struggle. Responding to 
these, the Forward, a newspaper founded by the Swarajist leader C.R. Das, took aim 
at the very Intelligence Departments that Saha’s intended target, Charles Tegart, had 
played such an important role in establishing:  
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Intelligence Departments are the curse of modern civilisation. They have 
brought ruin on Germany and they are slowly but surely undermining the 
fabric of British rule in India, more than any political agitation or 
revolutionary outrage. The activities of all Intelligence Departments are as 
dark and dangerous as the ways of Satan. Where they exist, who their masters 
are, how they spend and waste public money, what their plans are, how they 
execute these plans, who their prospective victims are – nobody can tell. 
Even the light of Providence cannot probably penetrate the Cimmerian 
darkness in which the nocturnal agents of that department lay out their plans 
and cast their nets to entrap unwary citizens.[…] Repression is a double-
edged weapon. It destroys the victim no doubt. But in the long run it 
completes the moral ruin and political bankruptcy of the agent who uses it.506 
 
In the previous two chapters, we discussed how colonial officers and 
administrators in India, such as Claud Daly, Owen Berkeley Hill, John Hutton and 
James Mills identified themselves with a position of knowledge and mastery. In each 
case, encounters with psychoanalysis tugged at this construction of the self and 
threatened to undo it by casting light on both the sexual anxiety, as well as the 
murderous desires that formed the backcloth of this position of colonial self-knowing 
mastery. Their writing bears witness to the defences they put up against potentially 
transformative forms of insight, which would have created uncertainty and doubt 
untenable for men invested in occupying positions of colonial authority. Here, Das’s 
description of Intelligence Departments identifies for critique this very alignment of 
knowledge/mastery, finding it to be no less than ‘the curse of modern civilisation’. 
The tellingly named ‘Intelligence’ Departments (what does such naming do 
to our understanding of ‘intelligence’, one might ask) are identified by Das as places 
where knowledge merges into its opposites—obfuscation and deception—making 
these places ‘dark and dangerous’ sites of entrapment. These departments were the 
most heightened institutional expression of the alignment of knowledge with mastery 
in political life, showing how this necessitated the use of repression—whether it was 
the arrests and detention of political activists, or as we discussed in the previous 
chapter, attacks on Naga villages.  
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Das’s description of the inefficacy of the use of repression— ‘moral ruin’ and 
‘political bankruptcy’ is the long term fate of its agents—is an instance of how acute 
political awareness created a form of insight into the psyche. Das’s description of the 
failures of political repression is curiously like Freud’s description of the inefficacy 
of repression as a psychic strategy—the symptom may succeed in quelling what has 
been found unacceptable, but in time it becomes too expensive to sustain. The 
speech given by the Governor, Lord Lytton, when opening the Legislative 
Assembly, discussed the issue of the powers of arrest and detention vested in the 
government. Lytton used the Day murder to argue that Regulation III was crucial to 
the containment of revolutionary violence. Anticipating the argument that 
revolutionary crimes could be tried under ordinary law, he expressed his lack of faith 
in judicial process, and, like many of his contemporaries drew upon the category of 
perversion to speak of anti-colonial political action: 
 
eager impulsive natures and hearts aflame with righteous patriotic fervour to 
be poisoned by the revolutionary virus, to risk the lives of our servants and 
even those of innocent men in the street, to send the assassins to the gallows 
and allow those who have perverted them, trained them, armed them, and 
sent them out upon their butcher’s work to lurk in the background, unscathed, 
and to prepare lists of fresh victims—that is one policy, that is what is 
euphemistically described as relying on judicial proceedings.507 
 
Here the Government itself shares with the terrorists a lack of faith in judicial 
proceedings. The Governor of Bengal, and the European Association of Calcutta, 
both used the Chowringhee incident to argue in favour of continuing repressive 
legislation. They were champions of the police. “Mr. Day died indeed that some 
brave men might live, men who watched and guarded over them at a constant peril of 
their lives” said the European Association, referring to Tegart and praising his 
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courageous work.508 Their opinion was shared by the highest government authority 
in the country, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, who said that the 
importance of legislation like Regulation III “recently received tragic confirmation in 
the murder of Mr. Day and the injuries to three Indians who attempted to stop the 
flight of his assailant.”509  
It was a troubled time in Indian politics. The murder of Ernest Day took place 
the year after Gandhi had called off the non-cooperation movement, after the 
infamous incident at Chauri Chaura in which farmers set fire to a police station, 
killing twenty two policemen. Their actions were in retaliation for police firing at 
their peaceful non-cooperation demonstration. Gandhi had felt that the outbreak of 
violence showed that the nation was not spiritually prepared for Independence, and 
had not been able to truly accept the ideal of nonviolence.510 This sudden and 
somewhat authoritarian end to a movement that had consumed the lives and energies 
of a large section of the nation left many disillusioned and directionless, and created 
a vacuum in the political life of the country. Gandhi himself was sent to prison soon 
after. Following this, there was a split in the Congress party, in which a group 
headed by Motilal Nehru and C.R. Das differed from Gandhi in their understanding 
of what non-cooperation meant. While Gandhi was in favour of boycotting elections, 
Nehru and Das formed the Swarajist party, which decided to contest elections in 
order to non-cooperate from within, or, in C.R. Das’s words, to enter councils to 
“wreck these monsters of Reforms which were drinking the life-blood of the nation 
and make Govt. by Council impossible”.511 Their point was to show up the injustice 
of supposed political reforms which allowed Indians the right to contest elections, 
but which also allowed the Governor General in Council to overrule any decisions 
taken by the legislature. 
 Das’s Swarajist Party, which had a majority in the Bengal State legislature, 
used the murder of Ernest Day to argue in favour of the release of political prisoners. 
Das himself made an impassioned critique of the legislation when he addressed the 
house:   
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I ask the Government to seriously consider, can the application of these 
lawless laws, as I call them – these repressive orders, executive decrees- can 
it possibly put an end to revolutionary movement? […] in the history of the 
world has revolutionary movement been checked at any time by repressive 
legislation? It has never been checked. It can never check revolutionary 
movement. It can never suppress it. I am told that when these internments 
took place the revolutionary movement was supressed. It was not suppressed. 
If it was suppressed why has it raised its head again? It was not supressed. It 
buried its head underground. Every time you apply these regulations, every 
time you send people to jail without trial, it creates disaffection. I will ask 
you to seriously consider—can revolutionary crimes cease if disaffection 
increases? The revolutionaries may be temporarily supressed but only for the 
time. Remember, the man who throws the bomb is not the only terrorist. He 
is a terrorist undoubtedly. The man who shoots fellow citizens is a terrorist. 
He is a terrorist no doubt. But he is not the only terrorist. There are 
unconscious terrorists. These terrorists are those who practice upon the fear 
of the people.512  
 
 Once again, Das’s political commentary is akin to the language of 
psychoanalysis. If we return here to our discussion of the superego in the first 
chapter, we will remember that in Freud’s account the forces and desires in the 
psyche—aggressive, rebellious—cannot be kept in check by the superego, that 
internal ‘garrison’ keeping watch over a conquered city. Through the course of this 
thesis I have argued that the history of psychoanalysis in India allows us unique 
insight into the bloodthirsty and ruthless nature of superegoic injunctions, especially 
when these have institutional and cultural sanction. It is when the law and its 
representatives, whether Claud Daly or Berkeley Hill in relation to ‘natives’, the 
colonial administrators in the Naga Hills, or the Government addressed by Das, are 
most certain of their perfection that they can act in the cruellest and most aggressive 
fashion—creating what Das describes, in a revealing turn of phrase, as ‘lawless 
laws’. Judicial process functioned as a way of maintaining debate within law—the 
opportunity for interpretation of the law. By doing away with this possibility of 
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dissension, the writ of the law became identical with itself, allowing its 
representatives to usurp the symbolic place of the law itself, thus making it empty, 
worthless and vindictive. Such lawless laws, in Das’s account, produce the very 
thing that they set out to control—disaffection, just as the superego as an agent of 
repression within the psyche never manages to quell what it sets about to control.  
 Das then describes ‘those who practice upon the fear of the people’ as 
‘unconscious terrorists’. This description of the government is rich in its ambiguity. 
The colonial government is constituted of ‘unconscious terrorists’ because they are 
unconscious of, or in flight from their affinity with the terrorists they punished, since 
both rejected judicial process as a means to justice. Their rejection, though, came 
from different positions and for the revolutionary terrorists it was a response to 
repression, not in service of it. Quoting from an unnamed English newspaper article 
from a few years back, Das said: “[e]very one who talks of the need of law and order 
while ignoring the still greater need for justice is a terrorist.”513 By manipulating ‘the 
fear of the people’ the colonial government earnt itself the appellation of 
‘unconscious terrorists’ also because its policies targeted the psyche of the 
population of the people it governed: by producing constant fear and anxiety, the 
Government terrorised the unconscious of the people. And yet ‘those who practice 
upon the fear of people’ can also be read to mean that the practices of the 
‘unconscious terrorists’ not only created fear in the people but were themselves 
organised around fearing the people, based on the colonial government’s fear of the 
population is supressed. Das’s dense and revealing choice of words also allows us to 
suggest that the agents of a lawless law are terrorists in the unconscious: that the 
superego is a terrorist in every psyche. These explanations do not contradict or 
cancel each other, rather, they show political and psychic insight condensed in a 
challenge to colonial oppression.  
Yet amongst the nationalists and colonial government alike, some fears were 
shared. These related to the question of authority, and fear of the ambivalence in the 
relationship to authority, once again a theme that linked to discussions in the 
previous chapters. Sections of the nationalist press argued in favour of the release of 
political prisoners, precisely so that revolutionary terrorist action could be avoided. 
Some argued that people turned to political violence because nonviolent means of 
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expressing ‘patriotism’ were met with such severe repression.514. Other newspapers 
said that if they wanted, Indians could be good at armed revolution, but had chosen 
the strategically superior path of nonviolence instead. Insisting upon the non violent 
character of the political movement in India, the nationalist press was, at this time, 
keen to distance itself from the murder.  The Government, on the other hand, and the 
Anglo Indian press associated the murder of Ernest Day with resurgent terrorism. 
Yet for all concerned, the prospect of political violence that the murder called forth 
was accompanied by fears of anarchy: “we had been deceiving ourselves with the 
notion that the frankenstein [sic]  of anarchism had been laid at rest, and the common 
sense of our young men had found out that it was impossible to attain swaraj in this 
country by a crazy and impossible vendetta”.515 The spectre of anarchism threatened 
to disturb political order: “It is the duty of every Government, whether bureaucratic 
or popular, to firmly repress such dangerous activities and maintain peace and order. 
Once they are allowed to be flouted and the people grow accustomed to disregard 
them, the whole country will become a field for the performance of anarchist 
orgies.”516  
The nationalist press, however, was quick to qualify that anarchism could not 
be tackled by the government without the support of the people, or by repressive 
legislation. Yet, in contradiction to such a position, we find that the nationalist press 
simultaneously called on the government (bureaucratic or popular) to act 
authoritatively, and to ‘firmly repress such dangerous activities’. The aftermath of 
the Day murder was marked by a fear of loss of structures of authority which 
threatened, not just political order, but also sexual difference and sexual norms. A 
political murder threatened to turn the country into ‘a field for the performance of 
anarchist orgies’. Fear of an unbound, uncontrolled sexuality accompanies the threat 
of political disorder. No surprise then, that a description of anarchism is 
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accompanied by a reference to Frankenstein—it is unclear whether ‘the frankenstein 
[sic] of anarchism’ refers to the creature made by Victor Frankenstein in Mary 
Shelley’s novel, or the creator himself. In either case, there is a crisis of authority 
and sexuality. In the novel an act of paternal creation disturbs sexual difference, as 
no mother is involved. The creature, denied a parent, or filiation, commits a series of 
killings. In the previous chapters, we noted how colonial authority often represented 
itself as parental authority.  After the murder of Ernest Day, the press was 
demanding the restoration of a repressive authority, its invocation of ‘Frankenstein’ 
alerts us to the pervasiveness of the link between governmental and parental 
authority.  
At the time of these discussions, little was known about Saha or his 
motivations, but his crime had already become intermeshed in larger political 
concerns. He had come to signify, variously, the threat of resurgent revolutionary 
terrorism; the prospect of repressive violence: “we may now expect more searches 
and more arrests, possibly more applications of Regulation III”517; a disregard for the 
‘true’ nationalist/spiritual movement of India: “all forms of violence should by this 
time have been eliminated as the result of the movement of self-suffering and self 
purification”518; a warning to the repressive government etc.519 
 
‘Devotional Service to the Mother’ 
After the rejection of the insanity plea, Saha’s trial continued and the crime 
was reconstructed in Court, with the counsel for the prosecution reminding the jury 
that the accused had already confessed to killing Ernest Day. Then the judge turned 
to Saha and asked him if he had anything to say. His statement created a sensation, 
and I quote it as it was reported in the press:  
 
“It is a very auspicious day for me. The Mother is calling me in order that I 
may rest for ever on her bosom and therefore I want to go. In the ordinary 
way I left home after hearing the call of the Mother in order to offer 
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devotional service to her. I have been to many places in Bengal rendering 
devotional service to the Mother. In the beginning of last year I read in the 
newspapers that a European gentleman of the name of Mr Tegart, after going 
all over the world and collecting information regarding Freedom for India, 
was returning to India with a view to obstruct our endeavours. I began 
meditating very much on the question of this obstruction to our freedom. 
While thus contemplating over it I would feel my head got heated I could not 
sleep at night or eat my food and would walk about at night on the roof. In 
this state I heard the call of the Mother which was this – ‘follow him’. From 
that time onwards I began collecting information regarding him. I found that 
in the last Swadeshi era in Bengal he was the Deputy Commissioner of Police 
in Calcutta. At that time he ill-treated and oppressed the servers of the 
country and others who were not servers of the country. At times his ill 
treatment and oppression were inhuman. He interned without trial many 
people, including some who had nothing to do with political affairs. 
Investigating further I found that in the Balasore fight, the fight between the 
people at Balasore and the police, he was connected with the “Honorable” 
Jitendra Nath Mukerji.520 I also came to know he was a Sinn Feiner, that is to 
say, a resident of Ireland. He endeavoured to obstruct his own countrymen at 
Dublin in the matter of obtaining freedom but he failed.521 Then I began 
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meditating very deeply over all these matters. While meditating I got the call 
from the Mother which was this : ‘Remove him from this world.’ I first saw 
him at Lalbazar on the day of the distribution of the King’s Police Medal I 
saw him many times at the flower stalls of the New Market and I passed 
close by him many a time. Besides I followed him when he left his house, 
with fire arms in my possession to the Eden Gardens and many other places. I 
even opened the safety check of my revolver to be ready to shoot him while 
following him but did not actually shoot him because I had not received the 
final call from my Mother. I began meditating deeply as to whether I would 
kill him or not. Two or three days before my arrest I got back into my 
previous state. I felt my head heated. I had no sleep, no appetite for food, 
could not stop inside my room, felt as if there was fire around me in my room 
which compelled me to go on the roof and walk about. The day on which I 
was arrested I came out in the morning. I went to the maidan and walked 
absent mindedly for a long distance. I saw a Saheb and thought that was Mr. 
Tegart. Then I shot him. I fired many shots at him. I do not remember how 
many I fired. My idea was lest by any chance he should survive. Before I 
fired and even when I fired I did not have in my mind the idea whether I 
myself was going to live or not. When many people shouted out ‘robber, 
robber, murder, murder, catch him, catch him’ then I began to run.  I was in 
such a state I thought the road was swinging before me. I fled a good long 
distance through roads, gullies and buildings. I was surrounded by people 
who were running after me. I do not remember the details of my chase. I 
                                                                                                                                     
should mistake him for an enemy and seek his life on that count, is only the proof of how the strong 
wine of politics can inflame the passion and cloud the judgement of weak mind [sic]” in Amiya 
Samanta “Introduction” to Terrorism in Bengal Vol III, xxiii (Calcutta: Government of West Bengal, 
1995). Yet by the time this speech was made, almost a year after Saha’s attempt on Tegart’s life, the 
policeman, along with other officers had already been on deputation to the intelligence service in 
Ireland as “officers with experience in dealing with the terrorist organisations in Bengal were taken on 
deputation to take on the Irish terrorists in the 1920s.” Amiya Samanta ‘Introduction’ Terrorism in 
Bengal  Vol III, v. Tegart’s colleague David Petrie’s account of the policeman reflects this dualism in 
the portrayal of Tegart as someone both sympathetic to and intolerant of revolutionary movements:  
[w]as Tegart ever an enemy of the Indian freedom? To those knowing his characteristically 
Irish make-up, the bare idea is ludicrous. He loved freedom for himself as he did for others 
with all his ardent Irish nature […] He could find plenty to say against his own Government 
and could say it with point of vigour. Indeed few were better constituted than he to 
understand what the mind of the bomb and pistalwallah was blindly groping after. On the 
other hand, he set his face sternly against any short-cut blazed by murder and gang-robbery, 
on the plea that they were ‘political’. 
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could not run anymore. My throat became dry. I saw a tum-tum in front of 
me.  I told the man ‘drive quickly, I have done work for the country, I have 
done good, I have done no wrong.’ When I was on the step of the tum tum 
talking to the man a large number of people pounced upon me. After that 
they gave me the usual thing, namely, they assaulted me very much and after 
that I do not know what followed.522 I became unconscious. When I got back 
my senses I found I was inside the thana.” After setting out what transpired at 
the thana and in the Medical College Hospital, and, how after he was taken to 
Lalbazaar and questioned by various police officers, the prisoner continued: 
“Then I was taken to the room of the Commissioner of Police. Even then my 
idea was that the Commissioner of Police was dead. When I saw him 
standing in front of me I was dumb-founded I thought what have I done. He 
asked me ‘You have made a mistake , have you not?’ I said ‘How could such 
a thing have happened.’ I even now think that as regards the bullets which I 
have fired into the Saheb who was killed, a sort of current had formed by 
reason of which these bullet wounds have affected Mr Tegart’s body. I 
believe in thought current. Then, he asked me for my name and address. I 
said nothing at all. Then I was taken to the Special Branch Office at Elysium 
Row. There a Rathajatra festival went on. Many Sahebs and Bengali officers 
were there. I said to Bhupen Chatterji, ‘Don’t you worry me now. I am not in 
a good state of health now. Whatever I wish to say I will say tomorrow at 12 
or 12-30. It is no use worrying me.’ About 8 o’clock that night Mr Tegart 
himself came. He again asked me ‘You have made a mistake, have you not?’ 
I then thought what is the use in not speaking out any longer.  I said, ‘Yes, it 
was you I wanted to kill, but you have been saved by God’s grace’. The next 
day about 12 or 1 o clock I was taken to the Intelligence Branch. There I 
made a statement of Bhupen Chatterji. Before I made my statement I said to 
him ‘Look here I have got one condition to impose before I make my 
statement, namely, that after I finish what I have got to say nobody shall 
                                                
522.	At the time of his appearance at the Sessions Court, Saha had asked: “Is it not a fact that when I 
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examined, replied in the negative. Towards the conclusion of the day’s proceedings, Saha also 
remarked that “he had read and heard about the British being a very brave people but on the day of the 
arrest, when he was floored, one of his captors caught hold of both his hands from the back and 
another pressed his neck to the ground with his boot and assaulted him on his face and other parts of 
his body with kicks and blows […]” “The Chowringhee Murder” The Bengalee, January 16, 1924.	
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worry me asking questions or worrying themselves.’ I gave my name 
Gopimohan Saha, Serampore, formerly of Oxford Street, now Khetra Mohan 
Street. He asked my father’s name and I said ‘Bejoykrishna Saha, deceased.’ 
The next day I was again taken to the Commissioner, Mr. Tegart. From there 
I was taken to Bankshall Street Police Court and from there to the Presidency 
Jail where I am now living. I have now stated what I have got to say in regard 
to my history. With regard to the innocent Sahib whom I have killed I am 
extremely sorry. I do not consider anybody to be my enemy because he is a 
Saheb. I am extremely sorry for those persons who have been wounded. At 
the time of the execution of work whoever comes to resist is more than an 
enemy, whether he belongs to my country or not. For the soul of this Saheb I 
am praying to God. So far this is what I have got to state now. At the 
conclusion of the trial shortly before my sentence I want to say a few words 
which I intend to address to my countrymen. I pray that I may be allowed to 
do so. It will not take much time, it will be over in five minutes. From the jail 
I want to write a letter to my mother. For that you will please give me leave. 
Please give judgement taking into view the fact that I will not be able to live 
in jail, I want to go to the Mother. That is all.”523 
 
This is the first time during the trial that Saha spoke at length, and the first 
time the court and the public received his own account of his actions. As Bose 
pointed out in his testimony, the figure of Mother India was very important to Saha, 
and it is to her, in his speech, that he attributes both the impetus of his actions, as 
well as a form of restless, relentless suffering. For Saha, this disembodied voice 
created the need for meticulous research into the colonial system, especially the part 
played in it by Charles Tegart. The command to kill Tegart produced in Saha an 
intense ambivalence, and it is not clear if he carried out this action because he heard 
a final command to do so from the Mother, or whether he did so because he could 
not bear the uncertainty of not having heard this final command. Even though he 
used the gun as his political weapon, paradoxically in his speech, Saha ends up 
locating the greatest political agency in the psyche: ‘I believe in thought current’. 
The newspapers covering the trial highlighted Saha’s apology to the dead 
man and the calls of the mother country, but did not dwell too much on the 
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implications of what he had said. The next day, Saha was found guilty and sentenced 
to death by hanging. The verdict was delivered by a Jury with a majority of Indians, 
and the sentencing was carried out by Justice Pearson, who had presided over the 
case. The Viswamitra wrote that while the jury had found Saha guilty, the sentencing 
had been the prerogative of the judge, who had chosen the harshest sentence of death 
by hanging as opposed to the alternative of transportation for life.524  
On March 2nd 1924 Saha was executed inside the prison grounds. The 
authorities refused to return the body to his family, but allowed one of his cousins to 
enter the prison grounds to perform a Hindu cremation, a ceremony left incomplete 
because the family was not permitted to take Saha’s bones or ashes outside the 
prison. Saha’s speech had brought him into political prominence and on the day of 
the execution, a group of patriots gathered outside the prison to claim the body and 
perform funeral rites. They were led by Subhas Chandra Bose, Secretary of the 
Bengal State Congress and editor of the Forward, the newspaper offering some of 
the most trenchant critiques of British repressive measures. Yet Gopinath Saha does 
not figure prominently in accounts of the political struggles in India. In reading about 
him, the reader would be forgiven for thinking that there is not much to say. A young 
patriotic Indian shot the wrong man, significant enough to note, but not quite as 
interesting as revolutionary violence during the Swadeshi movement, the activities of 
secret revolutionary groups, or the later well-articulated political activities of 
revolutionaries of the Hindustan Republican Socialist Army, such as Bhagat Singh 
and Chandrasekhar Azad.525 This may in part be attributed to the greater effects of 
the other revolutionary incidents. However, one cannot escape the feeling that there 
was something about Saha’s act that escaped, or exceeded both the political 
commentators of his time, and the historians who have revisited the period. Saha’s 
trial confronts revolution with suffering and insanity. Here, the suffering cannot be 
assimilated entirely into ideals of self-sacrifice or devotion to the nation, and neither 
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is the insanity reducible to colonial stereotypes of anti-imperial politics as perverse 
or mad.  
A desire to be with the Mother marks the beginning (‘The Mother is calling 
me in order that I may rest for ever on her bosom and therefore I want to go’) and 
end (‘Please give judgement taking into view the fact that I will not be able to live in 
jail, I want to go to the Mother. That is all.’) of Gopinath Saha’s courtroom speech. 
This figure, Mother India, brings together psychoanalysis and nationalism, through 
the courtroom testimonies of Girindrasekhar Bose and Gopinath Saha. Taking us 
into the heart of how fantasies of community, femininity and sexual identity 
circulated amongst notable sections of Indian revolutionary terrorists and in the 
wider popular imagination, Saha’s invocation of Mother India calls forth the 
multiple, contradictory ways in which this powerful figurehead of Indian nationalism 
was invoked in the politics of the time. Here, I examine the antecedents, and many 
valences of Mother India, who never symbolized one idea, but rather drew her 
immense ability to inspire from being a composite of various images: divine and 
prosaic, ancient and contemporary. The art historian Sumathi Ramaswamy has 
drawn attention to a curious contradiction that seems to give Mother India her power 
and longevity as a symbol. She writes: “an important suggestion that was made by 
several key intellectuals at the start of the nationalist century that there is no 
distinction between the country named India by colonial geography and Bharat Mata 
who resides in all its constituent parts.”526 The visual melding of Mother India 
represented as a devi, or goddess, which placed her in a divine temporality, with the 
modern map of India, the product of British colonization, were not seen to be 
contradictory, instead producing a strong affective response.  
Mother India was sometimes all powerful, sometimes in need of help and the 
figure, by including so many versions of femininity in itself, allowed devotees to 
pick the form that inspired them, while still uniting them under the same symbol. 
The flexibility of Mother India, her ability to encompass various forms of femininity 
as well as features of geography, owes something to her affinity to the goddesses of 
Hindu cosmology. Mother India, like the goddesses, could have a benevolent or 
avenging form. Kali was particularly important, because of her associations with 
battle and annihilation. She was also seen as the embodiment of ‘Shakti’, translated 
                                                




as strength, which is more than simply physical prowess, an idea with great 
resonance for the believer.527 In drawing upon Kali, those fashioning Mother India 
could both endow the new female deity with ancient powers, and recast Kali as a 
modern avenger. In her article on the mother who possesses, in the book Devi: 
Goddesses in India, the anthropologist Kathleen Erndl puts it thus: “although 
individual Hindu goddesses possess distinctive attributes, their identities also overlap 
to a considerable extent, and many – if not most – goddesses are, at least in some 
contexts, considered to be manifestations of the one Great Goddess, Devī. Similarly, 
goddesses tend to manifest themselves not in a single form but in multiple iconic 
forms, as well as in such natural phenomena such as rocks, plants, rivers, mountains, 
and flames”.528  
Girindrasekhar Bose identified Saha’s relationship to ‘Mother India’ as a 
delusion, taking this as proof of the young man’s insanity. Saha’s courtroom speech 
certainly invites comparison with Freud’s famous case study “Psycho-analytic Notes 
on an Autobiographical Account of Case of Paranoia” [1911], better known as the 
Schreber case. Freud comments on the delusions of Senatspräsident Schreber, which 
involved a special relationship with God (divided into a lower and upper god) who 
oppressed him but also saw him as the bearer of a special task.529 Both Schreber and 
Saha shared this special relationship to a deity, who gave them a sense of purpose 
but also left them feeling persecuted. Yet any likeness between Saha and Schreber is 
complicated by the sheer number of men in Saha’s time who shared his belief in 
Mother India, and around it based their commitment to the country’s cause. If this 
was madness, then it was madness shared, and sustained over decades. Or, as 
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Jacqueline Rose puts it in The Question of Zion: “there is no normal yardstick by 
which we can measure the neurosis of the group. All-absorbing, a group is its own 
environment, creates its own world.”530 Bose’s reliance on the category of the 
‘normal’ in his diagnosis of Saha seems even more unhelpful given that Mother 
India was one of the key figures of inspiration for the nationalist movement, 
particularly the armed revolutionary nationalist movement in Bengal.531 In 1908, Sri 
Aurobindo, anti colonial revolutionary and mystic wrote: “The Mother asks us for no 
schemes, no plans, no methods. She herself will provide the schemes, the plans, the 
methods, better than any we can devise. She asks for our hearts, our lives, nothing 
less, nothing more.”532 It was as though in Saha, Aurobindo’s words had become 
prophetic. 
The divine ordaining of terrestrial terrorism, through communication between 
the supernatural and the earthly, was a feature of the revolutionary rhetoric of the 
time. The divine played a part not only in the quotidian aspects of terrorist life, but 
also served as a justification for which activities were carried out and when. In his 
memoirs, the revolutionary nationalist Hemchandra Kanungo, describing the famous 
Maniktola secret society which was led by Aurobindo’s brother Barindra Ghosh, 
wrote that religious practice was part of the daily routine of the group and 
experiences of spiritual realization were a means of moving up its hierarchy.533 
When the Maniktola Society decided to assassinate the Mayor of Chandernagore, a 
French administered territory that often provided a safe refuge away from British 
authorities, it seemed like a bizarre move, inviting persecution from otherwise 
tolerant French authorities. Kanungo writes that the reason given for this attempt 
(which failed) was a ‘message’ that Aurobindo had received.  
This ‘divine’ message prefigures Saha’s account of the attempted 
assassination of Charles Tegart. We do not know from whom Aurobindo received 
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his ‘message’, and Peter Heehs, historian and former archivist at the Aurobindo 
ashram, has argued that the consistent use of a mystical-spiritual vocabulary helped 
mask Aurobindo’s involvement with the revolutionary movement, which served him 
well at the time when he was called into court during the Alipur Bomb trial. This 
mystical vagueness may have been strategic, but in his writings, Aurobindo makes 
clear the centrality of the figure of the mother, passionately exhorting his readers to 
surrender themselves in entirety to her as a patriotic destiny: “the perfect sense of 
self-abandonment which Chaitanya felt for Hari must be felt by Bengal for the 
Mother. Then only will Bengal be herself and able to fulfill the destiny to which after 
so many centuries of preparation she has been called.”534 
In describing how his actions were guided by the commands of the Mother, 
Gopinath Saha evoked the love for the Mother celebrated by figures like Aurobindo. 
Saha’s statements, that he ‘left home after hearing the call of the Mother in order to 
offer devotional service to her’ and that he had ‘been to many places in Bengal 
rendering devotional service to the Mother’ have a double valence. They could have 
meant that he travelled to various pilgrimage sites as a devotee, but they could just as 
well have meant that he travelled through Bengal pursuing a revolutionary education. 
His relationship to the Mother presents us with a situation where the language of 
mysticism and a medico-legal account of madness confront each other. Yet tied to 
this confrontation is a narrative of pain. Though Saha used a mystical-religious 
vocabulary (‘auspicious’, ‘meditating’, ‘devotional service’) to communicate his 
experience of contact with the mother, he also conveyed to his listeners a feeling of 
trapped restlessness, describing how he couldn’t sleep, eat, or stay indoors, and 
experiencing sensations of being engulfed by fire.  
Commenting on the case of the Papin sisters, who murdered their employers 
and whose lawyers subsequently made an insanity plea in court, Elisabeth 
Roudinesco writes that in Jacques Lacan’s account of the sisters’ state of mind, the 
crime “ seemed to reflect the social reality of class hatred, but in fact it reflected 
another reality: that of paranoid alienation.”535 Roudinesco seems to suggest here 
that the psychic state is the truth behind an act that takes is contours from social 
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reality. I do not think the two can be so easily distinguished, or that one is more 
important than the other, though it is crucial to note, against the grain of nationalist 
remembering and forgetting, that Saha had a highly individual relationship to the 
collective social and political discourse of the mother, and this was a relationship of 
suffering and torment. 
Devotion, patriotism, madness—these are difficult to distinguish not only in 
the Saha case, but in the kind of nationalism that Bharat Mata inspired, and was 
herself a product of. This Mother, whose origins are not obfuscated in ancient 
history, was a modern cultural and political creation. However, she came to have, so 
to say, a life of her own , with her demands and mysterious ways. This makes those 
writing about her seem less like creators and more like mediums, akin to those 
experiencing goddess possession, a phenomenon in which the devi is understood to 
inhabit a human medium, who then becomes the mouthpiece for demands, 
prophecies and accusations that are thought to emanate from the Goddess herself.  In 
her study of these possessions, Erndl writes that “[t]his type of possession is not 
regarded as an affliction but rather as a sign of grace, as the Goddess’s chosen 
method of granting a sacred vision (darśan) to her devotees.”536 Whether through 
devotion or madness, the Mother was exceptionally prominent in both Saha’s 
account of his psychic states and in the nationalist movement’s revolutionary 
activities and cultural production.  
It is against the backdrop of the prominence of Mother India that I would like 
to discuss the mercy petition filed by Saha’s own mother, after her son had been 
sentenced to death. In it, she said that her son was insane, had been misled by 
revolutionaries, and asked for his death sentence to be commuted. This is the first 
and only time we hear the voice of Saha’s mother in the case characterised by the 
role the Mother had to play in it: 
“like many of the best of the land, Gopinath was drawn into the vortex of the 
movement. He left home despite of all our remonstrances. His simple nature 
drew him into all sorts of work and he did I am told the most splendid work 
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in connection with the Khulna relief.537 During the few occasions he came 
home his mental disturbance seemed more pronounced. The occasion I saw 
him was for a few minutes in the middle of December when the poor boy’s 
irresponsibility seemed so apparent that I begged him to stay at home. But he 
shook me off saying he was following the ‘Mother’s call’ and went away. I 
have already said of the horror one feels for such an act and the added horror 
of that [sic] a Hindu mother must feel to think that it was through the son she 
had borne the ideal of the Hindu race, the ideal of Ahimsa has been trampled 
to the dust trampled on the great ideal of the Hindu religion – Ahimsa. I 
venture to say that my poor boy Gopinath was not responsible for the act, but 
was used as an instrument by designing people who took advantage of his 
simplicity, his want of balance to sow in his mind the wicked ideas which 
unfortunately have fructified. Your humble memorialist has been further told 
that Dr. G.S. Bose, President of the Psycho-Analytical Society who made 
himself acquainted with the family and personal history of the accused and 
examined him personally, is fully convinced that my poor boy Gopinath is 
medically insane. […] Your humble memorialist prays that the sentence on 
the boy may be deferred and a Committee be appointed of medical experts of 
acknowledged authority like Major Birkley [sic] Owen of the Ranchi Asylum 
or Dr. G.S. Bose President of the Psycho-Analytical Society and some others 
like them. The finding of such a Committee of experts would I am sure 
support my cry for mercy on behalf of my poor boy who I firmly believe was 
irresponsible and unbalanced.”538 
 
The petition was rejected. Saha’s trial and execution set the stage for his 
worldly afterlife. On the day of his sentencing, before the jury were to retire, Saha 
called out to say that as long as “repressions such as Jalianwalabag, Chandpur etc. 
would go on this state of things would continue. A time would come when the 
Government would feel the consequences.”539 When the jury returned with its 
verdict and the judge pronounced his sentence, Saha received the news with 
equanimity, calling out: “[m]ay every drop of my blood sow the seeds of freedom in 
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every home in India”.540 The newspapers wrote about how Saha had put on weight 
after his death sentence, and “was so jolly and cheerful for these few days as though 
nothing extraordinary had happened to him.”541 It was reported that in Saha’s last 
letter, addressed to his mother, he appealed to her “to pray to the Almighty that every 
mother in India should give birth to a son like him and that every home should be 
sanctified by a mother like his.”542 It was as though neither Saha, nor the nationalists 
beginning to celebrate him, had heard his own mother’s words, and her attempt to 
articulate a political position different from her son’s. The Mother’s call drowned out 
Saha’s mother’s belief in ‘ahimsa’, non-violence. She became a symbolic figure, her 
disagreement with his actions was ignored when he wrote that every home should 
have—his word is ‘sanctified’—a mother like his. In Saha’s last words, his mother 
becomes an object of admiration and reverence, but at the cost of her words and 
subjectivity being erased. To understand further this gap between the Mother and 
mother, let us turn to Anandamath, a novel that helps us understand the politics of 
Mother India. 
 
 ‘Our Birthland is Our Mother’ / ‘Say Bande Mataram or we will kill you’ 
The origins of the figure of Mother India in relation to political nationalism 
are literary. The figure of the Mother-nation was developed in the novel Anandamath 
[1882] by Bankimcandra Chatterji, and first serialized in Bangadarshan, the leading 
Bengali journal of the time. This merger of mother with nation was, writes the 
postcolonial scholar Meenakshi Mukherjee: “the first time the Hindu concept of the 
mother goddess with its connotation of Shakti was linked with the idea of the 
country as a political unit, and the symbolic power of this fusion was far-
reaching.”543  The novel tells the story of a group of armed Hindu ascetics, who call 
themselves ‘santans’ or ‘children’ of the Mother. Set during the famine of 1770, it 
follows the Santans as they liberate North Bengal from its Muslim rulers, who were 
titular heads under the control of the British East India Company. Yet even in the 
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novel, this merger of the mother with the nation is presented as a surprising idea, 
outside the remit of immediate comprehension or rational understanding. A would-
be initiate hears a Santan hum a song: “Mahendra was a little astonished when he 
heard this song, and was at a loss to understand. Who was this mother ‘rich in 
waters, rich in fruit, cooled by the southern airs, verdant with the harvest fair?’”, and 
asks his companion for an explanation.544 On hearing more of the song, he exclaims: 
“[b]ut that’s our land, not a mother!”, which is the cue for his companion to say “We 
recognize no other mother. ‘One’s mother and birthland are greater than heaven 
itself.’ But we say that our birthland is our mother. We’ve no mother, fathers, 
brothers, friends, no wives, children, houses or homes. All we have is she who is rich 
in waters, rich in fruit, cooled by the southern air, verdant with the harvest fair.”545 
By connecting the mother and birthland, indeed collapsing them into each other, the 
speaker is forging an emotionally charged relationship with a landscape and its 
features. The libidinal tie to the mother is drawn upon, except that the limit placed on 
access to the mother’s body by the incest taboo is lifted, as the mother in question is 
a landscape. As geography, the mother also becomes eternally available, not subject 
to the fort-da movements of the mother who in Freud’s account is both present, and 
absent to the child. 
It is impossible to discuss political, and especially revolutionary activity in 
Bengal without reference to Anandamath. The novel functioned as inspiration, as 
template for organization, as well as being deeply contentious and divisive. Indeed, 
Hem Chandra Kanungo wrote in his memoirs that he was “trying to narrate the story 
of the so-called revolutionaries of Bengal trying unawares to enact ‘Anandamath’ on 
the political stage.”546 Aurobindo was deeply influenced by it, and translated 
Anandamath into English, publishing the first thirteen chapters between 1909-1910 
in a weekly he edited.547 Kanungo writes of Aurobindo’s ideas that “[t]his method of 
achieving the freedom of the country for salvation of the ancient civilisation and 
religion of India through supernatural power or religion, was borrowed wholly from 
Anandamath.”548 In the novel, devotion to the nation-mother is expressed through 
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the song ‘Bande Mataram’— ‘hail the Mother’, sung at various points as the story of 
the Santans unfolds. Aurobindo gave the title Bande Mataram to a journal he 
published and the words became a popular and stirring slogan during the protests 
against Curzon’s Territorial Redistribution Scheme, widely referred to as the first 
partition of Bengal.  
“For what is a nation? What is our mother-country? It is not a piece of earth, 
nor a figure of speech, nor a fiction of the mind. It is mighty Shakti, composed of the 
Shaktis of all the millions of units that make up the nation”.549 Thus wrote 
Aurobindo in “Bhawani Mandir”, a text in which he detailed plans for setting up 
ashrams in the hills to train spiritual-patriotic men who would serve the Mother. 
Bhawani is a name for Kali, and in this text Aurobindo attributes the oppressed 
position of India to the draining of Shakti in her residents: “We in India Fail in All 
Things for Want of Shakti”.550 The selection of the forest, in “Bhawani Mandir”, as 
the site where revolutionaries will prepare themselves for Hindu patriotic activity 
immediately calls forth the setting of Anandamath. In the novel, the Santans operate 
out of a dense forest. As Lipner puts it “[i]t is from their abbey in the womb of the 
forest that the vision of the new India is born”.551 He argues that the forest in Bankim 
is a “uterine symbol of a new national life”. 552 And indeed, in the novel, the temple 
to the mother is at the centre of many womb-like enfolding structures.  
Masculinity was key to this project, insofar as devotees of the Mother, 
political revolutionaries, were meant to emerge from this forest-womb as virile 
warriors. Mrinalini Sinha describes the ambivalent response of the educated Bengali 
to colonial characterization as ‘unmanly’ and ‘effeminate’. Partial acceptance of this 
accusation—for accusation it was seen to be—of ‘effeminacy’ was a means of 
critiquing British rule, which allowed its subjects to fall into such a state: “the 
emasculation of Indians was also the basis for challenging specific colonial 
policies.”553 Yet simultaneously, there was an attempt to recover this threatened 
masculinity through revolutionary action, of which Anandamath provided the 
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prototype. A powerful fantasy of the Mother as incubator for revolutionary men was 
mobilised, one could argue, at least in part to repair the harm caused by colonial 
stereotyping. A return to the mother seemed to offer an opportunity to be recreated 
as a stronger, more masculine man. Physical improvement in akharas (gymnasia) 
was as much part of the activities of revolutionary societies as was the worship of the 
Mother. 
The resurgent masculinity of revolutionary terrorism was accompanied by its 
own sexual politics. In Anandamath, the Santan order enjoined celibacy to the 
initiates. The penance for expressing desire for, or meeting a woman, was death. One 
of the Santans, Bhabananda, rescues a woman he finds dying by a riverbank (she is 
the wife of another Santan, and has consumed poison so that her husband is free to 
serve the Mother). He comes to desire her and says as much. She rejects him, 
reminding him of his duty. Later, in a battle against the English and Muslim soldiers, 
Bhabananda decides to do his penance by sacrificing himself to the enemy in an act 
of doomed, glorious, battlefield bravado. Bankim concludes the section soon after 
this hero is killed, with the words: “[a]las, for the charm of a beautiful woman! You 
are to blame in this world of travail.”554 The ideal Hindu revolutionary uprising that 
Bankim imagines has little room for women, and the episode of Bhabananda’s death 
in the novel suggests that within this framework, as the converse of the idealisation 
of the mother, women are tainted by some sort of primary fault which makes them 
responsible for whatever goes wrong in the world.  
This condition of celibacy for the mother’s devotees engaged in militant-
spiritual activity, both in Anandamath and in the project for Aurobindo’s Bhawani 
Mandirs, had antecedents in “a long-standing Sanskritic theme to harp on celibacy as 
an invariable condition for the accumulation of tapas or spiritual power, which could 
then be directed for the effecting of various ends.”555 Mother India, Ramamswamy 
has pointed out, is never shown with a consort, and the paternity of her children 
remains unknown. Some illustrations depict her with infants at the breast, but this is 
not very common. The Mother existed outside of the Hindu family. This is 
reinforced by Aurobindo’s rules for the Bhawani Mandirs that were to be built. Men 
working there were to give up their families and conjugal relations for the period of 
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their service to the Mother. The virginal maternity of the mother demanded celibate 
devotion from her sons. Anandamath, and Aurobindo’s plans for the Bhawani 
Mandir alert us to how the worship of the Mother was accompanied by fear and 
denigration of women, especially as sexual beings. Though the figure of Mother 
India remained open to interpretation and appropriation by groups with varying 
beliefs, this initial imagining of her not only excluded women, but was also linked to 
fear and aggression towards the Muslim residents of the region. 
Bankim’s mythology of the mother-nation has a central relation to forms of 
nationalism that have come to dominate Indian politics, as it was part of an attempt 
to fashion a glorious Hindu past. His story of the Santal uprising is set at the time of 
the Bengal famine of 1770, which witnessed a rebellion in which ascetics of both 
Hindu and Muslim denominations participated. Bankim, however, writes the 
Muslims out in his version of the rebellion. His novel draws its energy from the 
excision of the impure foreign body, whether this be women from the celibate Santan 
order, or Muslims from Bengal. Decribing the aftermath of the final major victory of 
the Santals in the novel, Bankim writes:  
that night the whole region was filled with cries to hari. The Children roamed 
around in bands, shouting Bande Mataram! Or “Hari, Lord of the world!” 
Some seized the weapons of the enemy soldiers or stripped their clothes, 
others kicked the faces of the dead or committed some other outrage. Some 
rushed towards the villages, other towards the towns, catching passers-by or 
householders and saying, “Say Bande Mataram or we will kill you!”556  
And yet Bankim’s tone is certainly not one of condemnation, and the reader 
is left wondering if there is more incitement than disapproval in the manner which 
Bankim describes the aftermath, as though to show that after the discipline and 
prohibitions of a holy war, the pleasures of unchecked violence await. The Bharat 
Mata that Bankim helped shape remains a deeply divisive symbol. India’s 
inhabitants were not all Hindus, and people of other denominations were both 
frightened and alienated by the Hindu rhetoric of many of the political actors. 
Anandamath directed its anger more towards the Muslim rulers of the past 
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than it did towards the British. Santan Jnanananda gave voice to these feelings when 
he addressed his army before an attack on the city where the leader of the Santans 
was held hostage: “[f]or a long time we’ve been wanting to smash the nest of these 
weaver-birds, to raze the city of these Muslim foreigners, and throw it into the river 
– to burn the enclosure of these swine and purify Mother Earth again!”557 Here, we 
find that the mother-landscape acquires a sanctity that is threatened by the presence 
of the foreigner. Jnanananda’s speech activates a discourse of male custody and 
sexual purity in which the men of a community are responsible of the ‘honour’ (read 
chastity) of the women who belong to the same group as them. 
Harsh Husbands: Aggression and Passivity 
To better understand how discussions of sexuality and identity were 
circulating in psychoanalytic writing at the time of the Saha trial, let us return to 
Girindrasekhar Bose, whose thoughts on masculinity and femininity were shaped by 
Bankimchandra Chatterji’s writing, indicating once more a key link between 
psychoanalysis, the literary imagination and the self-fashioning of nationalism. Not 
only an example of literature shaping the form of psychoanalytic thinking, Bankim’s 
writing creates an echo between Bose and Saha, who can both be seen to be 
participating within the same set of cultural influences, rather than separated by the 
divides of physician and patient, sane and insane.  
In his essay “Conjugal Quarrels”, Bose identifies these quarrels as ancient 
phenomena exacerbated in modern times: “Eve has eaten too much of the fruit of 
knowledge and her individuality is not to be suppressed so easily. The present-day 
Adam cannot have his own way. I mean no offence but the modern girl considers 
herself to be a member to [sic] the depressed class and claims not only equal status 
with her husband but also special privileges”.558 In saying this Bose claims he 
occupies the position of the neutral, scientific observer. A large part of the essay by 
Bose presents conjugal quarrels as arising from a conflict in women, between their 
desire to be dominated and their demands for a fuller place in the social. According 
to Bose, one of the chief reasons for conjugal quarrels is that modern man is not 
equal to satisfying women's masochism. Neither women's masochism nor the 
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expectation that this masochism requires men are questioned. Bose even goes on to 
make prescriptive statements: “[i]t is quite true that the female has to be wooed 
gently in the beginning but undue mildness on the part of the husband is often 
interpreted as lack of ardour and interferes with the happiness of the couple”.559 
Bose invokes Bankimcandra to support his analysis. According to Bose, 
Bankim said that women liked “sour tamarinds, hot chillies and a harsh husband.”560 
Even though in Bose's understanding, “aggressiveness is essentially a male trait and 
submissiveness pre-eminently a female trait”, in marriage the two sexes are supposed 
to resolve the demands of this 'curious admixture' by 'identifying' with the partner of 
the opposite sex, and through the other's aggression or submission, satisfying their 
own desire for the same.561 Man must continue to be aggressive so that woman can 
satisfy her aggressiveness (which has no social outlet) by identifying with him, and 
woman must continue to be submissive so that through her submission man can live 
the passivity that will not be admitted of masculinity in the social. It is as though 
Bose's discussion of conjugality leads him straight into a crisis in heterosexuality 
that cannot be resolved.  
Bankim excluded women from any participation in what was depicted as the 
ideal theological-revolutionary setting. Santan society gets one of its most devoted 
and daring members in Shanti, the wife of the Santan Jibananda. Women are not 
permitted into the order, so Shanti takes on the guise of a male ascetic to join the 
Santans. For crucial missions she transforms herself back into a woman, which 
allows her to be a successful spy in the enemy’s camp. Bankim, like Bose, thought 
that aggression belonged to males and submissiveness behoved females. A note to 
the fifth edition of Anandamath by the author states: “Shanti has been made 
comparatively more restrained”.562 His novel, on the other hand, relies on the ability 
of his female heroine to perform both masculinity and femininity seamlessly, and 
this includes mastering masculine prowess as it is displayed in horse riding, combat 
and Sanskritic scriptural learning. As it so happened, Bankim felt the need to 
‘restrain’ the character Shanti, and he never could allow her to enter the social order 
in the novel.  
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At the conclusion of the novel, after her husband Jibananda has performed 
his penance by dying on the battlefield (and subsequently been revived by a tantric 
healer), Shanti decides that even though their service to the Mother has been 
rendered and they are free to begin conjugal life, they shall remain celibate, saying: 
“[t]he two of us are renouncers, forever following the path of celibacy”.563 As Shanti 
and Jibananda had been married as children, their marriage was unconsummated. At 
this point, the narrator’s voice breaks through, much as it did after Bhabananda’s 
death: “[a]las, Mother, will they ever return? Will you ever again bear in your womb 
a son like Jibananda and a daughter like Shanti?”564.  
In this context, Bose's advocacy of the 'harsh husband', placed alongside his 
discussion of the heterosexual union can be read as symptomatic of the violence that 
was required to hold in place masculine identifications under colonial rule.565 The 
historian Tanika Sarkar argues that one of the reasons for the immense resistance to 
British legislative intervention into the 'personal' lives of Hindus in colonial India 
was that this would threaten the colonised Indian man in the only sphere – the 
domestic – where the greatest authority was his, colonised Indian men having had to 
take a position of subservience and passivity towards their British rulers in what had 
come to be carved out as a 'public' sphere. 
Yet as we shall see, Girindrasekhar Bose’s writing and political positions are 
hard to pin down. The very categories of masculinity and femininity between which 
he tried to force a differentiation in theory, in fact basing his entire theory on the 
need for such a distinction, are tolerated in a much more muddled form in a case 
vignette in his book, A New Theory of Mental Life (1933). This case provides an 
exceptional account of the way in which questions of group affiliation and sexuality, 
staged in Anandamath, were taken up in the psychic life of a young man in early 
twentieth century Calcutta. Bose discusses a patient who develops a fear of being 
stabbed in the back after communal riots between Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta. 
Bose mentions that the man was 'Mahomedan' and that he felt this fear even in the 
safety of his house, long since the riots were over. Analysis brings forth memories of 
“school boy fights in his childhood when he used to play the tyrant with younger 
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boys. Homo-sexual scenes of the active type began to appear in his association, and 
it was then seen that in the unconscious mind the patient had equated ordinary fight 
with sexual assault.”566  
Bose writes that when the memories were those of 'active' homosexuality, the 
dreams revealed fantasies of passivity. When these 'passive homo-sexual traits' were 
mentioned to the patient, he expressed 'abhorrence' and denial. Later, the patient was 
to recall his willingness to play the 'passive' role in sexual encounters during his 
school days. According to Bose, the patient’s dreams at this time began to show “an 
active attitude with a distinct pleasurable colouring”.567 This once again made 
contemplation of the 'passive' role unpleasant and it was only when the patient could 
bring up at will and enjoy in imagination what are described by Bose as the passive 
and active attitudes, that his fear of being stabbed disappeared. In this case, Bose 
hypothesises, both the active and passive wishes sought fulfilment simultaneously, 
and as their 'action attitudes' were contradictory, they were removed from 
consciousness. During the process of analysis, the wishes dominated consciousness 
by turns, and the cure coincided with the patient being able to hold both in mind, 
quite unlike Bose’s theorisation of sexual difference where the two had to be kept 
separate.   
If passivity is what has to be, historically and psychically, repudiated 
amongst men, then one might argue that this imposition of a passive position would 
also be a part of establishing domination is situations where men are in an 
antagonistic relation to other men—colonial occupation being one of these.568 
However, this internal psychic resistance to what was seen as passivity could 
perhaps also express itself as neurosis even when the threat was not a structuring 
condition like colonialism, but violence between commonly colonised groups, such 
as Hindus and Muslim in India. Like the Saha case, this account of Bose’s patient 
highlights the impossibility of tracing a straightforwardly causal connection between 
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the social—in this case, the riots—and psychic difficulty, but shows the 
interdependence between the two because the riots become intertwined, in the 
patient's psychic life, with the childhood initiations into masculinity. Bose does not 
theorise this imbrication, indeed his theory may not even be able to admit it.  
As we have seen, Bose was himself invested in the idea of a normative order 
in which men repudiate passivity. His prescriptions in an essay like “Conjugal 
Quarrels” shored up the idea that men need to be assertive and dominating, 
particularly in relationships. While at the same time allowing for a radical ambiguity 
in how activity and passivity were distributed between the sexes, his therapeutic 
practice seems to have been directed at creating in the patient an acceptance of the 
passive position, and an ability to bear his own pleasures and desires. How, then, are 
we to understand this, given that Bose's writings also helped support a social 
structure that added to the psychic difficulties of his patient, and was, at least in part, 
the cause of distress? I think that Bose's work does not allow for this contradiction to 
be resolved. For an opportunity to take up these questions beyond the impasse posed 
by the political situation and the psychoanalytical writing, in the following section I 
turn to work by Rabindranath Tagore and Mahasweta Devi. 
Other Mothers: Gora and ‘Breast Giver’ 
If Rabindranath Tagore has an important place here, it is because his novel 
Gora is an immensely powerful exploration of group identity and sexual politics, and 
the bearing that these had on an emerging Indian nationalism.569 The novel follows 
the hero, Gourmohan, ‘Gora’ to his friends because of his remarkably fair 
complexion, his friend Bipin, and the two heroines Lolita and Sucharita, through 
crises of faith, love and patriotism. It foregrounds the schisms in Hindu society, 
particularly those created by caste and the oppressive control of women. Tagore set 
the novel in the 1880s, but it is informed by his experiences of the anti partition 
movement. The text does not mention the year during which its events unfold, but 
the reader is told that Gora was born in the year of the Indian mutiny against the 
British in 1857, and Tanika Sarkar, in her commentary on the novel, has suggested 
                                                




that the events therein most likely take place in the 1880s.570 The hero is a Hindu 
revivalist patriot, and Sarkar has noted that “it seems undeniable that Rabindranath 
of the Swadeshi era provided the model for the patriotic language of the early Gora 
in the novel. The novel is, therefore, autobiographical in a split mode. The early and 
the later Gora reflect the two different political moments in Rabindranath’s life.”571  
Early on in the novel, the reader witnesses a conversation between Gora’s 
mother Anandamoyi and her orthodox Hindu husband, in which it emerges that Gora 
was the child of Irish parents, entrusted to Anandamoyi by his birth mother during 
the sepoy mutiny of 1857, when there were widespread killings of the British in 
India. The child is raised by Anandmoyi in an orthodox Brahmin household, but the 
act of taking in and raising an outcaste and foreign child leads her to question Hindu 
social norms, and caste in particular. In another conversation with her husband, who 
has become increasingly orthodox in his old age, she says: “I have long since ceased 
to take pride in my caste”, following that with “if, after having brought up Gora as a 
my child, I now start playing at orthodoxy, then, apart from its offending society, it 
would offend my own conscience.” 572  Gora’s antecedants have been kept a secret, 
both from the boy and from other members of the family and community. The irony 
of the matter is that Gora identifies as an orthodox Brahmin and refuses to eat with 
his mother because she employs a servant of a lower caste, even going to the extent 
of forbidding his friend Binoy from accepting food offered by Anandamoyi. Gora’s 
allegiance is to the motherland, and, like we saw in the Saha case, this alienates him 
from his own mother. Gora identifies the motherland with tradition: “if I once begin 
to show disrespect for tradition, then one day perhaps I shall cease to respect my 
mother also.”573 His rejection of his mother then, paradoxically, is his attempt to 
preserve what he thinks is the basis of the respect he has for her—Hindu orthodox 
tradition.  
The strength of Tagore’s novel is that he does not parody Gora’s position, 
even though the plot is structured to lead Gora to encounters that make him question 
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his beliefs. Rather, the novel shows how the colonial situation closed off room for 
self-critique, and encouraged complete identification with ways of life that were felt 
to be disparaged and threatened by the presence of the coloniser. Engaged in 
correspondence, in the papers, with an English missionary who “attacked Hindu 
religion and Hindu society”, Gora “would not acknowledge a single one, not even 
the smallest fraction, of the faults imputed to the Hindus by the opposite party.”574 
That Gora feels his country and religion to be under siege is evident when he says 
“[w]hen the whole world has forsaken India and heaps insults upon her, I for my part 
wish to share her seat of dishonour – this caste-ridden, this superstitious, this 
idolatrous India of mine!”575 Gora can be read as an attempt to understand the 
compelling pull of Hindu patriotism, while at the same time suggesting that the 
identifications that go into the making of such patriotism need to be questioned. It is 
remarkable how much of the novel is structured as dialogue, where questions of 
patriotism, religion and love are all debated. In Anandamath, by contrast, all rules 
and actions are explained on the basis of a divine order. In Tagore’s novel, the 
patriot is given the gift of being heard, especially by those who disagree with him. 
The characters portrayed with sympathy in the novel are the ones who listen to each 
other, and allow themselves to be open to the transformative effects of listening and 
being heard. Crucial here is the place that Tagore gives to women’s voices, 
particularly the two young heroines of the novel, Sucharita and Lolita. Raised in a 
Brahmo family, they are not confined to the Hindu zenana, and engage the men in 
dialogue, questioning them about caste and sexual oppression in orthodox Hinduism.  
Like Anandamath, Tagore’s novel is set in the past, but to very different 
ends. Set during the decade in which Anandamath was written, Tagore’s Gora 
imagines a different relationship with what is thought of as ‘foreign’. His novel is set 
at the time when Anandamath would have been enjoying widespread success in 
Bengal. By implanting a foreigner, Gora, in midst of an insular Hindu identity, 
Tagore seems to suggest that recognising what is foreign in us is a route out of 
entrapment in an exclusive, violent identification with nation or religion. In the 
course of the novel, Gora’s travels in rural India confront him with the brutality of 
caste violence, as well as the relief afforded to the poor by the casteless solidarity of 
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Islam. Gora’s instinct is to express solidarity where he sees oppression, but his 
emphasis on caste purity, fear of pollution and rituals of purification all inhibit what 
he can do for the sake of justice. Learning that he is an outcaste is therefore a form of 
freedom for Gora: 
I need no longer fear being contaminated or becoming an outcaste – I shall 
not now have to look on the ground at every step to preserve my purity […] I 
have all this time been struggling against everything around me in my efforts 
to preserve my faith whole and entire in that impregnable fortress! To-day in 
a single moment that fortress of my own creation has vanished like a dream, 
and I, having got absolute freedom, suddenly find myself in the midst of a 
vast truth!576  
Tagore’s novel is radical in the place that it gives to women’s voices, and its 
treatment of caste issues. There are limits to his radicalism though – while the novel 
is undoubtedly a critique of caste, the only place it has for a lower caste actor is that 
of a servant, whose liberation consists of finally being asked to serve her upper caste 
master a glass of water. Likewise, though Tagore creates heroines endowed with a 
complex interiority, and allows them to challenge the norms of their society, they are 
still presented to the reader as idealised forms of femininity.  
It is this theme of the feminine body and its relationship to the nation that 
will be explored with great nuance by the feminist writer Mahasweta Devi. Her work 
is exemplary in its focus on how the armed nationalism and developmentalism of 
postcolonial India interacts with the experience of the subaltern woman. Here, I 
focus on her story “Breast Giver”, which, I suggest, unravels the fantasy of the 
Mother-nation as developed by nationalist revolutionaries, of forbearing and 
sacrificial womanhood as represented in Bankim, and of gentle and enlightened 
Bhadralok femininity in Tagore. “Breast Giver” has as its protagonist Jashoda, an 
impoverished Brahmin woman, a “professional mother” who has given birth to 
twenty children. 577 She “doesn’t remember at all when there was no child in her 
womb, when she didn’t feel faint in the morning, when Kangali’s body didn’t drill 
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her body like a geologist in a darkness lit only by an oil-lamp.”578  
Devi is playing with the dominant image of the bountiful, nurturing mother, 
but this mother is corporeal, sexual and her maternal capacity is depicted as 
mechanised (though not without pain) rather than idealised. Yet Jashoda, who shares 
a name with the mother of the Hindu deity Krishna, is not a mother simply by virtue 
of her twenty children. The title of the story, “Breast Giver”, gives a clue to 
Jashoda’s profession. She is also an immensely capable wet-nurse, suckling the 
many children of a large, wealthy household. As her employer says, “[t]he good lord 
sent you down as the legendary cow of fulfilment. Pull the teat and milk flows!”.579 
A small cult of the Mother forms around Jashoda, and she comes to be sought 
after and revered. Yet with age, and changes in child rearing practices, Jashoda is left 
abandoned and income-less, working in exchange for food in the house where she 
raised an entire generation on her milk. Here Jashoda discovers that she is ill, she has 
a stone in her breast. Diagnosed with cancer, but refusing to go to a hospital for 
religious reasons, ignored by her family and employers, Jashoda lies on the floor of 
her room as her breasts stream pus. Taken to hospital when no longer conscious, she 
enters a sort of a dream state, seeing her ‘milk sons’ in all those around her, she 
eventually dies alone. 
Devi uses an ironic, interjecting narratorial voice that establishes its view of 
the world through allusions to historical events, literary texts and well-known 
figures, and a nuanced portrayal of the habitus of small town Hindu Bengal: 
Such is the power of the Indian soil that all women turn into mothers here 
and all men remain immersed in the spirit of holy childhood. Each man the 
Holy Child and each woman the Divine Mother.[…] Because he understood 
this the heroines of Saratchandra always fed the hero an extra mouthful of 
rice. The apparent simplicity of Saratchandra’s and other similar writers’ 
writings is actually very complex and to be thought of in the evening, 
peacefully after a glass of wood-apple juice. 
The first sentence here combines colonial stereotypes of the native as 
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infantile, with the nationalist fantasy of nation as divine mother to describe Jashoda’s 
participation in the cult of motherhood. In her account of mothering, Devi substitutes 
parody for piety. This is a departure, not just from nationalist accounts of Mother 
India, but also from the tone of progressive writers like Rabindranath Tagore. In fact 
the next sentence, referring to the Bengali writer Saratchandra, indicts the Bengali/ 
Indian intelligentsia for the way in which both nationalist and colonial fantasy was 
taken up by native writers in their construction of ideals of masculinity and 
femininity. In the final line the voice has switched, without the use of diacritical 
marks, to the voice of a generalised (male) Bhadralok speaker, recognisable through 
his wood-apple juice, his evening intellectual activity. This parodic representation of 
the male bhadralok reader/ intellectual has a parallel elsewhere in the story with the 
man who would visit another household to read a liberal newspaper, because he was 
afraid that the newspaper would disturb his own household’s status quo by stirring 
up the women: “‘[t]hey would wear shoes while they cooked’”.580 Devi is pointing 
out the hollowness of an enlightened intellectualism that excludes women. Yet she 
doesn’t leave it at that. The story also depicts how the ‘liberation’ experienced by 
bourgeois women often comes at the expense of a labouring underclass woman. The 
women of her employer’s household, freed by Jashoda from the task of breast-
feeding, can retain bodily autonomy, enjoy sexual pleasure, and previously 
unimagined freedom of movement. 
In her meticulous commentary on the text, Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak has 
pointed out that Mahasweta Devi, in her own reading of the story, sees it as : 
a parable of India after decolonisation. Like the protagonist Jashoda, India is 
mother by hire […] the people who are sworn to protect the new state, abuse 
and exploit her. If nothing is done to sustatin her, nothing given back to her, 
and if scientific help comes too late, she will die of a consuming cancer […] 
the ideological construct ‘India’ is too deeply informed by the goddess-
infested reverse sexism of the Hindu majority.581 
As Spivak points out, this reading, though the author’s own, obscures the 
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complexity of Jashoda as a character, a subaltern. I would like to suggest that rather 
than solely functioning as a parable, the story works to expose the limitations of the 
identifications available to Jashoda, the poverty of the discourses of religion and 
patriotism in interpreting her world. Jashoda, like those around her, sees her work as 
something divinely sanctioned: “the Lionseated had appeared to Jasodha as a 
midwife […]. Otherwise who has ever seen or heard such a thing as constant 
pregnancies, giving birth, giving milk like a cow, without a thought, to others’ 
children?”.582 These frequent allusions to the holy, nurturing cow strengthen the 
allusion to Mother India. Lactation is elevated to a supreme value within the universe 
of the story, as Jashoda’s feats make giving birth seem inadequate. Yet even suckling 
over fifty children fails to secure Jashoda’s place as a mother. Dying of cancer, alone 
in the hospital ward, she exclaims: “‘If you suckle you’re a mother, all lies!’”.583 
Motherhood collapses in on itself, failing to secure a place for woman in the 
social. The story ends with a strange shift in tone, in an almost theological 
pronouncement, Devi writes: “Jashoda was God manifest, others do and did 
whatever she thought. Jashoda’s death was also the death of God. When a mortal 
masquerades as God here below, she is forsaken by all and she must always die 
alone.”584 Devi’s ‘others do and did whatever she thought’ calls forth Aurobindo’s 
statement about how the mother herself will provide the schemes and plans. Yet 
Devi suggests that when the sexed body, located in its dense network of caste and 
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‘Something rotten in the state of’ 
How slow my big-bosomed Mother India moves, even with her Army generals 
pushing and goading her. 
Yezdi Gundevia to W.G. Archer, in the papers of W.G. Archer 
 
Watching a production of Hamlet not long after writing about Gopinath Saha 
for the final chapter of this dissertation, I was astonished and somewhat unsettled by 
the similarities I found between what we know of the Saha case and Shakespeare’s 
literary creation. Much like the Saha case, Hamlet troubles the idea of what we 
would call madness, and blurs the lines between performance, politics, and insanity: 
“I essentially am not in madness but mad in craft”.585 I was struck by how both 
Hamlet, the prince of Denmark, and Saha, a young man in early twentieth century 
Calcutta, were troubled by a vision, a visitation which seems to be more than a 
delusion, something that others acknowledged as real, but were not similarly 
tormented by. In the play, interrogations of internal psychic states are coeval with the 
question of the state of the polity, so when Marcellus says: “there is something rotten 
in the state of Denmark” it suggests not just that there is trouble in the polis, but also 
that something disturbs Hamlet the Prince, since the play often uses names of the 
royal kingdoms as synecdoches for members of the royal families.586  This proximity 
between the state of the polis and the individual may, at least in part, be attributed to 
the fact that as heir to the throne, and future figurehead and representative of the 
state, Hamlet is particularly intimate with, and vulnerable to disturbances of order 
within the state.  
And yet, Hamlet is not only disturbed by the ‘something rotten’ in the state, 
he goes further. Coming across a Captain accompanying the army of Fortinbras, the 
Norwegian prince, Hamlet enquires where this army is headed. In response, the 
Captain lets him know that the army goes to Poland “to gain a little patch of 
ground/That hath in it no profit but the name.”587 A soliloquy by Hamlet that follows 
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this encounter has him regretting his hesitation in taking revenge. Here he seems to 
seek, in the way in which a war-time state acts, a template and inspiration for his 
own actions: 
 
“Rightly to be great 
Is not to stir without great argument  
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw 
When honour’s at the stake.”588 
 
The double negation in ‘not to stir without great argument’ suggests that 
greatness lies not only in stirring in the absence of any great provocation, but in 
inventing cause for quarrel. To be great, in this account of things, is not only to be 
belligerent, spoiling for a fight, so to say, but also to be a fabricator, a liar. This 
‘greatness’ though, that prompts Hamlet’s speech, is specifically political and 
military and alerts us to how the State can be in thrall to its own self-idealisation: 
‘honour’s at stake’.  The tragedy of Hamlet plays out against the history of feuds 
between the royal house of Denmark, and the forces of Norway, and the audience is 
told that Hamlet was born the day his father defeated Norway. It is the violence, in 
fact the gratuitous violence of the state that Hamlet wants to channel into himself. As 
he says about the army expedition to Poland: “Exposing what is mortal and unsure/ 
To all that fortune, death and danger dare/ Even for an eggshell”.589 If Hamlet is 
troubled by his conscience then his conscience leads him into imitating the violence 
of the state.590  
In this dissertation, we have encountered a connection between the state and 
psyche not just in relation to the Saha case, but also in Freud’s discussion of the 
superego which, I have suggested, calls forth characteristics of the colonial state, 
notably its proclivity for violence sanctioned through moralism. The history of 
psychoanalysis in India has confronted us with this aspect of the colonial state, 
whether in the account of Claud Daly’s fantasies about the tribal other, or in relation 
to anthropology in the Nagahills, when those seeking to interpret and curb head-
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hunting become the agents of a frenzied violence, sanctioned in the interests of 
‘civilisation’. 
 
Making a link between Hamlet, the psyche, and national identity in her 
unparalleled account of the Balkans, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, Rebecca West 
wrote:  
 
after Hamlet and Othello and King Lear it could not be pretended that man 
was an animal who pursues pleasure and avoids pain. But of nations that 
pretence is still made. It is assumed that if a nation goes to war, it must have 
a reasonable motive, based on material calculations, and must desire to be 
victorious. It is not conceded that a nation should, like Hamlet, say that in its 
heart there was a fighting that would not let it sleep, or like Othello and King 
Lear, hatchet its universe to ruin.591 
 
Hamlet may turn to the logic of the State to spur his revenge, but he gives 
pause, questions, and second guesses himself. Speaking of the conscience “gives 
Hamlet some of his best lines”, writes Adam Phillips in an article titled “Against 
Self-Criticism”, suggesting that the strident and punishing voice of conscience 
requires “imaginative redescriptions” if the individual is to escape being tortured by 
it.592 It is the tragedy of nations, West seems to lament, that they are unable to 
present themselves as troubled, as riven by contradictions. They seem unable to 
perform the “imaginative redescriptions” that Phillips speaks of, adopting instead a 
voice that is all too certain, trumpeting its claim to superior knowledge. As our 
discussions of Wilfred Bion’s work have allowed us to note, a position of ‘knowing 
it all’ can be the best way to not find out. This account of psychoanalysis in India 
suggests that much of the knowledge that was produced about the ‘primitive’ or 
‘native’ other was in the service of avoiding transformative insight that could have 
led to an ethical relationship with a like but different subject. 
In Satyajit Ray’s 1970 film Aranyer Din Ratri (Days and Nights in the 
Forest), four men from Calcutta take a holiday in Palamau, Bihar, one of the 
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country’s forested regions. As they are driving in their car, one of them reads 
descriptions of the indigenous Santhals from Palamau, written by Sanjib Chandra 
Chatterji: “the women are dark-skinned, and all young. They are scantily dressed and 
naked from the waist up”.593 Being away from ‘civilisation’ and coming into contact 
with tribal women seems to make them act in ways that are unpredictable to 
themselves and contrary to expectations of men of their social class. The film brings 
its viewers close to the fantasies which the urban Indian middle class has about 
‘primitive’ tribals, especially tribal women. In an essay that sets out to study “the 
‘unconscious’ as an area of ascription”, the literary critic Kumkum Sangari tracks 
how, for the urban male writer both before and after decolonisation, “the woman and 
the tribal, separately as well as together, become the ‘unconscious’ of the nation, the 
essence of a collectivity.”594 Like Santhal women in Ray’s film, they signify 
something both dangerous and desirable for the urban man who encounters them. 
Ray’s film suggests a continuity between pre- and post-colonial India in how 
fantasies about primitivity circulated, and the role of anthropology in shaping these 
fantasies. 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to both track how ‘primitivity’ and 
‘civilisation’ were historically mobilized in colonial India in relation to 
psychoanalytic writing, and to find, through the work of psychoanalytic thinkers like 
Freud and Bion, an alternative approach to temporality and the category of the 
‘primitive’. Some months back as I was completing the thesis, I came across the 
papers of W.G. Archer and Mildred Archer, both remembered as distinguished 
commentators on Indian art. An Indian Civil Services Officer posted in the Bihar 
province, and later the Nagahills, from 1931-1948, W.G. Archer collected and 
recorded folklore, poetry and paintings in the region and was instrumental in 
organizing the India collections of the Victoria and Albert Museum. Mildred, his 
wife, curated the art held by the India Office library. Towards the end of their time in 
India, Archer was posted in the Naga Hills, a period described by Mildred Archer in 
her diary from that time. In future work, I hope to explore how this category of the 
‘primitive’ circulated in the Archers’ engagement with art and poetics, a project I see 
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as being in continuation with this dissertation, not least because the many notes on 
Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones in W.G. Archer’s papers indicate a sustained 
interest in psychoanalysis. Mildred Archer’s diary, discussed briefly in Chapter 4, is 
a fascinating account of a crucial period in Indian and Naga political life and one that 
I would like to return to in order to better understand how the Indian State came to 
carry out its oppressive policies in the erstwhile Nagahills. The writings of Verrier 
Elwin, missionary turned Gandhian turned anthropologist, and later Nehru’s advisor 
on ‘tribal’ affairs, are another key source I hope to draw upon when writing about the 
persistence of fantasies of primitivity in how the postcolonial State governs—a 
project begun in this dissertation, that remains ongoing. 
It is not only these attitudes to ‘primitivity’ that have persisted in the 
aftermath of India’s decolonisation. The postcolonial nation has taken on the 
repressive apparatuses of the colonial state, incorporating into itself the intelligence 
agencies and the torture chambers that formed the backdrop to the Saha case. This 
dissertation has drawn attention to colonial violence while offering an account of 
psychoanalysis as it was practiced in India in the early to mid-twentieth century.  Yet 
the violence did not stop with decolonisation. Partition, Jacqueline Rose suggests in 
Proust Among the Nations, is one of the global legacies of British colonialism.595 We 
could add that occupation is another. The aspiration to nationhood, expressed as part 
of anti-colonial struggles, was realised in India, but only by crushing attempts at self-
determination on the part of people who were forced to accede to the newly-created 
nation. Responses to the Saha case suggest that political upheaval is accompanied by 
fear of a loss of order, of collective insanity. The tragedy of political life, before and 
after colonisation, seems to be that the State-superego steps in with prohibitions and 
prescriptions for punitive action. 
In 2013, I was exploring archival material relating to the history of 
psychoanalysis in India, and trying to piece together the Saha case from old 
newspapers in the National Library, Calcutta. In the February of that year, in secret, 
without notice to his family, and with legal process still unfinished, Afzal Guru was 
executed by the state. In 2006, Guru, a resident of Kashmir, had been sentenced to 
death in the Indian Parliament Attack Case. In an extraordinary judgement, the 
Supreme Court said that Afzal had to be hanged to satisfy the “collective 
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conscience” of the nation.596 Guru’s remains were not returned to his family and the 
case is enmeshed in allegations of torture and the use of coercive tactics by India’s 
‘intelligence’ agencies. At the time, I had wanted to write about the Saha case and 
Guru’s killing together, as two courtroom trials that splice politics and the psyche in 
a way that lays bare certain fantasies operating in Indian nationalism. I soon realised 
that this work would be beyond the scope of this dissertation, but Afzal Guru’s 
killing and its justification by the invocation of the ‘collective conscience’ created 
questions that have accompanied and spurred my work for this dissertation. In an 
interview he gave in prison, Guru said that “Kashmir has everything that you don’t 
want to see in a civilized nation. They breathe torture. Inhale injustice”.597 We could 
not be closer to Freud’s insight, discussed in Chapter 1, that there is something 
obscene about the State: “the state has forbidden to the individual the practice of 
wrongdoing, not because it desires to abolish it, but because it desires to monopolise 
it like salt and tobacco.”598  
If these trials attest to the vital link between political and psychic life, 
working on this dissertation has taught me that neither the psyche nor the political 
are reducible to each other. If anything, a careless or hasty attempts read one in the 
terms of the other does injustice to the complexity of either, as the psychoanalytical 
articles written by Claud Daly and Owen A.R. Berkeley Hill, as well as Tarun 
Chandra Sinha and Girindrasekhar Bose all seem to suggest. An eloquent account of 
the difficulty, and urgency, of examining the links between the psyche and political 
conditions is to be found in Frantz Fanon’s classic essay “Colonial War and Mental 
Disorders”. In one of the brief case descriptions in the essay, Fanon describes 
treating a policeman who carried out interrogations and torture at the police 
headquarters, and who sought treatment because all through the night, in his own 
house, he would hear screams. The policeman himself drew a link between the 
torture and the screaming that he heard, and Fanon writes that in time, the 
policeman’s condition improved, and that he left Algeria for France. Yet knowing 
the political conditions of the time, can we call this alleviation of suffering a cure? 
Claud Daly and Berkeley Hill’s writings suggests that their conflicted attempt to 
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reconcile colonialism and a psychoanalytic consideration of the self also created its 
own forms of suffering. It is one of the sobering conclusions of the history of 
psychoanalysis in India that psychic distress does not in itself lead to insight, an 
ethical relationship with an other, or a change in political position. As Berkeley 
Hill’s war-time letters suggest, suffering could be seen as a flaw, as a threat to a 
cherished self-image.  
Most people involved with psychoanalysis in India, in the period that I write 
of, were men, and with the notable exception of the writers Temsula Ao and 
Mahasweta Devi, women have occupied a marginal, shadowy place in the writing 
that I have discussed. Questions of gender and sexuality have nevertheless been 
critical in interpreting this material, though in the course of writing this dissertation I 
have found myself speculating what the history of psychoanalysis in India would 
have looked like had there been more women involved. The figure of Mother India , 
discussed in the final chapter in this dissertation, alerts us to how an icon of 
femininity can serve to veil the disenfranchisement of women (this is not to suggest 
that women themselves are not capable of identifying with forms of idealised 
nationalist femininity). However, we find that in the postcolonial nation, even 
Mother India’s femininity becomes something to be disavowed.599 In the letter 
quoted in the epigraph, Yezdi Gundevia, then Foreign Secretary of India, wrote to 
William Archer lamenting India’s ‘femininity’. In an historically inaccurate 
attribution of Mother India to Gandhi and Tagore, Gundevia alleges that this 
feminine presence has held India back: “There is a saying attributed to me in Delhi, 
which goes, somewhat, thus: If Mahatma Gandhi (or was it Rabindranath Tagore) 
had not taught us to talk about Mother India (pendulous bosoms and all), but had 
made us think in terms of Father India, with a tight LANGOTE, we might have gone 
further and, what is more, somewhat faster.”600 A more masculine national identity, 
signified by the ‘langote’ a kind of loincloth worn by wrestlers in North India, is 
what India needs. 
In 2014, Narendra Modi was elected the Prime Minister of India, in an 
election campaign that frequently referred to his chappan inch ki chaati (56 inch 
chest). The years following the election have seen a chauvinist, masculinist Hindu 
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nationalism overlaid onto the piety surrounding Mother India and the discourse of 
honour and propriety that she sets in motion. The lynchings of Muslims and Dalits 
over the past years, the imprisonment and political murders of dissidents (while I 
was writing this, news came that journalist Gauri Lankesh, a committed critic of the 
right-wing, was shot at point blank range by unidentified men)—Modi’s government 
has lived up to its promises. At times like these, a complex, contradictory account of 
the past, and forms of thinking that help us accommodate ambivalence, such as 
literature and psychoanalysis, offer possibilities of rethinking exclusionary and 
belligerent forms of group identity. Even if, in this attempt, what comes to mind is 
the allusion made by Freud in his correspondence with Einstein on ways of 
preventing war, to an image of “mills that grind so slowly that people may starve 




                                                





Shakchi, Killer and Artist 
Story written by J.P. Mills 
 
William Archer Papers, MSS Eur F236/230, IORPP 
 
  
Yimlong felt happy that evening as he sat by the fire in his house and sipped a 
bamboo cup of warm rice beer. He had found a tiger’s kill in the morning that was 
five days old and stank to heaven, but there had been more than enough fairly firm 
meat on it to provide a tasty supper, with plenty of chillies added to bring out the 
flavour. It was a pity his wife would not be able to share it with him, but she was 
pregnant, and immemorial Naga custom forbids pregnant women to eat meat from 
kills. She had already borne him a daughter who would bring him a good price in 
cattle when the time came for her to marry, and this time she might give him a son to 
carry on the line and to be as great a headhunter as his forefathers. Anyhow the child 
ought to be a strong one, for he was a noted warrior and his wife was not one of 
those weakly women who sat idly about for a whole day before they were brought to 
bed. She had done a full days [sic] work that day and in the evening had carried a 
load of rice as heavy as a good-sized pig from the fields in the valley to the village 
on the hilltop. 
True she was not as lucky as some women he had known, who had gone down to 
work as usual in in [sic] the morning and in the evening had climbed the long ascent 
with a newborn baby in their baskets. A child born in the fields in this way always 
had good crops and became wealthy later in life. But this son of his, if son it should 
turn out to be, even if poor, would surely be a mighty raider, for only three months 
before Yimlong had killed a man of Pongling, the village further along the ridge with 
which they had been at war as far back as memory went, and the virtue of that deed 
would enter into the child. When, therefore, late that night a son was born to him and 
he spoke to the infant the traditional words “Thou art a man. Be brave and kill” as he 
placed a little model spear in the tiny hands he knew that his wish would be fulfilled. 
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Thus did Shakchi begin a life in which he was long to seek adventure [sic?] rather 
than safe ease. Only now that middle age has come to him does he leave the fighting 
to others. 
 For two years the child lived an uneventful life with his parents in his home 
at Hukching on a spur of the great range that divides Assam from Burma. Strange-
looking Sahibs, with skins so pale that it seemed as if the sun had never ripened their 
bodies, had imposed peace on the tribes to the East and West, but between the 
frontiers there there [sic] was ample territory where men could still win renown by 
bringing in the human heads that make crops and cattle to flourish. Shakchi, of 
course, knew nothing of all this. From time to time he saw raiders welcomed as they 
returned with their gory trophies, or he would go with his father into the great 
guardhouses that no women was [sic] allowed to enter, and gaze at the rows of 
grinning skulls. But he was too young to understand it all, and war had not yet come 
near him. In the village he was safe enough behind a dense hedge of cane and a 
double bamboo palisading, and he never left it except under guard. Every morning 
he rode on his mother’s hip as she joined the long procession to the fields. First went 
picked scouts, with shields on their left arms and spears poised, peering and 
watching for a twisted leaf which would betray an ambush. Then came the women, 
naked but for little skirts that hardly reached halfway down to their thighs and laden 
with baskets and babies. There was a sprinkling of armed men among them and a 
strong guard brought up the rear. Once down at the fields the families scattered to 
their respective plots, and it was then that the danger was greatest. Sentries were 
posted, but they could not watch every hollow of the broken ground and every yard 
of the encircling jungle. There were little gullies along which an enemy might creep 
unseen, and it was from one of these that tragedy first came into Shakchi’s life. He 
was too small to walk down to the fields and back, and he was getting very heavy to 
carry. So his parents got more and more into the habit of leaving him at home with 
his grandmother, who was his slave and never happier than when she was playing 
with him. One day the wrinkled old dame was sitting weaving and talking to her 
cronies while the boy ran about in the almost deserted village, when there was a 
sudden shout from a sentry and two panting messengers brought news of disaster. 
“Yimlong is dead. Men of Pongling have killed him” was all they could gasp out at 




 Yimlong’s plot was on the edge of the block of shifting cultivation the 
villagers were doing that year and was bounded on one side by a gully of which the 
sides, too steep and rocky for crops, had been left uncleared. His daughter was big 
enough now to lend a useful hand to her parents and all three were bending over their 
weeding in in [sic] a fold of the ground that hid them from the workers in 
neighbouring plots when the pad of running feet from the direction of the gully 
caused them to look quickly round. Six men of Pongling were charging towards 
them, and checked [sic?] to throw their spears as their victims stood for an instant. 
Yimlong was brought down by a spear in his knee, and his wife turned and stumbled 
feebly away, pulling at a shaft which transfixed her stomach, while the little girl, 
untouched, ran shrieking after her mother. Yimlong, unable to rise to his feet, sat up 
in an instant and drew his “dao”. Two men of Pongling raced for the honour of 
taking his head. One, an impetuous youth, came a foot too near before he struck. Up 
swung the heavy blade of the sitting cripple and sheered through his ribs, and 
Yimlong had killed his last man before the other attacker clove him from left 
shoulder to right breast. He died too soon to see his wife and daughter cut down. It 
was all over in a moment and the three headless bodies and a dead raider marked the 
scene of tragedy. The shrieks had brought armed men tearing in from all directions, 
but the raiders had a good start and the pursuers returned tired and angry. There was 
nothing to be done but to carry the three bodies up to the village and lay them on the 
corpse-platforms with scant ceremony, since with their heads the men of Pongling 
had borne their souls away into exile. The head, hands and feet of the dead raider 
were cut off and the trunk thrown into the jungle to rot, but these trophies made 
small amends for the death of a noted warrior and his family. 
 Shakchi immediately went to live with his father’s brother, whom he had 
always addressed as “little father”. From childish play he passed to mimic war 
games, hurling his reed spear at the opposing side and learning to fend off missiles 
with his little shield. Sometimes boys were hurt or even killed, at this sport, but no 
one minded much as long as the rising generation grew up hard and manly. When he 
was about eight he ceased to sleep in his uncle’s house and spend the nights and 
much of the days in the guard house of his clan, fagging for the older boys and 
listening to the talk of the men. He knew from childhood that he must never have 
anything to do with girls of his own clan, but it was not many years before he learnt 
to steal off, when all was dark and still, to the sleeping houses where girls of other 
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clans congregated and a whispered welcome awaited him, slipping back to his own 
guard-house before dawn. He could only remember his parents dimly and his 
father’s name was rarely mentioned, since he had died by an enemy’s hand. But he 
nursed an undying longing for vengeance and when he was a strapping youth chance 
brought him his opportunity and a miraculous escape from death. 
 A truce had just been patched up between Hukching and Pongling. Their 
lands adjoined and every few years the rotation of shifting cultivation compelled 
them to clear and sow blocks near their common boundary. “You cannot eat heads” 
is a common Naga saying, and crops had to be grown even if it meant a curtailment 
of the pleasant sport of headhunting. When therefore the two villages cultivated 
adjacent blocks war had to cease between them to enable them [to] sow and reap in 
reasonable safety. Thus it was this year. Envoys carrying green boughs had gone to 
and fro between Hukching and Pongling to call the old men to a meeting on the 
boundary. There, after the shouting, boasting and abuse that public opinion 
demanded, a truce till after harvest had been arranged. It was understood however 
that members of one village would not visit the other, thought they were only six 
miles apart. That would have been asking for trouble. 
 One day Shakchi was restless. At night he had held Aminla’s firm young 
body in his arms and asked her if she would be his always, and she had said he could 
be her lover, but never her husband till he had avenged his father and proved himself 
a man. He was bound by the truce, but in the morning, with some vague idea of 
reconnoitring the ground, he moodily, and without telling anyone, set out alone 
along the ridge to Pongling armed only with his “dao”, his inseparable companion. 
Before the gate of the village came in sight he found the usual advance sentry on a 
platform on a platform in a tree. Shakchi called cheerfully up to him to come down 
and talk, and the sentry did the first of several foolish things – he came down. The 
second foolish thing he did was to talk too much. Since the two villages were 
constantly at war men in one might know men in the other by name and repute, but 
very rarely by sight. The sentry knew the stranger must be a Hukching man, and by 
an incredible chance asked him if he knew a youth called Shakchi! Shakchi was on 
his guard at once but not a muscle of his face showed it and with a smile he said he 
did slightly and that he was a useless weakling. The sentry thereupon laughed and 
said he had only asked because his father had happened to kill Shakchi’s father. 
Shakchi instantly determined to kill him, truce or no truce, but he showed that 
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coolness which was so often to stand him in good stead. He had to take the sentry at 
a disadvantage. At the moment the odds were against Shakchi, for while both men 
carried their long “daos” sheathed on their backs so that the handles protruded over 
their right shoulders ready to be instantly drawn, the sentry had a spear in his hand. 
Shakchi therefore led him along the path talking. Walking on the right he casually 
drew his “dao” and began flicking at the tall grass stems. When he saw that the 
sentry suspected nothing Shakchi, too close to him for him to use his spear, swung 
suddenly to the left and aimed a terrific blow at his neck. By evil chance the heavy 
blade flew out of the haft and sailed into jungle. As quick as thought the sentry’s 
hand went up to draw his “dao”, but Shakchi, unarmed, leapt on him, bore him to the 
ground, wrenched the half-drawn “dao” from his hand and killed him with it. One 
more stroke and Shakchi picked up his first head and raced for home. 
 He had no qualms about the welcome he would get, for he know that 
satisfaction at the death of a warrior from hated Pongling would far outweigh any 
such detail as the breach of a truce. After all a head was a head, and the men of 
Pongling, if it had been they who had broken the truce, would have been the first to 
maintain that a head got by treachery was better than none at all. And had not his 
provocation been extreme? No man, in Naga opinion, could have been expected to 
spare in any circumstances what-ever the son of the man who had killed his father. 
There was therefore unmixed triumph in his voice as, safe from pursuit, he breasted 
the last slope from the saddle, chanting the victor’s song that brought people running 
to the gate. He did not enter the village at once; that would have been a gross breach 
of custom. Instead sat with his trophy on the ground beside him while he told his 
story and waited for messengers to bring workers from the fields. 
 Among the first to arrive was his aunt, carrying a meal of rice and meat on a 
leaf, and a bamboo cup of rice beer. Having appeased the malignant ghost of his 
victim by tossing aside for it a little of the food and spilling a few drops of beer on 
the ground Shakchi ate and drank with unwashed hands. He had, of course, heard the 
story that somewhere in the unknown mountains to the east there was a village of 
men who ate human flesh, but he would have denied with surprised disgust and 
indignation that this ceremonial meal with blood stained hands was itself a last relic 
of forgotten cannibalism. Yet it was so. 
 By the time he had finished the village had assembled in full force to 
welcome him, and the procession started. It was the proudest moment of his life. 
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First went the oldest warrior of the village, clutching the head in his skinny hand and 
hobbling along with the aid of his spear. Then came Shakchi, blood stained “dao” on 
shoulder, and behind him the men of the village, chanting and twirling their spears. 
Along the single plank over the deep ditch they went and through the gate. Within 
the women, all in their best, lined the path. Among them was Aminla with flowers in 
her ears and her young breasts almost hidden by strings of beads, many of them 
borrowed from friends eager to deck her out to greet her acknowledged lover. One 
glance at her face as he took her proffered drink and Shakchi knew he had won her. 
But he had no time then for thoughts of love; there were pressing ceremonies afoot. 
Before the guard-house at the end of the long street stood a monolith with a 
recumbent slab in front of it. On this slab the old man laid the head, where hundreds 
had been laid before. Gently he set it down, for it was to be welcomed, not insulted. 
Then he placed flowers in the grey, bloodless ears, and food and drink between the 
sagging lips, and called on the captured soul to eat and be happy and summon its 
relations and friends to a like fate. Once or twice the men circled the stones singing, 
and then all dispersed to prepare for the feast and dance. 
 Shakchi slipped away on a mission of his own. His feat had gained him the 
right to put on the ornaments of a warrior. Most of these were only worn on special 
occasions and could wait till he had accumulated the rice wherewith to buy them. 
But he had longed for a pair of shell ear discs since boyhood, for those who had won 
them wore them always and to be without them marked a man as one who had never 
taken a head. Now the right was his and he went straight off to a friend’s house and 
borrowed a spare pair. His next visit was to an old man of his clan, who after a few 
words from Shakchi, put a think iron spike to heat in the glowing embers of his fire. 
By the time a cup of beer had been consumed the spike was ready and, holding each 
of Shakchi’s ears in turn, he pushed the iron through the sizzling flesh. Then he 
threaded short pieces of thick cord through the holes and hung the discs from them. 
Not a sign of pain did Shakchi show during this operation, nor all the long hours that 
he danced that night and the heavy discs sawed at the raw flesh. Round and round 
the dancers swung, with slow step and deep-chested chant, as they sang of the heroes 
of old and of Shakchi, the hero of the day. Rice beer flowed and from time to time 
girls held lumps of salt to the dancers’ lips that they might nibble at them and 
stimulate their jaded thirst. But there was no orgy of drink and sex. Old men dropped 
out and went to bed as the Eastern sky began to lighten, and the young men danced 
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on, wearily but soberly. They knew that Pongling, furious at their loss, would sent 
scouts to watch from the dark fringe of jungle outside the fence and bring back 
instant word if there were signs that an avenging raid at dawn would find a drunken 
and defenceless foe. But the scouts saw that the village was on the alert and did not 
wait to watch the rays of the rising sun strike the diminished ring of dancers croaking 
out a last song before they dispersed for breakfast and a rest. A few days later the old 
men of the village cleaned the skull and ornamented it with tasselled buffalo horns, 
bound on where the ears had been. It was then ready to hang up in the guard-house 
with the smoke blackened trophies of former raids. 
 Pongling thirsted for vengeance, but Hukching were thoroughly on the alert, 
and their thirst was unassuaged. That winter Shakchi collected timber, bamboos and 
thatch and built a new house for himself and Aminla, and married her. His care-free 
days were over. His uncle had provided cattle for the marriage price, but henceforth 
the young man had to support himself and his wife. And he was not content with a 
mere subsistence, for he was an artist in his unwashed finger tips, and loved beautiful 
things. Having won the right to wear a warrior’s ornaments he could not rest till he 
had bought them, and this meant he had to grow enough rice and millet to provide a 
surplus wherewith to barter. This compelled him to work steadily and hard, and for 
the next year or two only the passion that his young wife returned prevented him 
from finding life monotonous, though for a civilized man, to whom war is something 
abnormal, the constant raids and counter-raids would have provided more than 
enough excitement. Always there was danger, for, if they were not to starve, work in 
the fields, far from the protection of the village defences, had to go on, however 
great the hostile pressure. The jungle on the blocks [sic?], cut in the winter and left to 
dry, was fired in the spring. The day of burning always provided sport and 
amusement. From the new, “clean” spark which the village priest kindled by friction 
the fire spread till a line of flame swept roaring up the hillside, and dense smoke 
gathered in the sky to form the monsoon clouds, as the villagers thought. Jungle fowl 
flew ahead cackling, and terrified deer and pig bolted for safety only to find their 
retreat cut off by waiting spearmen. The skill with which allowance was made for 
the slow-moving missiles was extraordinary, and a galloping deer that tried to pass a 
spearman twenty yards away was doomed. After the burning the ground had to be 
cleared of charred logs, and men and women were black with ash from head to foot 
for days, - and for nights too, for when all water has to be laboriously carried up in 
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hollow bamboos from a spring below the village there is none to spare for baths. 
Then came the sowing and weeks of weeding in the streaming rain of the monsoon, 
and at last the harvest on which their very lives depended. 
 One head was not enough for Shakchi. He had won a warrior’s ornaments, 
but he yearned to see his chest decorated with a warrior’s tattoo. It would have been 
unseemly to have had this done after killing only one enemy. Etiquette laid down 
that he must take three or four heads and thereby prove himself a fighter of 
outstanding merit before he could proceed to the supreme honours. Opportunities 
were not lacking, but it was a hard task. In a land where war is the rule and peace the 
exception wariness is highly developed, and watchful eyes note every movement in 
the jungle, every twisted leaf or blade of grass, and every track however faint. Time 
and time again raiders prowled near the paths Hukching used, in the hope of catching 
a man or woman unawares, and time and again the men of Hukching retaliated. But 
nearly always the guards were on the alert and it was many months before Shakchi 
could achieve his object. 
 When he had he faced an ordeal of pain. The tattooer and his assistants took 
him to a quiet place outside the village, where his groans, if any, were forced from 
him, could not be heard. There he lay down and the tattooer drew with soot on the 
pale brown skin of his chest and stomach two thick lines curving up from his navel 
over his two breasts, where they ended in broad spirals. Then, taking a little bundle 
of thorns and a small wooden hammer, he tapped out the pattern with hundreds of 
punctures and literally engraved it on the living flesh, while his assistants held the 
patient’s quivering limbs and wiped away the blood from time to time when it 
flowed so fast as to hinder the operator. On the chest the pain was bearable, but the 
tap-tap of the thorns into the delicate nerves of the stomach was agony almost past 
endurance. Beads of sweat stood on Shakchi’s face, but he never uttered a moan. At 
last the tapping was over, a mixture of soot and sap was rubbed into the punctures, 
and he staggered to his house. 
 Some of Shakchi’s raids had been distant ones, through hostile country that 
could only be crossed at night, to villages made careless by the belief that the allies 
who surrounded them were a sufficient barrier against attack. But, ever a man of 
foresight, he was careful not to stir up hostility with the tribes lying between his 
home and the British border. This was for two reasons. Firstly he realised, from what 
he had heard, that raids near the frontier were apt to lead to trouble, and to very 
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serious trouble indeed if a wandering British subject, impossible to tell on sight from 
an independent Naga, happened to be killed by mistake. Secondly he had always 
wanted to see a white man, and so he took care to keep his road open to do so. He 
was proud, and had always meant to meet the Sahib as an equal, and this he felt he 
could do now that his tattoo and finery proclaimed his prowess to the world. One 
day, therefore, with half a dozen companions he walked into camp when the officer 
in charge was touring along that section of the frontier. The contrast with the drab 
figure in khaki shirt and shorts was striking enough, and Shakchi’s appearance is 
worth a brief description, for there is assuredly no finer dress in India than that of a 
Naga warrior. On his head was a tall helmet of the finest plaited scarlet cane, topped 
by an upstanding crest of scarlet goat’s hair. His ears were decorated with the prized 
shell discs he had worn so uncomfortably that day he took his first head, and round 
his neck was a collar of huge boar’s tushes. His naked torso showed every rippling 
muscle, and round a waist that a dandy would have envied he wore a broad belt of 
cowries, from which hung his only garment, a little red and dark blue apron 
embroidered with the figure of a man in cowries. On his legs were greaves and on 
his wrists gauntlets of canework like that of the helmet, and polished sections of 
elephant tusk ornamented his upper arms. His spear was in his hand and his trusty 
“dao” sheathed on his back. His face was grave as he offered the Sahib a drink of 
rice beer, but the smile with which it was received brought an answering smile of 
great charm. On that day began a friendship which has never been broken, rare 
though meetings have needs been. 
 Curiously enough this friendship once almost cost Shakchi his life, and only 
a miracle averted a horrible tragedy. It befell as follows. The Sahib was touring 
across the frontier with an escort, and Shakchi, hearing of this, set out to meet him. 
But the journey was a long one and a moonless night had fallen by the time he 
reached the village near which the camp had been pitched. The perimeter had long 
been closed and sentries posted at the gate. Shakchi was impatient to see his friend 
and would not wait till morning. Having ascertained, therefore, in the village the 
exact whereabouts of the camp he walked boldly towards one of the gates, carrying a 
live chicken as a present. The sentry, hearing footsteps and seeing a dim figure, 
called out “Halt! Who goes there?”, giving his challenge in English as he had been 
taught to do. The visitor, knowing nothing of military ways and discipline, thought 
the sentry was calling to some friend in the camp in an unknown tongue and, taking 
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no notice at all, walked straight on. Up went the sentry rifle, and his finger was on 
the trigger to fire at point blank range when Shakchi’s chicken squawked. That 
squawk saved his life. The sentry guessed the stranger must be someone with a 
present, and therefore presumably friendly, and held his fire till Shakchi came right 
up to the gate and was recognised, smiling and sublimely ignorant of how near death 
he had been. 
 From the first the white man saw in his friend a man of great personality – 
brave, treacherous to his enemies but true to his friends, intelligent, artistic, and 
possessed to a very definite mind of his own. He has never been merely 
conventional. True he has followed custom in seeking renown in war, but that was 
because the danger and excitement appealed to him. He has always differed from 
most of his fellow Nagas in caring nothing for wealth. He is too artistic and 
dilettante for that. His fingers are never idle. The urge to create something seems to 
be always upon him, savage though he is according to our standards. He is one of 
those rare men who make a definite contribution to the artistic achievements of a 
tribe. His carvings, on which he spends so much time, are of the traditional tribal 
patterns with something new added. They are very fine, and some of the best are in 
England now. 
 Few Nagas are misers. Money is almost unknown to them and one cannot 
very well hoard grain, which will rot, or cattle, which are liable to die in an epidemic 
or be killed by tigers. Most of Shakchi’s compatriots slaved all their lives 
accumulating rice and cattle, not to keep, but to spend on the great Feasts of Merit 
which brought them social eminence. Every tribe has its fixed series and a man gains 
in distinction as he rises from grade to grade. The first is a homely affair. A pig is 
killed and a few households are entertained. Then come bigger feasts, in which cattle 
have to be slaughtered in every increasing numbers and more and more vats of rice 
beer are emptied, till the supreme feast at which bison are the victims and the whole 
village is entertained. Two or three of these great feasts were given every winter and 
Shakchi thoroughly enjoyed them. He could not see why he should toil for years to 
give them when there were other people ready to oblige; his prowess in war and his 
shrewdness gave him all the position in the village he wanted. The entertainments 
lasted for days and many animals had to be slaughtered for meat, but the culmination 
was the ceremonial killing of a bull bison without blemish. Reluctant though the 
British are to interfere with ancient customs they have felt compelled to check the 
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awful cruelty of these sacrifices and enforce more humane methods of killing 
wherever their rule extends. Shakchi’s village was, however, free from all control 
and he himself never a gave a thought to the cruelty, seeing only a custom that had 
come down from time immemorial. There stood the splendid, placid beast, tethered 
to a post in front of the house of the giver of the feast, watching the ring of dancers 
with bewildered eyes. Suddenly, when the moment came, someone would unloose it 
and the young men would wrestle with it till it was mad with terror. One or two 
might be injured, but even its enormous strength would be unavailing against 
numbers and at last it would be thrown. Instantly the tendons of its hind legs were 
slashed so that it could never rise again and while it was still alive the men hacked 
lumps of flesh from it haunches and, disembowelling it, fought for its entrails. Soon 
the blood covered, shrieking maniacs were driven off and the dance went on till 
morning. 
 It was all horrible, but it was a reaction against the monotony of village life, 
though no one was conscious of that monotony. The round of feasts and ceremonies 
provided all the diversion Shakchi and other men of his age wanted. He continues to 
act in defence of his village when required, but he left the raiding to younger men. 
His short-lived youth was over and his hot blood was beginning to cool. He had 
taken all the heads he wanted, and work in the fields all day and a little carving by 
the fire in the evening gave him enough to so. Yet fate had one more narrow escape 
in store for him. It came of a plan he never relished. Sowa, a great village of five 
hundred houses or more, had becomes an intolerable nuisance. Its braves raided far 
and wide with impunity and their boasts of the size and strength of their village came 
filtering through and were a constant irritant. To put an end to the trouble there was 
formed that very rare thing, a Naga confederacy. Over a wide area villages ordinarily 
at war sent messages of peace to one another, and a meeting of delegates was held to 
decide on the measures to be taken to teach Sowa a lesson it would never forget. It 
was not just a matter of sending out an invincible host to overwhelm it by sheer 
weight of numbers in a surprise attack. There was a serious obstacle in the way of 
any such straightforward plan as that. Less than a mile from Sowa on the side 
towards its enemies and on the ridge along which an attacking force would have to 
come lay a small village called Ukha, ostensibly friendly to Sowa and certainly 
afraid of its big neighbour. The problem before the delegates was how to deal with 
Ukha. One method would have been to surround it and wipe it out. But the feeling of 
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the meeting was against this. Not that anyone pitied the small village; rather the 
temptation of easy heads was a sore one. But it was realized that a single fugitive 
would be enough to give alarm to Sowa, even if they did not hear the shouting and 
cries, and so spoil the whole plan, for no force armed with spears and “daos” could 
hope to breach the palisade of the big village if its defenders were on the alert. The 
only alternative was to win Ukha over to the confederacy, and this it was decided to 
attempt, great though the rise of treachery was. Shakchi and many others disliked 
this plan, but could suggest no other way out of the difficulty. 
 A go-between from a neutral village having made sure that messengers 
would be given safe conduct, a small party slipped through the gate of Ukha after 
dusk one evening. Long was the whispered talk they had in the chief’s house, 
squatting with their “daos” untrustingly ready on the floor by their right hands. But 
there was no sudden attack and the message they took back was that Ukha would 
side with them against the bullies. It was agreed that the attackers should reach the 
village before dawn on the tenth morning from then, and be given food and rest 
before they made their final rush. One the appointed day a strong party of picked 
men set out, and among them was Shakchi. He was full of foreboding, but his 
reputation as a warrior was a thing he really valued and he could not hang back. 
Anyhow there was one house in Ukha where he would be safe,  for his family and 
the owners’ were bound by ties of ancestral friendship which made treachery 
impossible. Cold and soaked with dew the attackers crept into the village when the 
sky over Burma was only tinged with the glorious primrose light that heralds the 
dawn. Shakchi went straight to his friend’s house. His friend seemed to be strung up 
and ill-at-ease, but Shakchi thought it was only the excitement natural at such a 
moment. He sat on the stool while the embers on the hearth were blown into a flame, 
and watched his host bring a tall bamboo cup from the inner room and offer it to 
him. It seemed strangely light when he took it, and when he lifted it to his lips it was 
empty! Quicker than thought he threw it down, picked up his shield and spear, and 
dashed to the door, drawing his “dao” as he did so. The empty cup was a warning he 
understood. Ukha, terrified of the vengeance of their powerful neighbours, had 
broken their word and warned them of the coming attack. Even now the village 
might be surrounded and the expedition in a trap. Shakchi’s host had done his best; 
he had tried to warn his friend without revealing the plans of his own village. The 
moment Shakchi reached the open he knew that his worst fears were realized and the 
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situation desperate. A spear rattled on his shield as he ran, and he cleared in his stride 
a man of his own village lying coughing out his life with a blade in his throat. A 
Sowa warrior slashed at him in the half light, but he swerved and felled his opponent 
with a sweeping backhander. There was no time to take his head. The only chance of 
escape lay in instant flight. The gates, he knew, would be full of enemies streaming 
in. So he dashed to the side of the village where there was no fence and the cliff fell 
sheer. There he leapt, and his usual luck was with him. A tree growing out from the 
cliff broke his fall and he climbed along it to safety. Cautiously he worked his way 
back to the path along which the expedition had come, and there he met more 
stragglers. The Sowa men were busy with the dead and wounded and the retreat was 
unharassed. The losses were less than might have been expected, for the bad light ---
ed [page torn] the desperate men as they climbed or broke down the palisade and 
charged through the encircling enemy. But it was a crestfallen party that dispersed to 
their villages and Shakchi yearned for the warpath less than ever. He is a middle 
aged man now, as Nagas go, and has done with raiding. He is happier sitting over his 
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